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S'. ABSTRACT 
JOHN BERNARD INGHAM: THE ROLE OF BRITISH 
ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1848-1854. 
NORTH AMERICA IN 
This study analyses the impact on mid-nineteenth-century 
Anglo-American relations of British North America. It argues that 
successive British governments worked to retain the 
strategically-important colonies, despite the often exaggerated 
influence of Little Englandism. It also stresses the overwhelming 
loyalty of the colonists, despite aberrations like Canada's 1849 
Annexation Crisis. 
It points to two annexation crises - in 1848 and 1849. During 
the former, Anglo-American relations suffered as the colonists braced 
themselves for a popular American invasion. In the 1849 cr1s1s, 
unknown to the British, the American government briefly considered 
annexing Canada. When this opportunity vanished, Washington 
willingly prolonged the crisis in order to weaken Britain during 
negotiations over Central America. 
The Fishery Dispute of 1852-1854 found Britain practising 
pressure politics. London used years of tension between American and 
colonial fishermen as a pretext for· a show of naval strength off 
North America during negotiations with the United States over Cuba 
and Central America. 
The Fishery Dispute also succeeded in forcing the Americans to 
take Reciprocity seriously. This study rejects traditional 
interpretations which claim that Lord Elgin's success in 1854 stemmed 
from his own brilliance and his ability to tell America's feuding 
sections different stories about the likely effect of Reciprocity. 
Instead it argues that Elgin succeeded in 1854 because of the work 
over several years by other diplomats. He also succeeded in 1854 
because of a mutual desire for transatlantic calm due to America's 
domestic problems and Britain's involvement in the Crimean War. 
Though Elgin's ability oiled the wheels of success, he was also 
fortunate to arrive just as the ruling party in Washington put down 
its guard and celebrated the Kansas-Nebraska Compromise. 
The ratification of Reciprocity in British North America 
confirms that, despite granting self-government to the three main 
colonies, Britain put wider imperial interests before purely colonial 
interests. 
The thesis concludes that British North America, though 
nominally powerless and dependent on Britain, had a significant role 
in Anglo-American relations. The colonies pressured London and 
Washington by various tactics, while Mother Country and territorially 
rapacious republic frequently used the colonies as a weapon in their 
dealings with each other. This produced a diplomatic North Atlantic 
Triangle with each polity cynically trying to use the other two for 
its own ends. 
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INTRODUO'ION 
PAWNS IN A GAME 
In the middle of the nineteenth century July 4th was, as now, 
-
a day of celebration in the United States. From New Orleans to 
Maine, Americans launched into an orgy of patriotism as they 
remembered their declaration of independence from Great Britain. 
But at Niagara and Detroit, and on the borders of Maine and 
vermont, the festivities did not ring true. The flag waving and 
fireworks were genuine; but they took place within sight of 
Redcoats. Though an independent, republican nation, the United 
States had not expelled her old colonial master from the New World. 
By retaining British North America, Britain retained her place as a 
North American power. Inevitably, therefore, British North America 
had a role in Anglo-American relations. 
Nor was this role merely passive, arising solely from the 
existence of British colonies along the northern border of the 
United States. The colonies played a positive role themselves in 
shaping relations between Mother Country and rebellious offspring, 
sometimes by becoming rebellious themselves. Equally, both Britain 
and the United States cynically used the colonies as pawns in their 
own wider diplomatic games. Indeed, Britain's very retention of 
the colonies reflected the diplomatic and strategic value she 
placed on them. 
Underlying this diplomatic activity was a strong sense of 
political uncertainty. British North America was particularly 
unstable between 1848 and 1854. Made up of the scattered colonies 
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of Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island 
and Canada - nowadays Ontario and Quebec - British North America 
was rocked in these years by fundamental changes 1n her 
relationship with Britain. For decades the five squabbling. 
colonies had lived under an economic, administrative and military 
umbrella held aloft by London. They enjoyed a protected imperial 
market, their costs of government and defence were borne by 
Britain, and their defence was the responsibility of the British 
Army and the Royal Navy. Politically immature and with fledgling 
economies, the colonies had little power, but they also had little 
responsibility. By the middle of the nineteenth century, all this 
was changing. Britain first dismantled her closed commercial 
empire by opting for free trade, normally symbolised by the 1846 
Repeal of the corn Laws. Equally profound was the decision of the 
British government to introduce responsible self-government to 
Canada, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. Though Britain retained 
responsibility for defence and foreign policy, the colonies now had 
to govern themselves. Even the role of each colony's Governor or 
Lieutenant Governor changed. In the past the Queen's 
representative had tended to favour one faction which, with his 
support, ignored democratic opinion. Now, he acted more like a 
constitutional monarch, formally approving whatever legislation the 
colonial parliament passed, even at the risk, in Canada, of 
appearing to be a Francophile. 
These controversial developments reflected changing attitudes 
towards the Empire in Britain. In Parliament the twin influences 
of free trade and 'The Economisers' led many to question the wisdom 
of spending large sums to retain uneconomic colonies which most 
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assumed would soon become independent. To judge by some of the 
parliamentary speeches reprinted in Canada, the ties that bound 
Britain to British North America were being loosened daily. At the 
same time, the ties between the Provinces and the United States 
were growing, despite the former's hostility to republicanism. and 
the latter's ignorance about the Colonies. Further, the shock 
caused by ·the introduction 
subsequent recession gave rise 
of imperial free 
to pressure from 
trade and the 
within British 
North America for even closer transcontinental links. Forced out 
of one protected., .. market, many colonists naturally looked for 
another - and turned immediately to the huge market on their 
doorstep, in the United States. This led to agitation for 
Reciprocity - or reciprocal free trade in agricultural products 
with the United States. Others, possibly also as a result of 
political disappointment under responsible self government, took a 
more drastic step, forming the Annexation movement and petitioning 
for their Province or the whole of British North America to be 
annexed peacefully by the United States. But if British North 
America was edging ever closer to either economic or political 
union with the United States, it was also moving in another 
direction. The effort to secure Reciprocity -widely seen as the 
only antidote to Annexation - paved the way for Confederation of 
the Provinces in 1867 by forcing the rival colonies into an 
unprecedented level of cooperation. All through this period, then, 
there was no certainty as to where the political destiny of British 
North America lay - within the Empire, as a series of independent 
colonies, as a new united nation or as a part of the United States. 
In the desperate days of 1849, when the colonial Annexation 
3 
Movement was at its peak, union with the United States looked the 
safest bet. For the past few decades, the United States had been 
expanding rapidly across the continent. Before the 1840s, the 
republic had acquired new territory peacefully, through diplomatic 
agreements like the Louisiana Purchase. But in the 1840s, the 
United States showed a steelier determination, largely because it 
found in Mexico an enemy it thought it could beat comfortably. 
Having first annexed Texas, the White House launched in 1846 into a 
war with Mexico and turned victory two years later into one of the 
biggest land acquisitions of the century. With its southern 
neighbour subdued and the race to the Pacific Coast won, the 
obvious next step for the increasingly confident republic wa~ to 
turn ever northwards. There, strung out along the American border, 
remote and 
possessions. 
vulnerable, lay Britain's last North American 
That many Americans hoped eventually to expel Britain from the 
New World and to see British North America as the northern 
constellation of the Stars and Stripes is not in doubt; less 
certain is whether this vague desire affected the actions of 
American governments. Though the territorial and economic 
expansion of the United States gave it an outward air of robust 
health, the republic was decaying from within. In this period, the 
agitation over the slavery issue repeatedly reached fever pitch and 
then subsided; at no point did the warring politicians reach a 
lasting solution, possibly because none was available. As a 
result, the future of the United States was also in doubt, with 
contemporaries predicting the 
South. This made defining the 
ultimate separation of 




particularly critical: though continued growth could bring 
political and economic gain, it could equally spell political and 
economic ruin. As British North America was a vast area of free 
soil, with a strongly abolitionist population, advocates of its 
admission to the Union knew they were playing with fire. 
These years, then, produced a cocktail of emotions, which 
could easily have been fatal for any one of the parties involved. 
The United States was torn between further expansion and the 
problems caused by its latest acquisitions; the British were torn 
between keeping the colonies and facing up to the uncertain 
consequences of losing them; and the politically inexperienced 
colonists were trying to establish new relationships with Britain 
and the United States in the wake of losing their privileged 
economic and political positions in the Empire. This situation 
begs several questions. Were the colonies in any danger from the 
American government or 
take their efforts to 
its citizens? How far 
build new links with 
did the colonists 
the republic? What 
value, if any, did Britain place on her North American colonies, 
and how did she respond to American-inspired threats against them? 
Did these problems have a direct influence on Anglo-American 
relations and what roles did the colonies play in transatlantic 
diplomacy? 
Historians, though, have consistently failed to answer these 
questions. In the standard historical works of this period, 
British North America is largely forgotten. Indeed, a newcomer to 
world geography could be forgiven if, after leafing through these 
books, he assumed that British North America had never existed. In 
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most texts, the British colonies rate dismissive treatment; and 1n 
those works on transatlantic diplomacy which refer at greater 
length to British North America, there is no attempt to establish 
what its actual role was. There have been books on Anglo-American 
Relations, American Foreign Policy in canadian Relations, 
Canadian-American Relations, The American Problem in British 
Diplomacy and even on Britain and the Balance of Power in North 
America. All cover their subjects thoroughly, and all touch on the 
influence of British North America; but all minimise the 
significance of the colonies in Anglo-American relations and miss 
key developments which point to the need for a review. 
Most of the studies are old - twenty years and more. This in 
itself does not justify revision; but their content does. The 
seminal study is Donald C Masters' work, The Reciprocity Treaty of 
18541 which is invaluable in its detailed account of the eight-year 
pursuit of greater economic cooperation in North America. 
Nevertheless, Masters produces a range of explanations for the 
success of the negotiations which depends on evidence drawn from 
1848-50, when Reciprocity failed, rather than from 1853-54 when it 
succeeded. To explain the final success, Masters has to emphasise 
the role of British North America's Governor General, Lord Elgin. 
Attractive in that it personalises the episode, this view 
underestimates the hard work by others which made Elgin's triumph 
possible. It also undervalues the peculiar circumstances which 
made the Americans better disposed towards cooperating with the 
British. More serious, Masters spawns the myth that Elgin secured 
the Treaty in 1854 by playing the anti-slavery North off against 
the Southern slavocracy. Such a view assumes that the political 
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life of the United States was dominated at this time by sectional 
conflict, and so ignores the continuing importance of national 
political parties with distinctive views on nearly every issue, 
including Anglo-American relations. 
This interpretation of the settlement of 1854 is repeated in 
John Bartlett Brebner's influential 1945 book, North Atlantic 
Triangle: The Interplay of Canada, the United States and Great 
Britain. 2 Similar failings may be found in the other key studies, 
ranging from Lester Burrell Shippee's Canadian-American Relations, 
1849-1874 and Donald Warner's The Idea of Continental Union: 
Agitation for the Annexation of Canada to the United States, 
1849-1893 through Kenneth Bourne's impressive Britain and the 
Balance of Power in North America, 1815-1908 to Reginald Stuart's 
recept United States Expansionism and British North America, 
1775-1871. 3 By covering very wide periods, all of these works miss 
many of the details which could have changed their conclusions. 
They give the 185~-t Fishery Dispute even briefer treatment than 
the 1854 Reciprocity Treaty, and, most importantly, they 
underestimate the significance of the 1848 and 1849 Annexation 
crises. 
Despite the influential precedent established in 1837 and 1838 
when American adventurers invaded Canada in support of minority 
rebellions, most historians ignore the 1848 Annexation Crisis. At 
that time Montreal lived in fear of a popular invasion by American 
citizens as a result of Irish-American scheming, the return to the 
border area of unemployed Mexican War veterans and the political 
manoeuvrings of the presidential election. Equally, all fail to 
7 
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appreciate the extent of White House interest in Canada's 1849 
Annexation Movement. crucial in understanding this are the papers 
of Israel de Wolf Andrews, appointed by successive governments as 
America's first Special Agent to British North America. Though 
some of the studies refer to the letters of the extravagant and 
excitable spy, not one analyses the nature of his relationship with 
the State Department. A more detailed study yields interesting 
information. It is clear that President zachary Taylor and 
Secretary of State John M Clayton considered annexing Canada at the 
same time as they were studying the possibility of buying CUba. At 
the very least they were happy to prolong Britain's embarrassment 
in British North America to gain the upper hand in negotiations 
over Central America. 
Seduced by the build-up to the Civil War, historians have 
tended to ignore these issues, focussing their attention on 
positive rather than negative developments. Thus, the cause, 
course and consequences of the 1846 Oregon Crisis have been 
exhaustively covered, as have the Compromise Debates and 
irresistible slide of the United States into its own internecine 
conflict. With such glamorous problems to research, historians 
have understandably skimmed over the significance of British North 
America. After all, it was so often the 'Nearly Man' of North 
American history. It was nearly attacked in 1848 by American 
citizens, it nearly rebelled during the 1849 Annexation Crisis, and 
it nearly led to war between 1852 and 1854 over the Fisheries. 
Moreover, when Britain managed to stave off a repeat of these 
problems in 1854, she did so with an economic agreement which, 
superficially at least, is hardly likely to set the pulses of 
8 
historians racing. But contemporaries took an interest and 
rightly so. They did not know that British North America would not 
be annexed or that a third war with Britain was certain to be 
avoided. It is worthwhile asking why this tension existed, why it 
did not have more serious consequences - and what this reveals 
about Anglo-American relations· in this uncertain period? 
9 
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CHAPTER ONE 
NORTH ATLANTIC TRIANGLE 
"If the Americans make war for Canada, we must meet them with war." 
Prime Minister Lord John Russell to Colonial Secretary Grey, 
January 1 1849. 1 
For successive British Governments, the possessipn of British 
North America had been a liability in their relations with the 
United States. Since the American Declaration of Independence, 
Britain had frequently been forced to defend the colonies against 
the possibility of attack from their southern neighbour. The war 
of 1812 had seen bloody battles on Canadian soil, the Canadian 
rebellions of 1837 and 1838 had sparked off supportive invasions by 
American citizens, and the Aroostook Dispute, the MacLeod affair 
and the Oregon crisis had all threatened war up to 1846. During 
the later 1840s and early 1850s, the Provinces remained a thorn in 
the side of Anglo-American relations. 1848 and 1849 both produced 
tension over the prospect of annexation - that is, the admission of 
the colonies to the United States - and between 1852 and 1854 the 
Fishing Grounds off the Maritimes became the centre of another 
potentially explosive Anglo-American dispute. Accompanying all 
these episodes was the long-drawn out and frequently amateurish 
attempt by the British and Colonists to secure Reciprocity. An 
unlikely pot of gold for anyone to chase with such persistence over 
an eight year period, Reciprocity was widely seen in Britain and 
British North America as an economic and political cure-all. But 
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it also became a time-consuming distraction for the foreign and 
Colonial Offices - and left Britain vulnerable to American pressure 
politics. 
On the face of it, it may well seem strange that so weak and 
divided a group as the British North American Provinces could exert 
any sort of influence on Anglo-American relations in the middle of 
the nineteenth century. Britain was then near her peak as an 
imperial power. Her industrial and commercial might extended her 
economic and political influence all round the globe, and, while 
her European rivals tottered on the brink of a revolutionary abyss, 
the Royal Navy made Britain the world's most formidable military 
force. The place of British North America in this powerful global 
jigsaw was small- rather like a bit part in an epic. Moreover, 
despite the introduction of responsible government to some of the 
Provinces, the colonies were still heavily dependent on the Mother 
Country, who handled their defence and their relations with foreign 
countries. Yet, the 1840s were a period of massive territorial 
expansion by the United States, which was beginning to loom as a 
rival to Great Britain. Not only did the Americans pose a growing 
threat to Britain's privileged position in world trade, but their 
apparently insatiable appetite for land was a threat to British 
territory in North America. After annexing Texas from Mexico 1n 
1848 - a development the British had worked hard to prevent - the 
United States gave notice of their increasing self confidence by 
trouncing Mexico in war, and swallowing up the modern states of 
America's south-west as their price for peace. With a dual 
tradition of hostility to Britain and of acts of aggression towards 
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British rule in British North America, there was no guarantee that 
the Republic would not make the British Provinces its next target 
for territorial expansion. And just as millionaires rarely get 
rich by giving their money away, so Britain believed that she would 
not stay powerful by surrendering her territory, least of all to 
her precocious rival. 
Even so, there were contradictions in the British attitude 
towards British North America. Undeniably, the ties between Mother 
Country and the five British Provinces were fraying at the British 
end of the connection. For Governor-General Elgin, who was to 
pilot British North America through the rockiest phase of its 
imperial marriage, the British attitude was depressing 1n the 
extreme. "I feel myself," he told Colonial Secretary Grey in 1848, 
in the position in which the master of one of 
those ricketty vessels which are sent to this 
quarter in quest of timber occasionally finds 
himself. By dint of much labour and watching 
he succeeds in conveying ship and cargo safely 
through the tempests and icebergs which assail 
him on the voyage out and home, and he is not a 
little disappointed, poor simple minded man! 
when on reporting his arrival, he hears the 
owners mutter to one another 'It would have 
been better for us if the whole concern had 
gone to the bottom, as we should then have 
realized the Insurance'. Much in the same 
light are exertions made to maintain and 
perpetuate the connexion between this Province 
and the Mother Country, likely, I fear, to be 
viewed: - for Canada is beginning to be 
reckoned, I shrewdly suspect, by most English 
politicians, a bad bargain at any price.2 
Bes·ieged by criticism in the House of Commons and the press, 
Colonial Secretary Grey agreed. Indeed he was profoundly alarmed 
by the growth "of a formidable party in favor of a dissolution of 
the connexion between this Country & its Colonies." However, this 
body did not in reality want to destroy the Empire; instead it 
13 
. 3 
wanted to reform it. 
What these colonial reformers objected to most strongly in the 
present system was the cost of maintaining the Empire. Men like 
Richard Cobden and Sir William Molesworth argued over and over 
again that the cost of administering and defending the empire was 
far greater than the value of colonial trade. 4 Such views were 
given a boost by the abandonment of imperial protectionism. In 
1848 Molesworth argued in the Commons that under the old system 
Britain had kept up vast military and naval establishments to 
protect their colonial commercial monopoly. The logic of this 
policy lay in the belief that "the expense thus incurred was repaid 
by the benefits derived from the monopoly of the colonial trade." 
He added: 
It is evident, however, that with the 
abandonment of colonial monopoly, the arguments 
in favour of colonial dominion, which were 
derived from that monopoly, must likewise be 
abandoned ... As far as trade is concerned, the 
colonies are becoming virtually independent 
States ... 5 
As the British North American Colonies gradually gained responsible 
government, the Reformers found a further justification for reduced 
expenditure from Britain, arguing that the self-governing should at 
least contribute to the cost of defending themselves. 6 Nor were 
the Reformers the only ones to resent the financial drain of the 
Colonies. As Chancellor of the Exchequer, Grey's Cabinet colleague 
Charles Wood had to manage the purse strings of the Government at a 
time when the pressure for economising· was great. He frequently 
complained to Grey of colonial expenses, explaining that any money 
spent on increasing the military force in the colonies would be 
portrayed as "providing the means of supp:>rting 
. 7 
misgovernment." 
At one point he was so exasperated that he wrote to Grey: "May the -----
14 
(sic) I won't say who, run away with some of your colonies." 8 And 
soon after the Montreal Parliament was burned to the ground in 1849 
in a riot at least partly inspired by the Canadian Annexationists, 
he wrote: "for one I am most decidedly against the amount of 
expense now incurred for our colonies." 9 
Putting further strains on imperial ties was the widespread 
belief in the Ripe Apple theory of Empire: that there would come a 
time when each cQlony would reach such a state of political and 
economic maturity that it would naturally seek - and obtain 
independence. The most mature of Britain's colonies were thought 
to be in British North America, and consequently talk of the 
imminent independence of the provinces was fairly commonplace. In 
1849 one commentator boldly stated: "No one disputes at this time 
the assertion, that our provinces in North America must saon be 
independent. "lO Even Prime Minister Lord John Russell told 
Parliament in February 1850 that the time would come when the 
colonies would ask for their independence and once sought it would 
11 be granted. 
Faced with colonies which might very soon be leaving the 
empire, many men were reluctant to spend a penny more on them than 
they had to. Under attack from both within the Administration and 
from the opposition benches, Grey found himself financially 
hamstrung. Aware of the need to show the Canadians that Britain 
was still committed to them, Grey spoke of his wish to get the 
construction of the Halifax to Quebec railway under way. But, he 
wrote despairingly, 
there begins to prevail in the H. of Commons & 
I am sorry to say in the highest quarters, an 
15 
opinion (wh. I believe to be utterly erroneous) 
that we have no interest in preserving our 
Colonies & ought therefore to Make no sacrifice 
for the purpose, Peel, Graham, & Gladstone if 
they do not avow this opinion as openly as 
Cobden & his friends, _yet betray very clearly 
that they entertain it, nor do I find some 
Members of the Cabinet free from it, so that I 
am powerless to do anything wh. involves 
expense - It is the existence of this feeling 
here wh. is to me by far the most serious cause 
of apprehension for the future.l2 
Indeed Grey felt as though he was walking a tightrope. He was 
convinced that the biggest British threat to the Empire "arises 
from the expense the maintenance of our Colonial Empire entails 
upon this country." Consequently, he felt his job was to get the 
right balance between leaving imperial defences too weak and making 
them so strong that their expense drove the British public into the 
arms of the anti-Empire groups. Thus, he told the hawkish Duke of 
Wellington "that in determining what amount of Military Force is to 
be kept up in the Colonies the effect of the expenditure this 
occasioned on public opinion must not be lost sight of. .,l3 
The importance of keeping British public opinion in favour of 
retaining the Colonies was two-fold. Most obviously, if the 
British increasingly grew disenchanted with the expense of Empire, 
they would in time start pressing Parliament for it to be 
dismantled. But the views and statements of the British could work 
in more subtle ways, largely because of the interest they generated 
overseas. British North American and American newspapers all 
eagerly awaited the arrival of ships from Europe with the latest 
news from the Old ~orld. And in the Provinces - especially when 
the imperial relationship was under strain - the statements of 
British politicians and newspapers respecting the Empire received 
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·very close attention. In such an atmosphere, newspapers often gave 
rumours the same status as fact. Hence, with Canada eagerly 
awaiting the response of the British Government to the 1849 
Annexation Manifesto, one newspaper carried the following 'news' 
from London, brought over by The Canada, just docked at Halifax. 
Quoting the Morning Advertiser, the article ran: 
we speak advisedly when we say that the country 
will be no loser by the secession of the 
Canadas. That is certainly the conclusion at 
which the Ministry have arrived, after the most 
able and careful deliberation. On that 
conclusion they have resolved to act.l4 
Elgin saw this as scaremongering by an annexationist press. 
However, rumours like this had credibility because colonial 
newspapers repeatedly carried attacks on the Imperial connection 
made by British statesmen. For this reason, Elgin thought the 
future of British North America was, to say the least, precarious 
if British politicians continued to make such speeches. In March 
1849 he warned: 
if ... the organs ... of the Govt and of the 
Peel Party are always writing as if it were an 
admitted fact that the Colonies, and more 
especially Canada, are a burden to be endured 
only because they cannot be got rid of; the end 
may be nearer at hand than we wot of.l5 
As he battled manfully to stem the tide of annexationism in 1849, 
he repeatedly warned Grey that "The assertion that England is 
indifferent to the maintenance of the colonial connexion is by far 
the most powerful argument which the annexationists employ, and the 
16 
most difficult to confute." 
Yet, for all the trouble British North America caused at home 
and abroad, British governments consistently worked to retain the 
provinces. For at least eight humiliating years they pressed the 
17 
Americans to grant Reciprocity, hoping this would cure the economic 
ills at the root of Annexationism. This, moreover, was simply the 
most noticeable of their Empire-preserving acts. They also strove 
to keep the peace within the Imperial family in much less 
spectacular ways. Thus, British Governments trod carefully when 
trying to persuade the colonists to pay more towards their own 
defence; they awarded honours and titles to distinguished colonists 
in a bid to strengthen ties with Britain; and they resisted 
disloyal acts by Canadians and threats on the Provinces by 
Americans. 17 Despite all the rumblings against the Empire in 
Britain, no government was willing to abandon British North 
America. Quite clearly, the colonies had a value which could not 
be measured in the monetary terms so popular with the would-be 
reformers of Westminster. 
Surveying the Empire from his LOndon home, the Duke of 
Wellington gave one indication of the importance of Britain's 
global possessions. Though in his eightieth year and, to judge by 
his handwriting, clearly feeling his age, the Iron Duke was still 
the Commander in Chief of the British Army and alert to all its 
needs. As the Christmas of 1848 approached, he had at least one 
reason to be in good cheer: the state of the British Empire. 
In truth excepting two or three points we 
occupy every position and Station throughout 
the World which any Individual can think 
interesting whether for the protection of 
Interests of Commerce, for defence or for 
strategical purposes in War ... I really know 
of nothing else that could be desired that we 
do not already occupy! 
I don't think that any Minister could propose 
to abandon any territory or portion which we at 
present occupy! and I really do not know of any 
one that could be occupied by a force 
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Wellington believed that the Empire was essential to Britain's 
power and that every colony, from Labuan in the East Indies to New 
Brunswick in the Maritimes, had a role to play. Of course, 
Wellington was old and had long been generally resistant to change. 
But these views, though rosy, were in keeping with those of his 
Prime Minister, Lord John Russell, and Colonial Secretary Grey. 
1852 the latter publicly analysed the value of Empire in a 




Russell who provided the most succinct commentary. In a jaunty 
letter to Grey in the summer of 1849, he proclaimed that he 
favoured colonial reform, "but not Cobden's reform - which would be 
a dissolution of the Connexion." He then went on to consider "what 
are the benefits which remain to us from the Colonial connexion, 
free trade being taken for granted." These benefits fell into two 
main categories~ economic and military. On the economic side, the 
advantages of Empire were clear: 
generally as to our Colonies we may secure the 
admission of our Manufactured Goods on the 
payment of moderate duties ... We are sure of 
the admission of British vessels & goods to our 
Colonies in time of War with foreign Nations, & 
can shut their ports to our enemies ... Our 
Merchants can Maintain a connexion with firms 
in the Colonies without fear of being partially 
or unjustly treated as foreigners. These 
connexions spread fat & wide in London, 
Liverpool, Glasgow & 
Even with free trade, then, a global network of colonies was a 
major asset to an island trading nation like Britain, especially as 
much of the country's commerce was already based on these imperial 
foundations. In military terms, the colonies were just as 
imp::>rtant. Some, like the Cape, Ceylon and Bermuda, were 
strategically valuable. They allowed Britain to control the sea 
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lanes; equally, if controlled by an enemy, they would "be serious 
injury to us 1n time of war." Others, said Russell, were important 
military ports, like Gicraltar and Malta. But in the case of the 
overseas colonies settled by British emigrants, there was a vayuer 
and longer term value. 
There is a general advantage in the possession 
of Canada & Australia, which is hard to define, 
but not difficult to perceive - The British 
race in these Colonies form in time of War one 
Nation with us, nearly as much as Aberdeen or 
Cork, tho' divided by a larger span of the 
world - But in point of communication Halifax 
is now almost as near as Inverness was a 
century ago-
To Russell the Empire was a source of strength for both the present 
and the future, and, moreover, it was a powerhouse that had to be 
jealously guarded. 
The loss of any great portion of our Colonies 
would diminish our importance in the world, & 
the vultures would soon gather together to 
despoil us of other parts of our Empire, or to 
offer insults to us which we could not bear.20 
In other words, thanks to her overseas possessions, Britain was 
truly a world power, and accepted as such by her rivals. But 
without her Empire, she would be worse than the weakest nation of 
Europe: she would be a fallen power, as daunting as a champion 
prizefighter in his dotage. It was something of a vicious circle. 
Through her colonies, Britain was a global trading nation, a world 
power. But to retain that position, she had to keep her colonies 
and, occasionally, acquire new ones. And the only way these could 
be protected was by using the colonies she already FCssessed. 
Thus, in Russell's eyes the Empire was vital to Britain's 
power and had to be kept intact. While he could grant independence 
to a colony which had become mature enough to ask for it, he could 
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not allow another ccuntry to steal ar.y territory from Britain. 
Moreover, some colonies had special roles, ~ith specific rivals of 
Great Britain as their targets. British North America was one such 
possession. Her importance stemmed from her strategic position 
right next door to the United States. Negatively, the loss of the 
Provinces would have at once weakened Britain and strengthened the 
United States because the Republic would have gained control of 
Britain's crucial naval base at Halifax and the Maritimes' 
shipbuilding industry. Were the latter added to the American 
fleet, the United States would have been able to challenge 
Britain's prized world mercantile supremacy and thereby threaten 
her economy. Moreover, the loss of the Provinces to the ~united 
States could threaten Britain militarily. Wrote Lord Elgin in 1848 
in one of his regular letters to Grey: 
Let the Yankees get possession of British North 
America with the prestige of superior 
Generalship - who can say how soon they may 
dispute with you the Empire of India and the 
Seas? Imagine 100,000,000 of confederated men 
inhabiting this vast continent and the proceeds 
of their duties on Imports invested in a 
Navy!21 
This nightmare vision of the future was enough to keep any 
British politician on his toes in the middle of the nineteenth 
century. But the North American Provinces had a more immediate 
importance. Though a significant trading partner, the United 
States' grov;i ng power and territory made the Republic loom not 
just as a future rival but as one to be considered for the 
present. Something was needed to keep American expansion in check 
and to prevent the spread of dangerous republican ideas. British 
North America was the weapon most readily to hand. Writing 1n 
September 1848, Grey confessed that he viewed the future with 
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apprehension "when I see the United States rising so rapidly 1n 
1 n" b . h 1 . . 22 power & popu at ut Wlt out any mora restraint. A month later 
he wrote more passionately: 
the more I see & hear of the state of affairs 
in the United States the more convinced I am gt 
the extreme im[Xlrtance ~f consolidating in Bs 
America a syste~ of Gov really [X)pular & at 
the same time not so ultra democratic in 
principle as that of the ~reat republic. - As 
the effect of the institn of the United States 
becomes more and more developed the more 
dangerous I think them to the peace ofdthe 
world, & though otherwise perhaps I ~h not 
attach so much value to our possessn in 
America I go think it of the utmost importance 
that we sh at least retain them long enough to 
raise them to a constitutn in which they might 
maintain their cwn independence instead of 
being absorbed in the Union.23 
So great a threat did Grey consider the United States that there 
was one circumstance under which he could accept the annexation of 
British North America to the republic. Accepting that Reciprocity 
between the States and the Provinces could lead to eventual 
political union, he expressed the hope to Elgin 
that this may take place ty ~icable 
arrangement instead of by war, & may lead to a 
division of the Union - British America with 
some of the Northern States forming ona Nation 
& the Southern States another - This w be no d 
such bad result & in the mean time our trade w 
flourish. 24 
However, such an option was very much the last resort. All 
Grey was doing in this letter was trying to see what good could 
possibly come out of a fairly dismal development for Great Britain. 
In reality, the British were determined to ·retain British North 
America. Apart from the emotional, cultural and historic ties the 
colonies shared with Britain, they were integral parts of the 
British Empire. And, however troublesome that global grouping 
might have been, it was a source of much of Britain's power, 
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whether measured in terms of co1runerce or world status. Moreover, 
British North America had an additional value as a strategic clock 
to the relentless rise of the United States - a development that 
promised nothing but danger for Great Britain. Of course, much can 
be made of the growing hostility to Empire in economy-conscious 
Britain. Yet too much should not be made of the activities of the 
Reformers. Most of that grouping died young and few held 
government offices while advocates of imperial reform. Equally, 
many politicians who made great show about the need for 
cost-cutting in the Empire or for abandoning particular Colonies, 
were merely jumping on what they thought to be a political 
bandwagon, seizing a stout stick with which they could beat the 
Government. Faced with the responsibility of office, these men 
like Disraeli - trod more warily. It was one thing to shout in 
opposition about reforming the Empire; quite another to set about 
the task once given the power to do so. And in the case of British 
North America, there was another restraining force. No man wanted 
to go down in history as the second Lord North; and no man wanted 
to be remembered as the bungler who set in train the dissolution of 
the whole Empire. Personal as well as national honour was at 
stake. So it was that on New Year's Day, 1849, after enduring a 
year of American threats against Canada, Russell told Grey: "If the 
Americans make war for Canada, we must meet them with war." 25 
Russell's defiant statement spoke volumes for his government's 
commitment to British North America; but it also revealed some 
degree of ignorance about American attitudes to the five Provinces. 
Admittedly there were groups within the United States who did covet 
the colonies, but on the whole mid-nineteenth century Americans 
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werE"· !': irr.i lar to their twentieth century descendants when it came to 
Canada. Most ignored and were ignorant of their northern 
neighbour. For instance, one of the biggest problems facing 
Reciprocity in the United States was not hostility but 
indifference. Thus, Reciprocity bills failed in Congress only once 
because of a negative vote, in January 1849. 26 All the other bills 
failed because Congress was so engrossed in its other, domestic, 
business that it did not get round to voting. on them. Even when 
the Reciprocity Treaty eventually passed Congress in August 1854, 
it did so only on the last day of the session. Moreover, its 
supporters had beaten the deadline only by forcing off the agenda 
countless private bills designed to boost the reputation of the 
spcnsoring members of Congress in their constituencies. Indeed, a 
constant theme of the American Government's expert on British North 
America, Israel de Wolf Andrews~ was that the United States paid 
far too little attention to the affairs of the colonies and the 
opportunities presented by them. 27 
Even so, British North America had a place in American 
politics, though not one that it welcomed. In truth, the vast 
majority of Americans paid little heed to developments north of the 
Great Lakes, concentrating instead on local and national issues. 
Apart from those either living near, or with commercial interests 
in, the Provinces, the only time Americans took any real notice of 
them was during elections or in times of Anglo-American tension. 
In this period there were several sources of friction between the 
two countries. Acting as a restraint on the hot-heads of both 
sides were the countries' strong trading links which formed the 
strongest argument for preserving the peace available to either 
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GovE·rnment. Yet this did not stop their rivalry forcing the 
transatlantic relationship to simmer ominously from ti~e to time. 
One of the biggest problems lay 1n the historical relationship 
between Britain and the United States. The latter had been born 
out cf a bloody struggle with an oppressive Mother Country which, 
until 1846 , remained as the republic's only significant martial 
foe. Short on history, the new country had looked hard for 
national heroes - and nearly all of them had made their reputations 
either by defying or killing the British. Paul Revere, George 
Washington, Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson all fell into this 
category, while many members of Congress Froudly wore the battle 
honours and military titles won in the second Anglo-American war, 
the War of 1812. Similarly, one of the key dates of the national 
calendar harked back to a major act of defiance against George III, 
the Declaration of Independence, and, if politicians wished to stir 
up patriotism, their safest bet was to revive distorted memories of 
past British outrages against the United States. Atrocities by 
British-backed Indians in the War of Independence and the War of 
1812, the seizure of neutral American ships in the Napoleonic War 
and the burning of the White House were all calculated to make the 
blood of every true American boil. In a nation with a growing 
immigrant population anxious to be acceFted as American, there were 
further advantages to Anglophobic statements. Tirades against 
Great Britain could be taken as public assertions of loyalty to the 
Republic while helping to unite an ethnically mixed nation against 
a common, external, enemy. And in mid-nineteenth century America, 
such outbursts were always likely to be popular with voters drawn 
from the Irish population who had fled their how.eland because of 
English misrule and the Famine. Hence, elections were always 
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likely to inspire self-seeking politicians to public abuse of Gre~t 
. . 28 Br1ta1n. 
The rivalry, however, did not lie merely in the past. Looking 
to the future, the United States was convinced that it was itself 
Britain's natural successor. Empires, ran the theory, rise and 
fall, to be followed ty r.ewer, uncorrupted Empires. This had been 
the case with ancient Greece, Rome and Venice, and so it would be 
with the British Empire. This view of world history figured in 
American art, in Thomas Coles' "Course of Empire", but it also 
found ~ore forceful expression in Congress. To interjections that 
England was "old and worn within", Virginia representative Henry 
Bedinger told the House in 1846: 
We are in the vigor of youth, increasing every 
year in prosperity and power. Great Britain, 
though she may not have reached that period 
when we may look for her speedy toppling 
downfall, yet she has evidently passed her 
prime. She smacks of age.29 
The acquisition of california and San Francisco's Golden Gate to 
the fabled wealth of the Orient in 1848 merely added to this 
confidence. It led some, like New York representative Giltert Dean 
in 1852, to give the battle for world power status between the two 
countries a more bellicose image. 
We have already had two wars with England, the 
first upon the land for national existence, the 
second upon the land and sea for commercial 
existence, and now we are waging yet another 
for commercial, industrial, and naval 
supremacy; and the struggle to attain it is not 
confined to any class, but it is a contest in 
which our manufacturers, our artisans, and our 
producers are engaged for the markets of the 
world; ... this, the third war with England ... 30 
While some hoped for a more peaceful resolution of Anglo-American 
competition around the wcrld, like America's Minister to Lcndon, 
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31 the wealthy industrialist Abbott Lawrence , others believed a war 
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was inevitable at some stage. All agreed that if this conf 1 i ct 
did break out, it would be the biggest the world had ever seen. 
Said Senator John c. Calhoun of South carolina in 1846: "It would 
speedily become a struggle for mastery between the greatest Power 
in the world, on one side, against the most growing on the 
other." 33 
Despite bold predictions that the end of the British Empire 
was nigh, Britain showed a frustrating unwillingness to lie down 
and die. Everywhere that American traders travelled round the 
globe, they faced competition from British rivals, and in the 
United States internal improvements depended heavily on capital 
raised in London. Worse still, rather than submit in awe to the 
growing power of the United States, Britain still seemed to have 
designs on the New World. In North America she was widely believed 
to have resisted American attempts to acquire Texas and California, 
and in the late 1840s and early 1850s, she took to meddling in 
Central America. This greatly annoyed American politicians who, 
firm believers in the hallowed Monroe Doctrine, wanted the United 
States to be the only power meddling in the Isthmus, or any other 
part of the Americas. But, more to the point, Britain chose to 
become active in Honduras and Nicaragua at a time when the need for 
speedier communications with California had directed the State 
Department's attention to the possibility of a trans-Isthmian 
canal. Differences over Central America were to dominate 
Anglo-American relations in this period, but, even without this 
problem, relations with Britain would always have been on 
tenterhooks, thanks to British North America. As long as Queen 
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Victoria could lock across the Atlantic to her pcssession~ in the 
New World, the United StatEs cculd not develo~ Frecisely as it 
wished. Instead of being in decline, Great Britain was very much a 
world power. But, more important, from a parochial point of view, 
she was a North American power. 
There lay the significance of British North America, in 
American eyes at least. The five Provinces were not an entity in 
themselves, but a territory which made Britain an American power. 
Consequently, the Provinces were rarely, if ever, seen or discussed 
in their own right; rather, they were treated as an extension of 
Great Britain, the United States' major trading partner and 
traditional foe in war. Nevertheless, the imFortance of America's 
relations with Britain ensured the colonies got some attention, 
especially as they appeared to be vital limbs of the British 
Empire. Yet shaping American attitudes to the Provinces were not 
their qualities or problems, because American orators knew precious 
little about them. Instead, the dominant factor was the state of 
Anglo-AIT.erican relations and, sometimes, the course each 
individual orator wanted the American government to take. From 
this, the colonies were given a dual - and contradictory - image by 
Americans. They portrayed them as possessions which either 
bolstered or weakened British power, and, as a result, British 
North America loomed as both a strategic threat to the United 
States and as Britain's Achilles Heel. 
Undoubtedly the most convincing orqtors were those who 
stressed that British North America increased Britain's ability to 
interfere in the New World. This was most forcibly brought home 
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during the 1846 Congressional debates on the Oregon Crisis, which 
forced all members of Congress - and many American citizens - to 
consider the importance of British North America in Anglo-American 
relations. One of tt:e most important points was the size of 
Britain's territorial presence in North America. Said Illinois 
representative John Alexander McClernand: 
Great Britain already owns eight provinces upon 
this continent, containing 2,800,000 square 
miles. The area of the United States,· 
including Texas and all Oregon, does not exceed 
2,318,000 square w.iles, 482,000 less than the 
present British territories upon this 
continent.34 
The statistics were debateable and, though the United States did 
not take 'all' Oregon, within two years it had swallowed up 
California and New Mexico. Even so, McClernand's point was valid. 
Britain was not just another Old World power. She had the 
strongest navy in the world which meant that she alone ~as able to 
breach America's best defence, her geographic isolation from all 
serious rivals. In addition, as a territorial power in North 
America, Britain was a force which could not be ignored, especially 
when war was a possibility. This was a problem which exercised the 
mind of Ohio representative William "Sausage" Sawyer. 
Britain, he told the House in 1846, 
would find great trouble in disturbing us three 
thousand miles off - as, in her proper sphere, 
she is - if she had no possessions upon this 
little island of ours; but having so many 
possessions all around us, and in our immediate 
neighborhood, she has resting places where she 
can run in for supplies, refit her ships, and 
even build them. She can thus supply herself 
with all the means necessary to a protracted 
and disastrous war.35 
Great 
This war, if it ever came, would be fought on two fronts, according 
to most commentators. The most vulnerable front for the United 
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States was the eastern seaboard. "There", warned Ne~ Jersey 
senator Jacob welsh Miller, "the first blow would be struck, there 
the second, and there the last." 36 Other members of Congress said 
that British fleets would rapidly blockade the whole eastern 
seaboard, "threatening every commercial city." 37 According to the 
House Committee on Naval Affairs, this was best avoided: "One of 
our great cities exposes to the depredations of an enemy [fleet] no 
less than a thousand millions worth of property." 38 
In making these incursions, Americans believed, the Royal Navy 
would be strengthened by British North America. Britain could, if 
necessary, call on the ships and sailors of British North America's 
impressive merchant marine, a body which Americans in the Colonies 
had long been observing. The US Consul in Halifax, Thomas 
Livingston, wrote to Secretary of state John M Clayton in 1849 that 
though ship building had been neglected in the city during the 
recent depression, "to the eastward and westward, however, very 
many vessels are built and some of the largest class." 39 As early 
as November 1848, Israel de Wolf Andrews had stressed that the 
capabilities for ship building in New Brunswick were 'very great' 
and ~redicted that the province "will soon occupy a prominent part 
as a Maritime section of this Continent." 40 Thus, in the sumiT.er of 
1849 he informed Clayton from New Brunswick that "in 1840, the 
British North American Colonies built as much tonnage as the United 
States." 41 
Under normal circumstances, however, the Royal Navy was more 
than strong enough to tackle the puny American navy on its own. 
But, Americans believed, the Provinces were particularly valuable 
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This tase was Halifax, Nova Scotia. "Halifax proper~" wrote 
Livingston in the winter of 1849, "is a garrison town well and 
strongly fortified. The military force may be stated at 3000 rank 
and file including artillery and engineers -" 42 A fortnight later 
Andrews confirmed this. Writing from the "Atlantic Citadel" he 
said: 
a place of so much importance, so well known as 
Halifax -which, notwithstanding its beautiful 
and unrivalled harbour is of more consequence 
as a military than a trading port - a place in 
which England has expended many millions to 
fortify and make the Gibraltar of America, and 
is now one of the Chief Seats of her Military 
and naval power on this Continent.43 
Britain fortified this port for good reason. Livingston continued 
in his less detailed letter: "The Harbour may rank among the first 
in the world for Safety and convenience The harbour was 
ice-free in winter, allowing its deeF waters to be a refuge for the 
navy all the year round and serving the first link in a chain of 
communications stretching from Halifax to Quebec, Montreal and 
Toronto. In Britain's hands, the port would always be friendly to 
the Royal Navy, furnishing it with essential supplies of fresh food 
and water. Also, in the middle of the nineteenth century, Halifax 
had one additional quality which made it invaluable to Britain's 
navy. As Congress was to learn during the protracted Reciprocity 
negotiations, Nova Scotia had ample reserves of coal, and Britain 
had built up "artificial mountains" of the minera1. 45 In an age 
when steamers were beginning to revolutionise sea travel and 
warfare, Halifax was in every respect ideal as a home from home for 
ships operating thousands of miles from the Mother Country. 
Democrat Representative Thomas Fuller had more reason than 
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most tc appreciate this British naval threat. His constituency was 
Calais, Maine, on the border with New Brunswick and three hundred 
miles by sea from Halifax. Proposing a massive increase in federal 
funding for a fort on Penobscot, he said in February 1851: 
It was the only fort East of Boston, and was of 
peculiar importance on account of the quantity 
of commerce along that shore, and of its 
vicinity to the great naval depot of Great 
Britain, Halifax.46 
Nearly three years earlier Indiana Senator Edward Allen Hannegan 
complained of Britain's naval strength in the Atlantic. "Is it not 
enough," he asked the Senate, 
that she holds all the maritime power of the 
North Atlantic coast? Is it not sufficient 
that she holds Halifax, standing out as it does 
- that mighty observatory, the most prominent 
feature of the coast?47 
Land-locked in Indiana, Hannegan's electors were unlikely to suffer 
from British naval power, unlike the electors of Whig Congressman 
John Otis from Maine. In August 1850 he argued: 
The whole coast of Maine is within striking 
distance of the great naval depot at Halifax. 
A powerful steam marine could in thirty-six 
hours reach any point of her coast. In case of 
war with England, her policy would be, by a 
powerful and rapid blow, to isolate Maine, and 
secure the communication with the Canadas.48 
Securing the communications to the Canadas was essential 
because British North America would be the second front in any 
future Anglo-American war. Isolated from Britain, especially in 
the winter, the land-based threat posed by the Canadas was taken 
less seriously in the States than the naval threat posed by Nova 
Scotia; even so, British North America could make Americans feel 
militarily vulnerable. Even a fire-eating Anglophobe like Lewis 
Cass conceded 1n 1852 that "England has great means of 
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annoyance; ... and if she should put forth her full strength- and 
who doubts it - she would be a formidable coadjutor with her 
Canadian sutjects in the defense of the 49 country." A basic 
problem was that British North America left the United States with 
an undefended frontier of 2,000 miles. It is true that in the 
decade that followed the Canadian rebellions of 1837-38 and the 
bloodless Aroostook 'War' between Maine and New Brunswick, the 
United States tried to strengthen its northern defences. It built 
forts near Detroit and Buffalo, began one at Rouse's Point on Lake 
Champlain, and in 1851 - a time of Anglo-American peace - spent 
more than $600,000 on fortifying its border with British North 
America. 50 Yet the country had long resisted the idea of a 
standing army, and the number of troops available to defend it was 
pitiful. Admitted the War Department in December 1845: "On our 
northern borders, along the line of the British provinces, frow. 
Maine to Lake Superior, an extent of two thousand miles, there is 
. d b . 1 . n5l now stat1one ut a s1ng e reg1ment. Nor did matters irr.prove 
during the Oregon Crisis. Said Michigan representative Alexander 
Woodruff Buel in 1850: 
the whole frontier was exposed, and without 
much ready defence, except that furnished by 
our fortifications, while the frontier from 
Fort Malden facing Detroit to the Vermont line 
was bristling with thousands of British 
bayonets, ready for action on the first sound 
of war. Such, to some extent must ever be the 
state of things with us on the eve of a war 
upon the northern and northwestern frontier.52 
Buel deliberately overstated the lack of preparation in 1846 in 
'-...... 
order to win more Federal funds for the defence of Michigan. 
However, his fears of Britain's northern base were echoed in 
Congress by Ohio representative Allen Thurman. Protesting at the 
undue attention given to Britain's naval threat, he asked: "DO not 
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Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, New York, Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, 
Illinois, Wisconsin and Iowa present a northern frontier still more 
exr:osed?" 53 
However, the Provinces did not just endanger a few Northern 
States, which would have been bad enough. In the eyes of some 
American military experts, British North America threatened 
national security by eating right into the heart of the Republic. 
Writing in the National Intelli9~~cer in May 1845, one commentator 
claimed that Britain•s possession of Canada left the United States 
split "by the most military and grasping nation in the world." 54 
That day Lieutenant Matthew Maury, Superintendent of the Washington 
Department of Charts and Instruments, argued anonymously in the 
press that Canada allowed Britain to thrust herself deep into 
United States. 55 To counter that danger, the Great Lakes had 
the 
more 
or less been demilitarised after the War of 1812, but the Americans 
rewained suspicious of British activities there. In August 1852, 
when debating whether the Federal Government should fund a ship 
canal round Saulte Saint Marie, Connecticut Democrat Isaac E Toucey 
told the Senate that the object of the British government was "to 
construct a ship-canal of this kind on the Canada side for the 
purpose of transferring their armed vessels into Lake Superior from 
Lake Erie and the other lakes." 56 This statement, while revealing 
Toucey•s ignorance of American geography, was not unusual. 
Uneasiness about the military use of the Great Lakes came to the 
surface regularly in this period, particularly in Congress. 57 
These fears were understandable. In any war· along the 
northern boundary Canada would give Britain two strategic options. 
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She could use her navy to swee~ American commerce from the Great 
Lakes and she could threaten the border with her troops. Quite 
simply, British North America gave Britain a military base. More 
than seventy years after the American Revolution, redcoats still 
drilled within sight of Aw.erican citizens. The British were keen 
to remind their land-hungry neighbours of this fact. When 
Americans made official visits to Canadian cities, it was 
deliberate policy to treat them to a military display by British 
troops. 58 It was easy to belittle the British strength in the 
Provinces but even a hawk like McClernand knew that "The dangers 
which impend over us upon this immense front have been demonstrated 
in the events of the last war." 59 Then, as in 1837 and 1838, 
Americans got a bloody nose at the hands of the British army after 
invading Canada. Now, to the dismay of those Americans who took an 
interest, there were plans to link British North America more 
closely with both Britain and the British army. A frequent topic 
of discussion in both the Mother Country and the Provinces was the 
proposed Halifax-Quebec Railway. This promised countless social, 
political and economic benefits to the colonists, but it also 
promised to tighten Britain's grip on North ' America. In papers 
sent to the State Department by Israel de Wolf Andrews, the Chamber 
of Commerce of St John, New Brunswick said in 1846: 
To Canada, it would be of great importance, 
affording it the advantage of a Port open to 
the Atlantic during the winter months ... [and] 
in case of any disturbance with their restless 
neighbours, would be the facility and despatch 
by which the British Government would be 
enabled to place any number of Troops in Canada 
that the emergencies of the case might require; 
the late improvements in steam navigation and 
the advantages of the Rail Road would make it 
possible to have them comfortably lodged in 
Barracks at Quebec, in fourteen days from their 
embarkation at Portsmouth or .Cork, and this 
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without undergoing any fatigue that would 
incapacitate them from entering upon active 
service on their arrival. 
The prospect of thousands of troops pouring into British North 
America at very short notice was bad enough. But, after reading 
evidence presented to the House of Lords, the State Department 
learned that the railway would also help Britain maintain a balance 
of power in North America. By uniting the colonies, it would allow 
Britain "to meet the rapid advances and huge strides now making 
towards the Dominion of the whole of North America by the People of 
the United States."60 
The railroad was not built in this period - the pressure of 
economy in Parliament deterred British Governments from raising the 
funds which the colonies either could not or would not raise 
themselves. However, British North America remained a problem for 
the United States because she appeared as the closest arm of the 
ever-encroaching British Empire. In this context, the Provinces 
were not a group of weak and isolated colonies, but the northern 
arc of an ominous circle of hostile British territories which were 
gradually surrounding the young republic. Hence, in 1848 one 
senator who was by no means hostile to Great Britain said: 
[She] holds one third of the North American 
continent. She has established her dominion in 
the Bermudas, the West Indies, and in Guiane, 
on the South American continent. She holds 
Belize, on the bay of Yucatan, in North 
America, with a district of about fourteen 
thousand miles.61 
The significance of this was clear. Explained Indiana Senator 
Hannegan that year: "the whole coast of the United States, from 
[Nova Scotia's] Cape Sable to the mouth of.the Rio Bravo ... is as 
locked in as it possibly . . "62 could be by fortified positions. Nor 
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would Britain necessarily use these possessions just to blockade 
the United States in an attempt to bleed her economy dry. Bermuda 
and Jamaica wEre "enormous naval depots and fortifications 
affording places of refuge for their vessels," said Virginia 
representative Thomas Henry Bayly. And on these islands, Britain 
was piling up supplies of guns, ammunition and Nova Scotian coal. 
Consequently "all the combinations which science has lent to these 
missive and destructive elements will strike at once", warned one 
Congressman in 1846. 63 And, according to House members, a war with 
Britain would provoke attacks from all the surrounding colonies. 
As in the first two wars, the British would unleash Indians from 
Canada and the American . . . 64 West on to Amer1can c1t1zens. But the 
real damage would come from regular forces. "England would 
fill Canada and Oregon with troops; the West Indies, Bermuda, and 
Halifax with her ships-of-war and war steamers" said Bradford 
Ripley Wood of New York. 65 And Virginia's Robert Mercer Hunter was 
still more vivid a spokesman: 
with the Indian tribes on our western frontier, 
with British and Canadian troops on our north, 
and with British fleets covering the eastern 
and southern line of our coast, we should be 
encircled as with a wall of fire.66 
This, of course, was a terrifying prospect, given added 
credibility by memories ~f the War of 1812. Even so, canada and 
the other provinces did not inspire universal awe. Indeed, many 
Americans saw them not as a strategic threat to the United States, 
but as Britain's Achilles Heel. And, like all true Achilles Heels, 
British North America was rumoured to be weak on the inside. 
Rather than bolstering Britain as an American power, Canada 
symbolised all that was rotten within the British Empire. 
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Acccrding to many American commentators, this alone made Britain a 
paper tiger, far removed from the world power they and the rest of 
the world had grown accustomed to fear. 
The most obvious reason for not fearing British North America 
was that she was virtually indefensible. She shared a huge 
frontier with the United States, had a tiny population of about 
1,500,000 compared to the republic's 23,191,000 in 1850, and she 
depended for her defence on a small army paid for and commanded by 
a country that was 3,000 miles away. Handicapping the British 
garrison was the climate. In winter, when the St Lawrence was 
frozen, the quickest channel of communication between Toronto and 
London lay through the United States. Viewed in isolation- that 
is, forgetting for one moment the Royal Navy, its base in Halifax, 
and previous unsuccessful American attempts to invade canada 
British North America appeared as a vulnerable and feeble arm of a 
distant Empire. Had Britain been confined to the British Isles or 
possessed an Empire without American territory, the United States 
would have found it hard to threaten any British territory. But 
British North America gave the republic a readily accessible 
British possession which it could attack or threaten at will. To 
some, this was a mouth-watering prospect. Responding to the 
popular belief that any Anglo-American war would be fought in 
Canada, Ohio representative Jacob Brinkerhoff declared 1n January 
1846: "I believe it, and I am glad that Great Britain has, ·in the 
present conjuncture, an assailable point here, where we can reach 
her with effect."67 In the sarr.e month, Ohic's Thurman shrugged off 
claims that the United States alone would suffer in a war with 
Britain. "Are there no British provinces to invade? Will there be 
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no means of bringing home to her the horrors of the conOict?68 
Knowing the Provinces to be weakly defended69 , many Americans were 
confident that they could actually win a land war~ In 1846, one 
Michigan politician confidently predicted that a volunteer force 
from his state could take Canada in ninety days. Six years later 
Cass proclaimed that "should war come, canada would fall, with 
comparatively little · . n 70 oppos1t1on. British North America also 
served to counter the strength of the Royal Navy. Said Alabama 
representative William Lowndes Yancey: 
The war [for Oregon] would be fiercely waged on 
the ocean and in canada. Riding in large 
fleets the cross of St George might pass 
triumphant. In single and more equal combats, 
it would be as certainly lowered to the stars 
and stripes. canada, too, would yield to our 
valour ... 
The War's end, he concluded, would find Canada in America's 
. 71 possess1on. This threat was ever-present in Anglo-American 
crises. In the 1852 Fishery dispute, New York senator William 
Henry Seward warned that Britain could not desire war with the 
United States. "She knows all this, and more: that war ... would 
find the United States able to surround the British colonies ... "72 
This power, claimed another senator during the Oregon Crisis, made 
the States Britain's most dangerous rival. The contiguity of her 
colonial possessions, he told the Senate, 
renders it easy for us to wrench off that large 
portion of her empire, and thus give the signal 
to Russia and France, to do the same with her 
East India and Asiatic dependencies. 
This threat, he claimed, "has imparted more circumspection to her 
. "73 h d aggress1ons. In ot er wor s, the knowledge that British North 
America was at the very least vulnerable to American attack 
encouraged Britain to treat the United States with more respect 
than might otherwise have been forthcoming. 
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Further weakenir.g any portrayal of British North America as a 
threat to the United States was the popular claiw. that the 
colonists were not loyal to Britain. True, some rEcosr.ised that 
the Canadians had traditionally been less than friendly to 
republicanism and the United States74 , cut events in the 1840s and 
1850s suggested that the colonists' hostility to their neighbours 
and their love of Great Britain were both in rapid decline. 
Evidence of this came thick and fast in late 1848 and 1849 as the 
Annexation Movement gathered steam, and annexationists peppered the 
S t "th . . d 1 75 tate Departmen Wl pet1t1ons an etters. But before this, 
the American Government had reason to suspect that British North 
America was becoming less British all the time. As early as the 
Oregon crisis, Andrews had predicted that the financial burden of 
an Anglo-American war would prove too much for the inhabitants of 
New Brunswick. He predicted they would abandon the Empire for the 
United States "for I am convinced their loyalty is founded as much 
. . . 1 "76 on 1nterest as pr1nc1p e. 
Justification for this slur on colonial loyalty came within three 
years, when the twin pressures of imperial free trade and a 
recession inspired many colonists to switch from violent loyalty to 
the Crown to violent support for annexation to the Republic. These 
developments did not and could not go unnoticed in the United 
States, where a belief in the innate moral superiority of the 
republican system was virtually an article of faith among all 
patriots. Newspapers covered the revolutionary events north of the 
St Lawrence - though not in today's minute detail - and the State 
Department received countless letters from its Consuls in the 
Provinces, and particularly from Andrews, adding flesh to the press 
reports. 
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These developments were of particular interest to Americans 
because they drew attention to the problems Britain was facing 
world-wide. British North America, it seemed was suffering from 
the same chaos that was threatening to tear Britain and the whole 
British Empire apart. As the Old World teetered from one 
revolution to the next, Britain herself was being shaken to her 
foundations. The closest observer of all these developments was 
the United States' Minister to London, George Bancroft. Already an 
eminent historian, Bancroft's objectivity was blunted by his 
confidence in the values of republicanism and the glorious destiny 
of the United States. Consequently, his bold statement after a 
series of European revolutions in 1848 that "The old world has come 
to an end" was typically naive. However, he was more acute when 
analysing the state of a Britain racked by fear of the Chartists: 
The results [of the European revolutions] for 
England must be momentous. A new impulse is 
given to Irish discontent and demands; and 
Smith O'Brien has gone over to Ireland, 
zealous, greedy of glory, and ready, it is 
said, if need be, to become a martyr. Scotland 
is impatient of the entailed monopoly of its 
lands. - Manchester stimulates active 
political opinion in England. There have been 
riots in London, Glasgow, Manchester, and 
Edinburg (sic), which it is the fashion to say 
are ridiculous and useful riots, being sure to 
prevent rebellion. Political parties are in a 
state of chaos ... West India interests. are 
ruined. Trade and industry are suffering from 
doubt and apprehension. There is a deficit in 
the revenue ... 
. h . . 77 Such 1s t e state of Great Br1ta1n. 
The British Empire was not much better off. In an age of slow 
communications, Britain faced the virtually impossible task of 
trying to control an empire of conquered people stretching around 
the globe. With characteristic exaggeration Ohio Senator William 
Allen described Britain's empire as "One eighth part of the whole 
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race of men, held in subjection by the pres~~ce ~i less than a 
------
million of strangers, and by the terror of a distant Government, 
itself menaced with destruction, both by civil discord and anxious 
neighbors."78 By definition, Britain's grip on these possessions 
was precarious. This impression got a boost from all the campaigns 
on which British troops were sent in this period. Apart frorn the 
constant tension in Ireland and the need to administer India, the 
thin red line got thinner as troops went out to South Africa to 
fight Kaffir tribesmen in a lengthy conflict and to China, Ceylon 
and the Punjab to tend to other unrest. Small wonder, then, that 
many Americans played down the threat posed by Britain to the 
United States. In the middle of the Fisheries dispute, New York's 
Seward told the Senate that Britain was in no position to wage war. 
"Her power has been extended over the east", he said, "and she 
employs nearly all her armies in India, and in Africa, to maintain 
herself against the natives of the one continent and the savages of 
the other." 79 This echoed a speech made six years earlier by 
Arkansas Senator Ashley. As war over Oregon threatened, he boasted 
that Britain could not fight America. She did not dare withdraw 
any part of her army from its present job of guarding her 
government against her 0~ citizens and "preserving dominion over 
the fragments of her empire, scattered in every part of the 
habitable globe." 80 As well as preserving this dominion from the 
unrest of its inhabitants, Britain also had to guard against the 
threats posed by her Old World rivals. Having won large chunks of 
the Empire by routing European enemies in war, Britain, claimed one 
senator, was diplomatically isolated, "without a friend in any one 
of the nations of the earth." This inevitably stretched her forces 
still further and meant that she would not be able to launch the 
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full power of her navy against the States because most of her ships 
were busy guarding her 1 . 81 . h . co on1es. In s ort, 1n time of war the 
Empire would be less of an asset and more of a drain on Britain's 
very limited resources. Already on its last legs, the Empire would 
disintegrate if Britain went to war, which inevitably served as a 
powerful restraint on the British. Seething with discontent, 
British North America was ·one of the biggest problems of them all. 
Said New York representative Samuel Gordon in 1846: "Let her 
[Britain] once become engaged in war, and let Canada or Ireland 
evince a disposition to regain their lost independence, and the 
British Empire will be at an end. She knows it." 82 
As with the daunting descriptions of Britain's strength, many 
of these speeches were insincere. In reality, the orators were 
trying to deter or justify a hard line with England and to calm 
down or stir up the populate. In the Oregon debates the "54-40 or 
Fight" faction usually portrayed Britain as on the verge of 
collapse and British North America as disloyal or indefensible. By 
such arguments they hoped to give the impression that the United 
States need have no fear of war with Britain and that, as a result, 
they were justified in calling for a firm stand. To increase 
pressure on both the American and the British Governments, they 
would also whip up patriotic fervour by again referring to past 
British outrages and British North America's role in previous 
Anglo-American clashes. Thus, Ohio's Allen, chairman of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, tried to stoke up hostility to Britain 
by referring to her "horrible practice" in the War of 1812 of 
"bribing the pitiless Indians to butcher our women and children of 
the west, while asleep, at night, in their cabins." And he went on 
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to distort the Caroline incident of 1837- in which one American 
border raider died - into the murder of several members of its 
crew. 83 On the other hand, the vulnerability of the United States 
to attack was used to justify a more moderate approach to 
Anglo-American relations. Thus in the same debates, South Carolina 
/ 
representative Holmes argued for greater restraint over Oregon by 
describing the ease with which the Royal Navy could descend on and 
destroy America's eastern seaboard. And in the Senate South 
Carolina's most eminent politician, John c. Calhoun, worked for 
peace by predicting that the next war with Britain would be the 
84 biggest and the bloodiest the world had ever seen. 
Given the choice, though, most Americans would have preferred 
Britain not to have held territory in North America. Whatever the 
warring Congressional factions said, British North America did make 
the United States vulnerable, and she did increase Britain's scope 
to meddle in American affairs. If the colonies provided the United 
States with Britain's Achilles Heel, they also gave Britain a 
strategic back door into the republic. British North America was 
the only point on the continent controlled by a power able to go on 
the offensive against the United States. Britain would certainly 
have been reluctant to errbark on a transatlantic war, largely 
because of its expense and the extensive commerce between the two 
countries. However, had such a war broken out, the Provinces would 
have given Britain the ability to wreak more havoc on mainland 
America than any other country. True, the colonies would have 
suffered in the land war, but they would have greatly reinforced 
the operations of the Royal Navy. For these reasons, and because 
of the long-term benefits expected from a global family of colonies 
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peopled by British settlers, successive British Governments were 
keen to retain British North America. Looking to the future, most 
in Britain believed that eventual independence was inevitable, but, 
reported Bancroft from London, "if they could exist separately from 
us, and as our rival, the number of friends to their emancipation 
ld . "85 wou Increase. But if London saw British North America as a 
means of keeping a check on the United States, the position of the 
Provinces next to the republic spelled trouble for Great Britain. 
It gave both the colonists and the Americans a means of putting 
pressure on the Mother country. As a result, the Provinces were 
unlike Australia or New zealand. They were very much a hostage for 
the good behaviour of Great Britain. 
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1848: AMERICA LOOKS NORTH 
For much of this period British North America and the United 
States behaved towards each other like a couple of ill-starred 
lovers. Though they often shared the same desires, they never did 
so at the same time. When American groups began in 1848 to talk of 
invading and annexing the Provinces, the Colonists clung 
contentedly to the skirts of the Mother Country. One year later, 
when an influential group of Colonists took the unusual step of 
petitioning the United States to annex canada, it was the turn of 
the Americans to reject the amorous advances of their neighbour. 
The truth was that the prospective marriage between the two suitors 
was doomed from the start because of a lack of sincerity on both 
sides. British North America and the United States were acting out 
their own diplomatic version of the eternal triangle, with Britain 
forming the other apex. When elements on either side of the 
Republic's northern border made their advances, they usually did so 
in the hope of creating an effect in Britain. In reality, the 
Provinces and the United States were flirting, playing each other 
off against Great Britain. And in this way British North America 
became a pawn in the games of several different groups. 
The first groups to shown an interest in using canada as an 
expendable chess piece were based firmly in the United States. In 
1848 they summed up the chief dangers which the republic posed to 
the colonies: the twin threats of a popular invasion and of an 
attempt by the American Government to annex British North America. 1 
The most obvious problem lay with the unpredictable behaviour of 
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American citizens. In the past, the United States had extended its 
borders by both diplomacy - like the LOUISiana Purchase - and the 
relentless spread of American pioneers. They had fought their way 
to the annexation of Texas, and their steady flow west along the 
Oregon trail had helped precipitate the Anglo-American Oregon 
Crisis of 1846. But American citizens did not just try to annex 
territory informally, by settling outside the borders of the United 
States. They were also prone to acts of violence against other 
countries, as the Canadians remembered bitterly from 1837-38. 
Then, quite independently of their government and its armed forces, 
American adventurers and advocates of republicanism had tried to 
invade Upper and Lower Canada in support of fitful rebellions 
across the two Provinces. Ten years later, the danger remained 
that such adventurers might return if they were given the least 
encouragement. And in 1848 there were plenty of people willing to 
give the nod to any reckless men living along the canadian border. 
Winking in the wings as he ranted from the hustings was the 
Democrats' presidential candidate, Lewis cass, a man who had fought 
the British'in the War of 1812 and, seemingly, never got over it. 
But the biggest danger of all came from the dispersed natives of 
Ireland, always Britain's most troublesome possession. 
In the wake of the mass emigrations from the Famine, there 
were thousands of Irish men and women in the United States and 
British North America. Though they had left behind the misery of 
the potato blight, many still retained their hatred of England 
along with close links with relatives in their homeland. Thus in 
May 1848 - as news of European revolutions made Prime Minister Lord 
John Russell cast a suspicious eye over the French-Canadians2 
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Elgin reported a more serious threat to internal order. 
(A] secret combination of the Irish in Montreal 
is on foot, and bound together by Oath, having 
designs inimical to the Government ... the 
number enrolled is at least 17,000 canadians 
and Irish together and ... they look to the 
acquisition of the Arms and Gunpowder stored on 
St Helens Island in case of an OUtbreak, -or 
if they cannot possess themselves thereof for 
use, ... they consider they will have little 
difficulty in succeeding to set the Building on 
fire, so as to destroy t~e depot and deprive 
the Govt. of the Stores. 
Not surprisingly, the reported disloyalty of Irish settlers in 
Canada made Grey question the wisdom of peopling the Provinces with 
them. "I fear," he told Elgin in September 1848, "we must always 
consider that adding to the Irish population of Ca~ada is adding to 
. n4 our enem1es. 
Generally, Elgin played down the Irish problem within canada, 
portraying their excitable factions as an uninfluential minority 
5 group. But that, he knew, was not really the point. However weak 
the would-be Irish rebels were in Montreal, they had to be taken 
seriously because of one unavoidable factor: the United States. 
The Republic's long border with Canada, never mind with the other 
Provinces~ made it a natural haven for all who wished to defy 
British rule in North America. The leader of the TOronto rebellion 
of 1837, William Lyon Mackenzie, had set the precedent when· he fled 
south to lick his wounds and regroup his forces, and all knew his 
successors might well adopt the same tactics. By moving south of 
the St Lawrence, they could plot and organise free from the 
interference of the authorities they sought to topple, knowing it 
would be easy to slip back into Canada when they were ready. And 
if they were Irish, they and their plans were sure of a warm 
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welcome in the United States, especially in the big cities on the 
north-eastern seaboard. Indeed, as rumours began to grow of 
something more serious than "a secret combination" in Montreal 
against the Government, Elgin reminded Grey of the influence of the 
Irish-Americans. "[A] large Irish contingent on the other side of 
the border," he wrote, n fanatics on behalf of republicanism and 
repeal [of the Anglo-Irish Union] - are egging on their compatriots 
here to rebellion." 6 Some of these 'revolutionary' Irish-Americans 
even visited Montreal to encourage their Canadian cousins7, but on 
the whole they confined their activities to south of the border. 
Here, though, they loomed as a major threat. The British learned 
in graphic detail of the activities of 'The Friends of Ireland' who 
had groups across the north of the United States. In Boston 5,000 
men reportedly responded to an appeal from visiting Irish-Canadians 
"to raise men and money for the invasion of the Canadas." In New 
York 15,000 were said to have subscribed in a few days8 and up the 
Hudson Valley in Albany the Irish population were planning an 
invasion in support of an expected Canadian rebellion. 9 All the 
time the Irish-Canadian rebels and their Irish-American supporters 
. h bod t "1110 h . were crossing t e r er a w1 , s owing just how vulnerable 
Canada was to the United States. 
Had this fund-raising and talk of military adventure been 
confined to expatriate Irishmen, the threat to Canada would have 
been alarming enough. But as tales of the preparations by the 
Irish spread, so too did the interest of many Americans grow. As 
early as March 1848 Elgin feared that the aspiring rebels in 
Montreal might well "turn the ... sympathies of the United States 
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to account." 11 By the spring, Elgin's fears looked to be coming 
true. Throughout the spring and suiTlJT'er of 1848, rumours flew round 
canada that the United States was to be the springboard for a 
popular attack on the Province. Elgin had long heard rumours that 
the Americans - or Yankees as he disparagingly called them - were 
sending arms over the f . 12 d ront1er , an he also learned that the 
United States was likely to serve as the arsenal of any invasion. 
Reporting third-hand news, one of his staff members wrote of the 
citizens of New York State: 
(T)here was a strong feeling to sympathise with 
Anglo-Saxon Party in Canada, that, as at 
Washington in 1837-38, the key had been left in 
the door of the Arsenal, in which were 12 Brass 
guns, complete, 10,000 muskets and 4,000 
Rifles, and that these were ready to be issued 
to any~ne who dei~red to assist the French 
party 1n Canada. 
But the Americans were also apparently extending their assistance 
beyond mere material of war. In May 1848, Elgin told Britain's 
Charge d'Affaires in Washington, John F. Crampton ftRumours reach me 
of 'Hunter's Lodges' being established on the American Side of the 
Boundary line."14 This was a direct reference to the groups set up 
along the Great Lakes in 1837-38 in sympathetic response to the 
Canadian discontent. Ten years later the dissident Canadians were 
giving every encouragement to the revival of the Lodges. Writing 
from near the Canadian-US border, Robert Battersly described in 
detail a Canadian group called "The Great Grand Eagle Degrees." 
Organised in Canada to plot against the Government, its ensign was 
ominous. "It was made of white silk, with an Eagle surmounting a 
Lion, tearing a Lion's eye out upon it." Nor was the link with the 
United States merely symbolic. Battersby claimed to have read a 
letter from an American General, called Millar, who had let it be 
56 
Known that he would work with the 'Hunters'. If Battersby's 
information was correct, these 'Hunters' would have been 
formidable. Together with the Great Grand Eagle Degrees, the 
Americans had available: 
1400 stand of arms at Port Stanley all Muskets 
30 pieces of Canon at Cleveland, 330 Kegs of 
Powder 20,000 Men organised two years since 
40,000 in Ohio, in readiness to invade Canada 
at a moments notice, Commanded by General 
Wilson. 
He added: "There is I have reason to believe a much larger 
15 quantity in other places." 
Serving as a potential catalyst in all this was the conclusion 
of the United States' war with Mexico. The British feared that the 
republic's success against its weakly southern neighbour "would 
create an appetite for excitement and gain" amongst "the worst 
• 11 16 Amencans . Wrote Elgin: 
Recent successes in Mexico have excited among 
the Citizens in many Quarters an appetite for 
Military renown, and a profound conviction of 
the invincibility of the Republic- ... vast 
numbers of disbanded Soldiers whom the 
termination of the Mexican war has thrown out 
of Work are now roaming through the states 
ready for any adventure which promises 
distinction or pillage.l7 
Indeed, some of the most lurid rumours gave great credence to the 
lust for battle and booty which the experience of war had given 
many Americans. Orange Lodge Grand Master Ogle R Gown, for 
instance, had heard that "a formidable enrollment" was underway 
across the St Lawrence for a hostile invasion of Canada. "50,000 
disbanded men," he wrote "with an experienced General to lead, and 
who served 1n the destruction of Mexico, are to compose the 
d . . "18 expe 1t1on. Elgin himself wrote that any invasion in support of 
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the Irish would be led by "an American General lately returned from 
Mexico." By July Elgin was talking of an American invasion force 
of up to 800,000, including 50,000 Irishmen. 19 Significantly, 
these figures grew and grew as the rumours became more fanciful, 
but the threat of Mexican War veterans was real enough. By the 
summer they were returning to their home states and many of them 
knew or desired only one profession - soldiering. For this reason, 
Crampton and Elgin took them very seriously. 20 Looking back, Elgin 
described the United States at that time as "boiling over with 
bandits and desperadoes." 21 And, according to Crampton, this 
republican pot was likely to be fully on the boil "during the next 
autumn and winter months- the period of idleness in those (Border] 
districts, - and the season which they have on all former occasions 
h f l . · l t" n22 c osen or po 1t1ca opera 1ons. 
But long before the freezing of the soil and the long winter 
nights could spawn scores of idle hands along the border, a much 
more volatile influence entered the maelstrom: a presidential 
election. The British had long been convinced that American 
elections were excesses of republicanism, leaving the country open 
to mob rule and turning politicians into unprincipled demagogues. 
1848 did nothing to change their minds. After bearing the brunt of 
the cross border tension for several months, Elgin gave Grey an 
accurate SlliTliTBry of its roots. "Your Lordship is doubtless aware," 
he began, 
that for some time past demonstrations of a 
formidable character had been made in the 
United States having for their ostensible 
object to raise funds and by all other means 
which sympathy and enthusiasm can suggest to 
Afford aid and support to the people of Ireland 
in their Struggle for independence. This 
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movement originated with the Irish residents 
and the more advanced professors of the 
doctrine of Republican Propagandism. It has 
however been countenanced and abetted by some 
of the more active and unscrupulous leaders of 
the parties who are now engaged in recommending 
the claims of their respective candidates to 
the Presidency and to whom it is of great 
moment to secure the Irish Vote ... It is well 
known that one at least of the individuals now 
aspiring to the Presidency has declared himself 
in favor of the Annexation of Canada ... These 
circumstances render it by no means improbable 
that an attempt may be made to turn against 
Canada the tide of Irish sympathy.23 
Leading the way as America's top demagogue was Lewis Cass, who had 
worked hard over a long political career to earn the right to be 
described as a fire-eater. With the United States' ultimate 
political prize as his guiding light, he resorted to a tried and 
tested electioneering tactic, twisting the lion's tail. 
Unfortunately tor the British Lion, Canada gave cass a readily 
accessible tail that was easy to twist. Even when just a senator, 
Cass was never slow to advocate the admission of Canada and her 
sisters into the Union, as his speeches during 
24 the 1852 Fishery Dispute reveal. 
the 1846 Oregon 
Crisis and But in 1848 the 
British watched in trepidation as he emerged as the man who could 
very soon control the destinies of the United States. 
Crampton warned Elgin that the Michigan expansionist was 
making very little secret of his intentions, so 
soon as the Mexican business is got rid of, of 
turning the attention of the American people 
towards Canada, which he boasts he could subdue 
with a very small force. All his speeches seem 
to be a preparation for something of the sort, 
and he never loses an opportunity of raking u~5 old subjects of irritation against H Ms Govt. 
In May 
Thus, in June, after the Democrats' nominating convention in 
Baltimore, Elgin reported that the news was "somewhat warlike." 
I am sorry to observe that Cass has been 
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nominated by the Democratic Convention as their 
candidate for the Presidency. -- He is the 
most pugnacious Gentleman in the Union ... war 
breathing Cass is the choice of the Democrats 
of the Union, and General Taylor the almost 
inevitable nominee of the Whigs -- If the 
flames of war are kindled in Europe there is no 
man s~6 likely to drag America into the fire as 
cass. 
Along the Canadian border, Crampton expected Cass' nomination could 
heighten the tension by spawning the revival of Hunters' ' 27 LOdges. 
So concerned were the British about the prospect of having to deal 
with Cass as President that privately they began to side with his 
28 
rival, "Old Rough and Ready", General Zachary Taylor. Preferring 
this Louisiana slaveholder may seem odd; he was, after all, another 
military man, the victor of the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de 
1 1 . h . 29 a Pa rna 1n t e Mex1can War. But, explained Crampton, "as far as 
regards international questions (he) would from all I have heard of 
him, be as safe a President as we could desi~e." 30 
Inevitably this constant talk of the threat to the Colonies 
from the United States began to take its toll on Crampton, Elgin 
and Grey. The most extreme response came in a letter written by 
the latter at his family home. As autumn began to spread across 
the Northumberland countryside, Grey told Elgin: 
I have received today ... your confidential 
despatch respecting the danger from America to 
Canada. - The latter is a very serious subject 
indeed - I have so very bad an opinion of the 
people & still more of the Govt. & institutions 
of the United States, that I cannot but 
entertain great apprehensions for the future of 
a Province they can so easily invade.Jl 
concerning cass, the British held several fears. Clearly, if he 
became President, relations between Britain and the United States 
were likely to deteriorate and, more specifically, Canada might 
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become the object of the American Goverrunent's territorial 
ambit ions. Instead of being threatened by bands of !T'arauding 
hot-heads, Canada could face a better organised, Washington-backed 
attempt at annexation. However, the Brit1sn tended to treat 
outrageous statements by electioneering American politicians as 
insincere vote-catching. Thus, when Cass spoke boldly of annexing 
Canada or Cuba or the Sandwich Islands, Palmerston and Grey did not 
necessarily believe that he actually planned to seize these 
possessions as soon as he entered the White House. In fact, the 
responsibility of power and the possibility of war were likely to 
restrain even the most aggressive of presidents. Instead, the 
danger was that Cass's annexationist outbursts would stir up the 
loafers and adventurers south of the St Lawrence and encourage a 
repeat of 1837-38. It was also possible that his public support 
for expansionism might rebound on him. Thi"s, wrote Cra!Tlpton, was 
the fear of a distinguished member of Congress who lived near the 
Canadian border. He believed that 
if a protracted struggle were to take place in 
canada, it would be next to impossible to 
prevent its being made the subject of a war cry 
by the Democratic party in order to bring in 
Genl. cass as President, who has committed 
himself so far on this subject as to make it 
very difficult for him, under such 
circumstances, not to act upon his avowed 
intention of attempting to gain possession of 
Canada for the United States.32 
Cass had made such a show of declaring himself in favour of 
annexing Canada that if a rebellion did occur either during his 
candidacy or when he was actually president, he would be powerless 
to stop a popular invasion. Instead, despite the obvious risk to 
transatlantic peace, he would be obliged to jump back on the 
bandwagon he had conveniently created as a vehicle for his 
promotion to the White House. 
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The British were unsure quite how to react to these 'Jar iec 
threats. Throughout, Elgin and his canadian Executive Council were 
reasonably confident of 
1 . 33 . 1 d. popu ation , Inc u Ing 
the loyalty of the 
h . h d. 34 t e Iris -Cana Ians , 
majority of the 
and this lessened 
their fear of an internal rebellion. Equally, Elgin could be 
scathing about the prospects of an American-based attack. Thus, he 
played down reports that there were 800,000 Americans ready to 
invade Canada in support of a rebellion there by the Irish, noting 
with glee that the Montreal meeting intended to inflame the Irish 
was washed out by a 35 thunderstorm. 'IWo months later, in 
September, his jaunty confidence allowed him to joke about the 
declining threat of invasion. Observing that the chief objects of 
American land-hunger were clearly California and Canada he 
described advertisements in American papers reflecting this. 
Referring to California's other name- the ·Black Bear Republic 
Elgin said that some of these papers had announced that there was 
to be "a Bear Hunt ... to take place in the Sierra Madre during the 
winter." But some 'hunters' were looking to the north for 
adventure, he wrote. 
The other amusement projected and announced is 
a red Fox. Hunt in Canada. This game does not 
appear at the moment quite as popular as the 
other - It may be that the love of sport does 
not increase as it ought to do in a direct 
ratio with the danger attending it.36 
Yet, the British were never truly blase, largely because they could 
not afford to be. The military authorities maintained "a constant 
and careful vigilance" for as long as the province's Irish 
population was restive and, wrote Elgin, "all the military men here 
... were confident that there was to be a rising of the French & 
Irish to welcome the Yankees." Though Elgin was less fearful, he 
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gave the commander of Britain's forces his "full permiss1on to take 
the whole garrison of Montreal to the frontier if he judged it 
necessary to do so." There was, wrote the Governor-General, a 
black storm hanging over the Province. 37 While this storm cast its 
shadow, Elgin took steps to secure advance warning of any acts of 
aggression from the United States. In the first private letter 
that passed between him and Crampton, Elgin asked the Charge 
d'Affaires to give him any useful information about the Hunters' 
Lodges. Such a step - repeated two months later in July 38 was 
essential to distinguish fact from speculation, which was rife in 
Montreal that summer. Crampton did his best, passing Elgin any 
information that came his way, and sending a trustworthy man "to 
inquire about the existence of secret Associations on the Boundary 
1 . ..39 1ne. Backing up this work were the activities in Boston of the 
Agent for the British Mails, James Moore,· and Elgin's Military 
Secretary, Colonel Bruce, who went to the States to get "accurate 
information with respect to the probable movements of the 
S h . d · h · · n40 ympat 1sers ur1ng t e ensu1ng w1nter. As polling day for the 
Presidency drew near, Elgin and Crampton watched the American 
election with the interest of men whose fates depended on the 
outcome. Thus, two weeks before the nationwide vote, Elgin 
reported that Canada was calm "although in the unsettled state of 
the World it will not do to slumber at any post - more particularly 
in the immediate vicinity of a territory which may be Cass's within 
a fortnight." 41 If any interlopers did attempt an invasion, the 
British planned to give them a hostile reception. 42 In this they 
had the full support of Colonial Secretary Grey. "I only trust," 
he told Elgin, 
if there should be any attempts on the part of 
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lawless bands from the States to invade the 
Province they will not be treated with the 
consideration due to a fair and honorable enemy 
- I have no hesitation in saying that of such 
miscreants the fewer prisoners that are taken 
the better, since in these days of squeamish 
humanity (which I think no humanity at all) it 
is not easy to hang them afterwards as they 
deserve.43 
The British were determined to resist any attack on their 
North American Provinces and any attempt by the United States to 
annex them. Yet their resolution was not put to the test because 
these attacks never came. This was largely because of the 
insincerity of most of those who made verbal threats against 
Canada. In reality, their prime goal was not to annex the Colonies 
to the United States; rather, they used the threat of doing so to 
serve their own, vari~d ends. And when for diverse reasons these 
became unattainable, Canada reverted to its traditional role in 
American politics: the forgotten man of North America. It is true 
that some of those who favoured an attack on Canada did so because 
they thought it would be a valuable addition to the United States. 
But they were in the minority. The activities of the Irish, for 
instance, did not reflect any real desire to see British North 
America as a member of the Union. On the contrary, they were 
trying to help their compatriots in Ireland and to fight the hated 
British Empire. Thus, M T O'Connor, a New York newspaper editor 
and a leading light in the Irish Republican Union, told an 
opposition member of the Canadian Parliament that 
with respect to himself and the thousands who 
felt with him there was no sacrifice they were 
not ready to make if they could humble England 
& reduce her to a third rate power. 
This gave the Irish Republican movement in North America more 
altruistic motives than it really possessed. If all went to plan, 
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the hope of the Irish-Americans was not so much to weaken Britain 
but to bolster an eagerly awaited rebellion in Ireland. Wrote 
O'Connor in a New York paper at the end of May: 
England must be attacked on all sides and at 
all points. Her doom will be certain, and her 
stocks will go down... Canada must and will be 
invaded whenever Ireland rises. 
This rebellion, moreover, was expected within the next few weeks. 
When it came, the plan of the Irish-Americans was to create a 
diversion in North America which would dissipate the strength of 
the British army and prevent reinforcements being sent from British 
North America to quash the rebellion in Ireland. Though O'Connor 
tried to widen the appeal of this venture by talking of the 
benefits to the United States of annexing the Province 44 this 
' 
would never had been a truly annexationist expedition. If the 
invasion had failed to wrest Canada from the Empire but had 
contributed to the success of the rebellion in Ireland, the Irish 
Republican movement would have been more than happy. Canada •..tas 
not their target; it simply provided an easy way of hitting back at 
Britain. 
The motives of the adventurers who would have formed the hard 
core of the Hunters' Lodges were less complex. In an unguarded 
moment, Elgin described them as some "of the dregs of the American 
people" 45 , an extreme view which nevertheless held a fair amount of 
truth. Some, though, may have thought an invasion in support of a 
canadian rebellion morally justifiable. Brought up in a country 
where republicanism was believed to be the best form of Government, 
they could see across the St Lawrence a colony groaning under the 
Old World oppression of Great Britain. As a result, Canada must 
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have seemed 1n particular need of liberty. ~ith Britain widely 
seen as the natural enemy of the United States, a liberatiny 
mission would have been especially appealing. It would also have 
lent moral justification for an attack on the sovereign territory 
of a neutral neighbour. But few men are willing to risk their 
lives for abstract principles alone, and the reception invading 
Americans had received in 1812 and 1837 made it clear that any 
'Hunters' would be taking their lives into their own hands. 
Another lure was needed and, as Elgin observed46 , the prospect of 
military glory and martial spoils served this purpose handsomely. 
As with the Irish-Americans, then, Canada was not the real target 
for these men. A fervent desire to spread the benefits of 
republicanism, wedded to a love of excitement and booty, was their 
motivation. As for Lewis Cass, he too was far from sincere when he 
made his annexationist rumblings at the hustings. Though the 
spin-off effect for canada could have been disastrous, his 
objective was not British North America but the White House. And, 
like many an American politician before and after, he thought he 
might get a lift up the political ladder through verbal attacks on 
Britain and her New World territories. Such statements, he hoped, 
would appeal to the Anglophobes among the electorate, who were by 
no means all Irish. Moreover, his bold stance would get him 
publicity and at the same time prove his patriotism and capacity 
for office by showing that he would not kow-tow to the undeniable 
might of the British Empire. 
Significantly, the much-heralded American-based attack on 
canada never came. There were several reasons for this non-event, 
but one fact dominated. Virtually all the would-be attackers had 
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threatened Canada because it was a means to more important ends. 
But as the year progressed these goals either slipped out of their 
grasp or became available elsewhere. The first stumbling block was 
the rebellion in Ireland. Long-predicted, it was to be the signal 
for the Irish-Canadians to rise up and for the Irish-Americans and 
the Hunters' Lodges to invade Canada. But when it came, it was a 
fiasco. On July 25 James Finton Lalor staged an uprising in 
Tipperary, but the rebels were few, poorly armed and without a 
clear plan of action. Their sweeping blow against British rule was 
to seize the Ballingary farmhouse of Widow McCormack and take her 
and her five children hostage. Police surrounded the building and 
their leader was faced with having to blow up the farmhouse and its 
occupants. He could not do this. Instead of trumpeting out an 
heroic message to their cousins across the Atlantic, the insurgents 
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were quickly rounded up, convicted and deported. Deprived of the 
reason for their attack on canada, the Friends of Ireland put away 
their arms. This, though, still left the returning Mexican War 
veterans and the loafers on the border. Without the support of the 
Irishmen who had aroused their interest in the first place, these 
men were unlikely to invade Canada, but they were still short of 
excitement. The news from California soon put an end to this. In 
January 1848 gold was found on the bed of the American River. The 
news did not get out immediately, but when it did, there was only 
one direction for fortune hunters and adventurers to go: west. The 
choice between the icefields of Canada and the goldfields of 
California was an easy one to make. Just as important for the 
security of canada was the defeat of Cassat the polls. In London 
Russell urged caution, wanting to see how Taylor behaved before 
f h d . . 48 reducing the size o t e Cana Ian garrison but in Washington 
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Crampton was much more euphoric. 
The Election of zachary Taylor has, I th1nk, 
with some assistance from the California "gold 
mania", quieted any mischievous schemes on the 
northern frontier which the success of Genl. 
Cass might have called into activity. Genl. 
Taylor is quite uncommitted on all these 
questions & ... has ... spoken out boldly his 
disapproval of the conquest & aggression and 
annexation system.49 
By the time of Cass' November defeat the American-based threat 
hanging over Canada had more or less disappeared. With the failure 
of the Irish rebellion, the lure of California gold and Taylor in 
the White House, the only purpose to a popular attack on Canada 
would have been to try to annex it. And in late 1848 very few 
people really wanted to do that. 
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l Elgin to Grey, December 6, 1848, EGP, I, 268: "There are two 
ways in which America may give us serious annoyance here and 
occupation for our troops - either by going Regularly to war 
with the view of wresting Canada from England, or by 
permitting bands of citizens under the denomination of fox 
hunters, buffalo hunters, - sympathisers, or what not, to 
invade this territory." See also Peter Burroughs, "The 
Determinants of Colonial Self-Goverrunent", in The Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History, VI (1978), 327. 
2 Russell to Grey, March 12, 1848, GP; cf Grey to Elgin, March 
22 1848, EP, A 397. 
3 Colonel W C E Holloway to Lieutenant General Sir Benjamin 
D'Urban, enclosed in Elgin to Grey, May 4, 1848, EP, A 399; 
also in EGP, I, 150. 
4 Grey to Elgin, September 6, 1848, EP, A 397; cf Grey to Elgin, 
July 27, 1848, EGP, I, 206. 
5 Elgin to Grey, May 4, 1848, EGP, I, 148-9. 
6 Elgin to Grey, May 4, 1848, EGP, I, 149. 
7 Elgin to Grey, November 16, 1848, EGP, I, 257. 
8 John Moore, British Despatch Agent in Boston, Massachusetts, 
to Elgin, December 26, 1848, EP, A 399. 
9 S C Sewell, Albany, New York, to Colonel Wetherall, July 23, 
1848, EP, A 398. 
10 Irish-American leader M T O'Connor, quoted in un-named 
American paper, addressing the Irish Republican Union: "An 
agent is coming from canada to buy arms here to take to Canada 
for the approaching crisis." Enclosed in John F Crampton to 
Elgin, May 29, 1848, EP, A 398. 
11 Elgin to Grey, March 27, 1848, EGP, I, 139. 
12 Elgin to Grey, April 26, 1848, EGP, I, 145: "It is said that 
the Yankees are sending arms over the frontier but I have no 
authentic information to this effect." 
13 Joseph Alexander to unknown correspondent, presumably Elgin, 
May 27, 1849, EP, A 398. 
14 Elgin to Crampton, May 20, 1848, EP, A 398. 
15 Robert Battersly to Elgin, May 7, 1848, EP, A 399. 
16 Grey to Elgin, September 6, 1848, EP, A 397. 
17 Elgin to Grey, September 7, 1848, EGP, IV, 1478. 
18 OgleR Gowan to Major Campbell, August 7, 1848, EP, A 398. 
19 Elgin to Grey, July 18, 1848, EP, I, 209-10. 
69 
20 Crampton to Elgin, August 4, 1848, EP, A 398. 
21 Elgin to Grey, October 8, 1842, EGP, III, 1047. 
22 Crampton to Elgin, August 4, 1848, EP, A 398; cf Elgin to 
Grey, August 16, 1848, EGP, I, 224: "Mr Crampton ... looks 
forward with apprehension to the winter when the Irish will 
have little work & the disbanded miscreants who are now . 
returning in hordes from Mexico with appetites whetted for all 
deeds of rapine & blood will be ready for any congenial job." 
23 Elgin to Grey, September 7, 1848, EGP, IV, 1477-8. 
24 Cass, Senate, March 30, 1846, Congressional Globe, 29:1, 
Appendix, 429-30; Cass, Senate, August 16, 1852, Congressional 
Globe, 32:1, 943. 
25 Crampton to Elgin, May 29, 1848, EP, A 398. 
26 Elgin to Grey, June 1, 1848, EGP, I, 179. 
27 Crampton to Elgin, May 29, 1848, EP, A 398. 
28 Crampton to Elgin, August 4, 1848, EP, A 398. 
29 Ray Allen Billington, The Far Western Frontier, 1830-1860, 
(New York, Harper & Row, 1956), 177. 
30 Crampton to Elgin, May 29, 1848, EP, A -398. 
31 Grey to Elgin, September, 1848, EP, A 397. 
32 Crampton to Elgin, August 8, 1848, EP, A 398. 
33 Elgin to Grey, May 4, August 16, 1848, EGP, I, 148-9, 225. 
34 Elgin to Crampton, July 24, 1848, EP, A 398. 
35 Elgin to Grey, July 18, 1848, EGP, I, 209-10. 
36 Elgin to Grey, September 21, 1848, EGP, I, 240-1. 
37 Elgin to Grey, April 26, 1848, EGP, I, 145; D'Urban to 
Major-General Gore, April 27, 1848, EP, A 399; Elgin to Grey, 
June 11, 1849, EGP, I, 369. 
38 Elgin to Crampton, May 20, July 24, 1848, EP, A 398. 
39 Crampton to Elgin, August 4, 1848, EP, A 398. 
40 Moore to Elgin, December 26, 1848, EP, A 399; Elgin to Grey, 
September 7, 1848, EGP, IV, 1480. 
41 Elgin to Grey, October 25, 1848, EGP, I, 251. 
42 Major campbell to Elgin, August 1848, EP, A 398: "It is most 
important that any attempt at invasion should be crushed at 
70 
once." cf Elgin to Grey, January 4, 1849, EGP, I, 280: "I 
only wish the scoundrels would come - we would give them a 
proper thrashing .... " 
43 Grey to Elgin, September 6, 1848, EP, A 398. 
The British had already set a precedent for meting out harsh 
treatment to American invaders. After capturing scores of 
"Buffalo Hunters" in the rebellions of 1837-38, the British 
authorities transported at least 150 Americans to Australia, 
where they faced indefinite hard labour. Though the British 
granted pardons in 1844, the Americans had to find their own 
way home. The 27 who eventually returned had to work their 
passage on a Pacific whaler. See Stuart D Scott, "The Patriot 
Game: New Yorkers and the Canadian Rebellion of 1837-1838", in 
New York History, LXVIII (1987), 285 ff. 
44 Elgin to Grey, July 18, 1848, EGP, I, 209-10; M T O'Connor 
article in American newspaper, enclosed in Crampton to Elgin, 
May 29, 1848, EP, A 398. 
45 Elgin to Grey, September 21, 1848, EGP, I, 241. 
46 Elgin to Grey, September 7, 1848, EGP, IV, 1478. 
47 William L Langer, Political and Social Upheaval, 1832-1852, 
(New York, Evanston and London, Harper Torchbooks, 1969), 
244-5. 
48 Russell to Grey, December 20, 1848, GP.· 
49 Crampton to Elgin, December 18, 1848, EP, A 398. 
71 
CHAPTER THREE 
1849: CANADA LOOKS SOUTH 
If Elgin had reflected ruefully in 1849 that his problems were 
never-ending, he would have had just cause. One of his top 
priorities the year before had been to ensure that the Canadians 
did not give the Americans any excuse for invading. It therefore 
became a guiding light of his policy to do nothing which could 
spark off public displays of unrest in any part of British North 
America. By 1849, though, he could no longer keep the lid on the 
seething discontent in Canada which was being heated to boiling 
point by political and economic disquiet. This inevitably 
transformed the whole question of annexation to the United States. 
In the past, the United States had coveted Canada, only for the 
colonists to spurn their advances. In 1849; though, the roles were 
reversed. Influential groups in the Provinces urged the 
once-despised republic to admit them into the Union, only for their 
pleas to fall on what appeared to be deaf ears. Like their 
American predecessors of the year before, these men were far from 
sincere in their actions. In reality, the 1849 Annexation movement 
was a clumsy attempt by a minority of politically and economically 
alienated men to pressurise Britain and to seek dramatic solutions 
to short-term problems. They chose to do this by exploiting the 
close proximity of the United States and Britain's fear of losing 
British North America to her rising North American rival. But in 
taking this course, the annexationists dragged the United States 
into what was really an imperial quarrel; and to do this was to 
play with fire. 
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The warning signs, of course, had been visible for some t1me. 
As early as february 1848 Elgin told Grey that "Britain and British 
Institutions have no hold whatsoever on the affections of certair1 
classes of the inhabitants of this Province - Powerful influences 
are at work dragging it towards the United States. ,l By November 
1848 he was airing his often-repeated claim that in Canada "the 
conviction that they would be better off if they were annexed [to 
the more prosperous United States] is almost universal among the 
commercial classes at present." 2 However, to more distant 
observers, public demonstrations of unrest were slov1er to appear. 
When they came, they were undeniably spectacular. The first hint 
of serious trouble came in the last week of April 1849 on the 
streets of Montreal, straight after Elgin had given his consent to 
the passage of the Rebellion Losses Bill. Introduced by the 
Liberal ministry of Louis Hyppolyte La Fontaine and Robert Baldwin, 
this Bill proposed giving belated compensation to the loyal victims 
of the 1837-38 rebellions in predominantly French-speaking Lower 
Canada. But, because the families of known rebels like 
Louis-Joseph Papineau were planning to claim under its terms, the 
Tory party branded it as a measure· designed to reward treason. 
Elgin's reward for giving his approval to the bill -passed by a 
majority in the Canadian Parliament - was to be pelted with stones 
as he rode through Montreal in his carriage. Five days later, 
notwithstanding his role as the official representative of Queen 
Victoria, the Mother of the Empire, a stone actually hit him. 
Compared to the Canadian Parliament, though, the Governor-General 
got off lightly. The mob vented its anger by burning it to the 
ground- though the arsonists did allow the Members to escape. 3 In 
the wake of the Old World revolutions of the previous year, this 
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outrage was full of menace. Such was the tension in Montreal that 
s1x weeks later Elgin sent a military officer in his place to 
prorogue Parliament, fearing that his own presence might provoke a 
fresh outbreak of rioting. 4 In the summer heat of August, Montreal 
again shook with violence. After the arrest of men implicated in 
the burning of the Parliament, a mob attacked the home of La 
Fontaine. In the fracas, one of the rioters was shot. 5 But the 
agitation was not confined to futile acts of street violence. 
Among the discontented in Montreal - as across the rest of Canada -
were influential, articulate men of means. In early October, with 
annexationist papers springing up across the province, they made 
the boldest move yet: they published the Montreal Annexation 
Manifesto. With this document, they sought to persuade their 
fellow countrymen that there was only one true remedy to Canada's 
economic, political and social ills: 
A FRIENDLY AND PEACEFUL SEPARATION FROM {sic) 
BRITISH CONNECTION AND A UNION UPON EQUITABLE 
TERMS WITH THE GREAT NORTH AMERICAN CONFEDERACY 
OF SOVEREIGN STATES. 
These men, who included Members of the Provincial Parliament {MPPs) 
and some of the city's top commercial figures 6, were openly 
inviting the American Government to carry out the peaceful 
annexation of canada to the United States. One year too late, the 
United States received its pretext to invade Canada in support of 
an appeal for help. 
Not surprisingly, the British took the annexationist threat 
seriously. In August 1849 Prime Minister LOrd John Russell wrote 
that an account he had received "of the wish for annexation in the 
LOwer Provinces is very formidable." 7 Straight after the 
Parliament had been razed to the ground, Elgin told Grey: "I 
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confess I did not before know how thin is the crust of order which 
cover (sic) the anarchical elements that boil and toss beneath our 
feet." 8 Nevertheless, the British were convinced that the movement 
was but a passing phase and that the annexationists, though noisy, 
were a minority. 9 The British policy, outlined by Russell as early 
as March 1848, was to ensure that the minority did not become the 
majority. Wrote the Prime Minister: 
People argue ... as if a million & a half of 
people were like one man, who wished for 
British rule, or were against it - But the 
truth is that if a million are for British & a 
half million for American connexion, the half 
million will soon get the majority on their 
side if they are active, combined, & zealous, 
while the opposite party are discouraged by the 
apa~hy, coldness, & indifferente of the Home 
Gov . Whereas if the Home Gov shew themselves 
friendly and determined the half million may in 
a short time be reduced to 100,000.10 
Russell was true to his word. Instead of the apathy, coldness and 
indifference expected from the Home Government by some 
. . 11 . s . 1 annexatiOnists , American pec1a Agent Israel de Wolf ' 12 Anarews 
and American administration and opposition 13 papers , the British 
acted firmly to demonstrate their commitment to the Colonies. But, 
having learned the lessons of 1837 and 1838, the authorities chose 
neither to inflame·matters nor to store up long-term problems by 
using military force. Instead, Elgin opted to defuse the crisis by 
holding out the prospect of a solution to one of its causes. Thus, 
he and the British Government stepped up their efforts to secure 
Reciprocity with the United States which, even if unsuccessful, 
showed Britain's commitment to Canada as well as promising a relief 
to canada's economic plight. At the same time, by disgracing the 
office-holding advocates of annexation, Elgin showed that Britain 
would not brook even the mildest form of treason. Such men were 
dismissed from office, an action clearly demonstrating the control 
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- - '11 h d d' f~ . 14 Br1ta1n st1 a over Cana 1an a La1rs. Grey underlined this 
decisive action by publicly stating the support Elgin had trom 
Queen Victoria herself. He continued, in bold capitals: 
HER MAJESTY CONFIDENTLY RELIES ON THE LOYALTY 
OF THE GREAT MAJORITY OF HER CANADIAN SUBJEcrS, 
AND SHE IS THEREFORE DETERMINED 'ID EXERT ALL 
THE AUTHORITY WHICH BEWr-x;S 'ID HER FOR THE 
PURroSE OF MAINTAINir-x; THE CONNEcriON OF CANADA 
WITH THIS COUNTRY, BEING PERSUADED THAT THE 
PERMANENCE OF THAT CONNEcriON IS HIGHLY 
ADVANTAGEOUS 'ID rorH. 
You~ Lordship will therefore understand that 
YOU ARE COMMANDED BY HER MAJESTY 1D RESIST, 1D 
THE UI'OOST OF YOUR POWER, ANY ATTEMPT WHICH MAY 
BE MADE 'ID BRING ABOUT THE SEPARATION OF CANADA 
FROM THE BRITISH DOMINIONS, and to mark in the 
strongest manner Her Majesty's displeasure with 
all those who may directly or indirectly 
encourage such a design. 
Grey rounded his message off with a flourish: Elgin was to take all 
necessary measures to bring to account any people who were guilty 
of disloyalty. 15 But long before this defiant official despatch 
was posted up around the towns and villages of Canada, Elgin had 
been working on his own initiative to undermine the annexation_ists 
with a subtle tactic. In the autumn he tested his faith in Upper 
Canada - modern Ontario - by going on an official tour of the 
largely British part of the fractious Province. Shell-shocked by 
his treatment in Montreal, Elgin set out warily to test the waters; 
but gradually he submerged himself in the spontaneous support that 
came his way until his tour turned into a glorious triumph. 
Throughout his journey which took in the American frontier at 
Niagara and towns like Hamilton, Toronto, Brantford, Guelph and 
London - huge crowds flocked to see him. Indians jostled with 
schoolchildren, and officials mixed ·with the general public as they 
all tried to catch a glimpse of him. By adopting a "Royal 
walkabout" approach, he showed Britain's confidence in her Canadian 
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subjects - and came away more convinced than before that the 
Annexationists were a minority. Indeed, Elgin believed that the 
Montrealers issued their Manifesto as a desperate last throw of the 
dice, hoping to regain the initiative they had lost by Elgin's 
successful round of "feasting, speech making and addressing." 16 
If the British were sure that the Annexationists were a 
minority, they were also convinced that they were, on the whole, 
insincere. After all, the advocacy of annexation had long been a 
popular tactic in Canadian political life. Thus, during a lull in 
the tension of 1849, Elgin wrote: "In Canada, Rebellion or as it is 
more delicately styled, the severance of the connexion with 
England, is the remedy which first presents itself to the 
imagination of every disappointed man." 17 Six months earlier, also 
in a letter to Grey, he wrote: 
There has been a vast deal of talk about 
annexation as is unfortunately always the case 
here when there is anything to agitate the 
public mind. - If half the talk on this 
subject were sincere I should consider ~n 
attempt to keep up the connexion with G 
Britain as Utopian in the extreme. For, no 
matter what the subject of complaint, or what 
the party complaining ... annexation is invoked 
as the remedy for all ills imaginary or real.l8 
What then, were the sources of the agitation? Undeniably, 
political immaturity had a contributory role. canada, like the 
rest of British North America, was a young, sparsely populated 
colony with but a short tradition of political activity. This was 
clear to Elgin from the start. On his arrival in Montreal to take 
up the post of Governor-General, he spoke bluntly in his opening 
address. "I did not shrink from speaking my mind, but did what I 
cd- to raise Canadian politics from the dirt." 19 Three months 
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later, he enlarged upon his analysis: 
In a community like this where there is little 
if anything of public principle to divide men, 
political parties will shape themselves under 
the influence of circumstances and of a great 
variety of affections and antipathies, 
national, sectarian and personal ... 20 
Yet it was to this squabbling, fractious colony that Grey and Elgin 
decided to introduce Responsible Government under which Governments 
were answerable to the provincial parliaments, the chosen 
representatives of the electorate. In the past, Governments had 
depended more on the support of the Governor-General than of 
Parliament, but under the new system the role of the Queen's 
representative was like that of a constitutional monarch. He had 
to sanction the measures passed by Parliament, whether he approved 
of them or not. Accepting that this was a great "experiment", 
Elgin and Grey constantly bore in mind the novelty of the 
constitutional change. Thus, Elgin wrote Grey a note of caution. 
It must be remembered that it is only of late 
that the popular assemblies in this part of the 
World have acquired the right of determining 
who shall govern them - of insisting, as we 
phrase it, that the administration of affairs 
shall be conducted by persons enjoying their 
confidence. It is not wonderful that a 
privilege of this kind should be exercised at 
first with some degree of recklessness - and 
that while no great principles of policy are at 
stake, methods of a questionable character for 
winning & retaining tha confidence of these 
arbiters of destiny, s be resorted to -21 
For the politically immature there was a .lot to be reckless 
about by early 1849. One of Annexationism's strongest roots was 
the political discontent of the previously ascendant Tories who, 
under Responsible Government, were wallowing 1n impotent 
opposition. At the end of 1847, in the first elections under the 
new system, the TOries became the victims of Canada's move towards 
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democracy. After surviving for some time with the tiniest 
majority, the Tories were trounced 3-1 at the polls by an alliance 
of french and Anglo-Canadian Reformers. As a result, the Tories 
had to surrender office and all its perquisites to men whom they 
had recently denounced as "impracticable and disloyal." 22 Added to 
their understandable disappointment and frustration was a deep 
sense of betrayal. The TOries had long seen themselves as Canada's 
true loyalists and over the years had grown accustomed to having 
the ear of a succession of sympathetic Governors and 
Governor-Generals. Indeed, Governor Metcalfe had been so partisan 
that Elgin believed he had damaged the British connection. His 
close association with the Tories had made them appear as the only 
group in canada which Britain trusted 23 . But under Responsible 
Government the Tories lost their influence over the Queen's 
representative. Despite thinking themselves ultra-loyal, from 
January 1848 the Tories found themselves marooned in the political 
wilderness, forced to watch Elgin accept repugnant 
introduced by Liberals and, worse still, french-canadians. 
measures 
Serving as a greater focus of discontent, though, was the 
economy. Throughout 1848, Elgin described the growing resentment 
of merchants as trade slumped dramatically. In August he wrote 
that "our mercantile and commercial classes 
disgusted and lukewarm in their allegiance, if not 
are thoroughly 
disaffected." 24 
TWo months later he repeated that "there is among the mercantile 
classes ... much sullen discontent." 25 The resentment in canada 
was stronger than in ordinary recessions because the blame for it 
could be laid at Britain's door. for the desperate in search of a 
scapegoat, the argument was convincing. Having long enjoyed a 
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privileged trading position with Britain, Canada's commercial 
classes received the prospect of even greater profits with the 
passage in Britain of the 1843 Canada Corn Act. This guaranteed 
entry to the British market of Canadian wheat and, more 
importantly, flour of any origin milled in Canada. In anticipation 
of becoming the gateway to Europe for the corn of the United 
States' Midwest, canadian entrepreneurs invested large sums in new 
mills. At the same time, Montreal licked its lips: it seemed at 
last to have trumped its long-standing rival, New York City. But 
before many of the new mills were even built, Britain removed 
whatever advantages the colony had over the United States by 
repealing the Corn Laws. This threw Britain's wheat market open to 
international competition and at once plunged the Canadians into a 
harsher commercial world. To a people used to a protected trading 
arrangement with their Mother Country- and- who were expecting a 
rich harvest from the Canada Corn Act - this was a severe jolt. 
And, as the strongest advocates of protectionism were traditionally 
Tories, the decline in the economy came at a doubly unfortunate 
time for Elgin and the British connection. Of course, to blame 
canada's economic problems solely on Britain's new policy of free 
trade was to miss several other influential factors. In 1845 and 
1846, for example, the United States passed Drawback Laws which 
reduced duty to be paid on Canadian trade with Europe which passed 
through the Union. If this swung the balance slightly in favour of 
New York, especially in the winter when Montreal was ice-bound, a 
general slump in world-wide trade added to Montreal's woes. 26 But 
world-wide recessions and the activities of American politicians 
were beyond the control of Canadian merchants; the policies pursued 
in the Imperial Parliament were not. 
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Here lay the problem for Britain. Wrote Elgin: 
With us, factions in the Colonies are clamorous 
and violent with tht hope oftproduc1ng effect 
on the Imperial Par and Gov just in 
proportion to their powerlessness at home - The 
history of Canada during the past year 
furnishes ample evidence of this truth. Why 
was there so much violence on the part of the 
opposition here last summer, particularly 
against the Governor-General? Because it felt 
itself to be weak in the Province, and look for 
success to the effect it could produce in 
England alone.27 
It was not that Elgin believed all annexationists to be insincere. 
Papineau and his Rouges undoubtedly wanted to see Canada in the 
neighbouring Republic, as did many of the Americans who had settled 
north of the Great Lakes. And across British North America there 
were men whose sympathies were genuinely republican. But for those 
who truly wanted to live under the American system or who found 
life in the British Empire unbearable, there was nothing to stop 
them selling up and heading south. There were no immigration 
controls on the border, there was plenty of land to spare 1n the 
Republic, and men and their families were forever leaving Canada 
for the United States. Small wonder, then, that Elgin portrayed 
the Annexation Manifesto as "an emanation from a knot of violent 
28 protectionists and disappointed party men." Nor was he alone in 
his view. 1849 saw abnormal activity in the Canadian press as 
every paper vied with its rivals to air its opinions and as new 
journals sprang up to represent this view or that for its own local 
area. Many were annexationist, but their rivals were ruthless in 
their criticism. Wrote the Examiner: 
Let us not be duped by disappointed men, who a 
few months ago were the bitter opponents of 
every Liberal measure, but now forsooth, when 
they have no chance of the loaves and fishes, 
are ready to run into the arms of the 
neighbouring republic.29 
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To Elgin and many Canadians, annexationism just did not r1ng 
true: it was creating too many false alliances. The first was the 
proposed union with the United States. Because of their vulnerable 
position, the Canadians took more interest in the United States 
than vice-versa, but this did not reveal any great love of 
republicanism. Instead, under normal circumstances, most colonists 
were hostile to the republican and frequently Anglophobic system of 
the United States. The brash political experiment was generally 
seen as corrupt, vulgar, and ruled by the passions of the mob. But 
worst of all, it supported and was 30 supported by slavery. Even 
so, the example of the United States acted on Canadians like a 
constantly dripping tap: try as they might, they could not ignore 
it. And however much they disliked the republican system, they 
were always willing to pick out its advantages when it suited them. 
In 1849, with the United States more prosperous than Canada, the 
Canadians were being more fickle than usual. countless papers ran 
features pointing out that land prices were higher and that there 
were many more miles of railroad and canals in the Republic. Even 
Liberal papers were guick to point the finger of blame at Britain. 
As early as 1847 the Montreal Pilot proclaimed: "Imperial 
interference in Canada has checked our enterprise ... It requires 
but a partial endurance of such conflicting despotism on this free 
continent to alienate the best affections of a loyal people." 31 
And when the colonists looked carefully at America's rapid economic 
growth, they could see that it was paid for by British capital. 
Yet Canada constantly complained of the lack of interest shown in 
her by these same British capitalists. Wrote Elgin: 
our greatest present danger arises from the 
impossibility of getting money on any terms and 
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the consequent paralysis of all trading 
operations. Your English Capitalists who are 
buying up large portions of the United States 
Loan will not look at our Provincial Securities 
- ... It begins, I fear, to be whispered in 
many quarters - "so far from our deriving any 
advantage from being Colonists, England would 
trust us much more readily if we were to cast 
her off for ever!"32 
Had Canada been isolated, like Australia, the effects of all this 
discontent would almost certainly have manifested itself internally 
within the British Empire. But the close proximity of the United 
States had two results. First, the colonists were able to compare 
their situation with the greener grass of the United States; and, 
second, the Republic provided them with an ally to turn to for 
help. But in 1849 the people who were loudest in their shouts for 
annexation were the very men who had traditionally considered 
themselves the staunchest loyalists in British North America. 
Thus, the Montreal Pilot - which was sympathetic towards the Reform 
Ministry - gleefully treated its readers to this article: 
The history of the Annexation Party is 
remarkably instructive. But a few months ago, 
it boasted of its loyalty, and professed the 
most ardent attachment to the mother country; 
now it is making every effort to shake off its 
allegiance to the Crown of Britain, and to 
unite itself with a republic it has for years 
held up to scorn.33 
This was not the only strange alliance spawned by the 
Annexation Movement. Within Canada itself, the agitation brought 
together some of the Province's bitterest political rivals. 
Probably the strangest bedfellows were the Tories - who had long 
detested republicanism and Papineau's radical followers who 
actually believed in it and had done so for some time. Canadian 
political and economic problems had, therefore, thrown together 
Francophobes or Orange Lodge members with French-Canadians, many of 
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whom were nominally Catholics. This situation was fraught with 
problems, which became clear from the signatures attached to 
Annexation Manifesto of OCtober 1849. Of the roughly 325 
signed the declaration, only 26 had French 34 names. 
alliance could not last - and Elgin knew it. 
All is working as I expected. - The TOries have 
succeeded in rendering annexation disgusting to 
the Radicals by advocating it ... You will 
observe that the policy of personally abusing 






Fairly rapidly the movement disintegrated as old rivalries 
took their toll and the differing goals of the annexationists 
undermined what little unity there was. The genuine annexationists 
apart, the bulk of the activists did not really want to drag Canada 
into the Union. The merchants, faced with falling profits and, in 
many cases, bankruptcy, wanted an economic revival. After enjoying 
a protected economic relationship within the Empire and then 
suffering commercial betrayal by Britain, they naturally turned 
away from the Mother country to the nearest glittering marke~ at 
hand, the United States. But by the end of 1849, Britain was 
intensifying her efforts to secure Reciprocity, which promised all 
the economic advantages of annexation without its distasteful 
political consequences. Moreover, Britain's determination to 
retain the colonies made it clear that there could be no annexation 
without war, which was the last thing most merchants wanted. As 
these truths dawned on the men of commerce, Canada began to enJOY 
the long-sought economic upturn. With their prospects improving, 
the merchants began to shy away from extreme and dangerous 
political actions. The political wing of the British 
annexationists - basically the old Tories also began to lose 
their way by the end of 1849. Traditionally hostile to the United 
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States, they had hoped that their involvement in annexationism 
could soirehow give them back the fX)litical initiative. It was a 
desperate and ill-conceived tactic, but inspired, as Elgin had 
explained, by the belief that to change the system they had to do 
something dramatic to catch the attention of the Imperial 
Parliament and Government. Thus, during the burning of the 
Provincial Parliament, leading Tory Sir Allan MacNab declined to 
stop the riot, saying: "If we don't make a disturbance ... we shall 
never get However, these Tories soon found that 
annexationism was not the key to the door that had been slammed in 
their faces by Responsible Government. The flood of loyal 
addresses that Elgin received on his tour of Upper Canada proved 
that annexationism had little appeal for the majority of canadians, 
and the hard line taken by the British Government against 
office-holding annexationists proved that the movement was having 
little effect on the Imperial Parliament. There would, therefore, 
be no abandoning of free trade or of Responsible Government. 
Instead the annexationists were in disgrace and, as a result, even 
further from returning to office than before. Thus by early 1850, 
the movement - a combination of disparate and rival groups - was in 
rapid decline. All along, the chief goal of most of its 
participants had not been to unite Canada with the United States 
but to create an effect on the British. When that tactic failed, 
so did the movement. 
From Britain's point of view, the insincerity of the majority 
of the Annexationists was small consolation. True, it meant that a 
firm British stand in Canada was likely to kill off the movement, 
but in international terms, the damage had already been done. By 
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openly applying to the United States for annexation, these men had 
dragged the republic - whose capacity for territorial expansion was 
well known - into the heart of an imperial quarrel. And though 
Elgin could shape the American response to Canada's internal crisis 
by his actions in the Province37 , he was in reality powerless to 
control the course adopted by either the United States Government 
or its unruly population. Alert to the American threat, the 
British took swift action to try to deter any intervention from 
south of the Border, and they were pleased by what appeared to be 
the mature and responsible stance of President Zachary Taylor and 
his Cabinet. But Taylor and his Secretary of State, Delaware's 
John M Clayton, were only partially honest in their dealings with 
Britain. They took as keen an interest in the Annexation Movement 
as anyone in North America and were almost certainly sympathetic to 
its aims. Ultimately, though, they had to bow to the realities of 
their relationship with Great Britain and in time the movement 
became more important as a useful weapon 1n America's dealings with 
the British and their North American Colonies. Even for the 
Americans, then, British North America was to be a pawn in a game. 
Remote from Great Britain, Elgin could have been forgiven in 
1849 for feeling as if he were sitting on top of two powderkegs. 
Even before the mob burned down the Provincial Partliament, 
Montreal was seething with discontent, and annexationism was giving 
birth to journals throughout Canada. But if Montreal was volatile, 
the United States was also notoriously unstable: 1n the past 
seventy years British North America had suffered from American 
disrespect for its sovereignty on at least three occasions. 
Elgin's fear was simple: that try as he might to control the noisy 
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minority of dissidents within Canada, the Annexation Movement m1ght 
well give the United States an excuse for its fourth invasion of 
the British Provinces. Never one just to sit back and worry, he 
took the offensive to the States before they could go on the 
offensive against him. But he deliberately avoided taking any 
action which could inflame relations with Washington or which could 
turn a domestic Canadian crisis into an assault on the republic's 
fragile sense of national honour. Instead, he chose to give the 
United States Government a firm warning through the most direct 
diplomatic channels open to him. Thus, on April 5 1849, a few 
weeks before the Montreal Parliament warmed the spring air, he sent 
a letter to Crampton who dutifully passed it on to John M Clayton, 
for whom its message was intended. After starting.in a carefree, 
alrrost chatty tone, Elgin got down to the real business. "I 
observe from your letter", he told Crampton,· 
as well as from comments in American newspapers 
that rumors of political discontent here have 
produced a considerable sensation in your part 
of the world. I do not at all wonder that this 
should be the case; for a very intimate 
acquaintance with men and things in canada is 
necessary in order to enable a looker on to 
estimate correctly the value of such 
demonstrations as we have had lately. The fact 
is that, for some years past, it has been very 
much the fashion in this Province to talk of 
rebellion as the natural and obvious remedy in 
all cases of difficulty or disappointment. 
When a merchant speculates unhappily - when a 
jobber fails in securing the place he has 
applied for - when a politician does not 
succeed in inducing Government or the public to 
take into favor his pet project, whatever it 
may be, it is too much the practice to hint at 
annexation as the legitimate consequence of 
such a contretemps. This kind of talk is 
frequently indulged in by persons who have very 
little intention of acting on their threats. 
The habit is a bad one; but it fits very 
loosely, and is put off quite as easily as it 
is put on. I could not therefore in conscience 
recommend any adventurers who had a regard 
however slender for their persons to hazard an 
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invasion of Canada on the faith of cooperaticn 
on the part of the inhabitants.38 
Ostensibly, Elgin's ~arning was for the jaunty adventurers who 
wished to continue the dubious traditions of the Buffalo's Lodges. 
Ever the diplomat, he avoided suggesting that the White House might 
itself turn into a Lodge for Red Fox Hunters. But, quite clearly, 
he also hoped to advise Clayton that the intervention of the 
American Government would neither be welcome nor wise for the 
simple reason that the Annexation Movement could not be taken at 
face value. The response of the American government was all that 
Elgin could have wished for. Even before he had penned his letter 
to Clayton, Crampton had told Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston of 
the Americans' good intentions: 
Great excitement produced by uneasy state of 
political feeling in Canada: - this has not 
gone beyond inflammatory articles predicting 
the speedy annexation of Canada, - Mr C. 
[Clayton) has been informed that G[enera]l 
Taylor has expressed in decided tones his 
determination to suppress by Military Force, 
any such attempts on the Frontier by U.S. 
citizens such as on former occasions have 
jeopardised the friendly relations of the two 
countries.39 
Taylor repeated this pledge in mid-April 40 and by mid-July General 
Winfield Scott, another Whig hero of the Mexican War, had been 
confirmed as the officer charged with keeping the border districts 
. h k 41 1n c ec . Moreover, as Clayton was quick to tell Crampton, all 
public officials working along the Canadian frontier were under 
orders to tell the Government if they heard of preparations for an · 
American-based attack 1n support of the Annexationists. As 
evidence of his resolve, Clayton asked the British Charge 
d'Affaires to share any information he had of such developments 
because "he was determined to take measures to put a stop to such 
proceedings, and ... would wish to do so before anything of the 
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sort should be brought to maturity."42 The administraticn 
underlined its commitment to peace with soothing editorials in its 
official journals asserting that: "For our part, we have not the 
slightest disposition to alienate the affections of Canada from the 
crown .... "
43 These measures had the desired effect: there was no 
popular attack by Americans on Canada and, between them, Taylor and 
Clayton impressed the British with their peaceful intentions. 
Indeed, by the end of May Elgin wrote warmly that their actions 
were "so honourable to General Taylor and his Cabinet" and praised 
"the good feeling and cordiality evinced by the 
Government of the United States." 44 
Executive 
Had Elgin known what the American Government really believed, 
he would have been less generous with his praise. Admittedly, 
Taylor and Clayton were determined to prevent yet another popular 
invasion of Canada, just as they were opposed to all filibustering 
expeditions from the United States. Thus, in the summer of 1849 
Taylor acted swiftly to denounce expeditions that were reportedly 
being prepared in the Deep South as that section's Buffalo Hunters 
cast their covetous eyes towards Cuba. In August Taylor deployed 
two war steamers off New York and New Orleans to intercept any 
invasion fleet and publicly warned the adventurers that, as well as 
facing heavy penalties in the States, they would "forfeit their 
claims to the protection of their country." The reason for such 
strong measures was because they threatened the United States' 
relations with other powers. Declared Taylor in his proclamation 
against the Cuba expeditions: 
An enterprise to invade territories of friendly 
nations, set on foot and prosecuted within the 
limits of the United States, is in the highest 
degree criminal, as tending to endanger peace 
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and compromise the honour of this nation. 45 
Though he did not issue a proclamation regarding Canada 
possibly because a large-scale invasion does not seem to have been 
planned in 1849 - these arguments were just as valid in the case of 
British North America. According to Treaty, the Provinces belonged 
to Great Britain, at that time a nation at peace with the United 
States. Hence, any unofficial attempt to invade the British 
territories would have endangered peace and compromised the honour 
of the Republic. As long as Taylor was in the White House, then, 
the British had every reason to believe that Canada was reasonably 
safe from an American attack. It seemed that Crampton had been 
right in December 1848 when he wrote of the old general's 
" ' . l f th t & . & t . .. "4 6 a1sapprova o e conques aggress1on annexa 1on sysLem. 
Crampton and Elgin, however, were wide.of the mark in their 
assessment of Taylor. Though as a politician he was opposed to 
aggressive expansion, this did not mean that he stood firmly 
against the territorial growth of his country. Indeed, if the 
right territory became available under the right circumstances, 
Taylor was more than willing to encourage the American eagle to 
spread its wings to the north, south or west. For instance, his 
objection to the plans of the Cuban-bound American filibusters 
stemmed not from their goals but from their illegal and violent 
methods. Little more than a month before Taylor issued his 
proclamation against the adventurers, he had sent an agent to Cuba 
specifically to try and buy the island. This man, Kentucky's 
Benjamin E Green, also had instructions to secure permission from 
the Dominican Republic for an American naval base at Samana Bay. 
Despite his confidence, Green's missions failed - but his very 
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appointment reveals Taylor's interest 1n peaceful territorial 
expansion. 47 Taylor was also active in the west. His guiding fear 
was that California might form an independent nation or be 
vulnerable to foreign interference if she did not proceed rapidly 
from territorial status to full statehood. Accordingly, he 
despatched T Butler King to the States' gateway to the Orient to 
d . . h . 48 . bl h spee up 1ts entry 1nto t e Un1on. Inev1ta y, t e possession of 
California created a new range of problems - particularly the need 
for better communications between the east and west coast of the 
Republic - and Taylor and Clayton found themselves looking ever 
southward for a solution. Clayton's attention became fixed on the 
Central American Isthmus, thought suitable for canals and railroads 
which, when built, would greatly speed up travel between Washington 
and San Francisco. Heightening his interest still further was the 
open willingness of some of the Central American States to be 
annexed to the United States, a fact he revealed to Britain's 
Minister in Washington, Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer, very early in. his 
49 
embassy. As early as September 1849 the Nicaraguan Minister to 
LOndon had been working for the annexation of his country, San 
50 Salvador and Honduras to the United States , though the rivalries 
between the three countries meant the prospects of success were 
l . h 51 s lg t. Fearing British interference in the Isthmus, Clayton 
actually considered securing American interests there by annexing 
the territory. In an undated and unsigned memorandum- but which 
was clearly in the Secretary of State's own handwriting 
argued: 
Either we must take command of the Isthmus, or 
England-will. To us it is vitally important 
that the wisest thing, perhaps, the U.S. could 
do would be to annex Nicaragua - with the other 
free & independent states, the fragments of the 
old Central America, into the bargain; besides 
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Clayton 
putting in train a project for purchasing 
Panama & vera Cruz. 
And he had an answer for those who would claim that this expansion 
would upset the fragile sectional balance. "They are all free 
States," he wrote, "but their affinities and sympathies would be 
52 Southern." Clayton seems not to have gone beyond thinking about 
this option, for a combination of domestic and international 
reasons. But he was obviously sympathetic to the principle of 
territorial expansion at the right time and if it was 1n 
America's interests. All that distinguished the Taylor 
administration from the previous Government was its greater 
caution, its desire to secure new lands through peaceful rather 
than warlike methods. Its hunger for land, though, was just as 
great. 
The Taylor administration's pious protestations of disinterest 
in Canada were equally hollow. Among its supporters - and some 
senior officials - were men who either expected or desired. the 
annexation of British North America to the States. In the wake of 
Montreal's incendiary outbreak, various influential northern Whig 
papers began urging the joint annexation of Canada and CUba. 
Supposedly in the confidence of the State Department, 
Washington-based correspondent of the Boston courier wrote: 
Now we are in favor, and we believe the country 
to be in favor, of annexing these provinces to 
the United States. We believe it will be for 
our advantage, and their advantage ... We 
therefore beg to suggest to our provincial 
neighbors that they take time by the forelock, 
and begin to initiate measures for the 
consummation of the great act of annexation. 
It will be their crowning deed of glory, the 
appropriate finale to their colonial 
apprenticeship ... It is a destiny they cannot 
escape ... and the sooner the transition is 
accomplished the better for the present 
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a 
generation, as well as for coming 
generations.53 
More revealing, though, was a letter published across the North in 
early July. It predicted - and welcomed - the colonists' early 
separation from Great Britain and continued: 
In my judgement the interests of both sides 
would be much promoted by annexation - the 
several provinces coming into the Union on 
equal terms with our present thirty States 
Though opposed to incorporating with us any 
district densely peopled with the Mexican race, 
I should be most happy to fraternize with our 
northern and north-eastern neighbors ... I 
think I cannot err in saying that two-thirds of 
our people would rejoice at the incorporation, 
and the other third soon perceive its benefits. 
Though the author stressed he did not know the views of the 
Government 54 , his public announcement was embarrassing for Clayton 
and Taylor. For the correspondent was Winfield Scott, writing from 
West Point where he was Commander in Chief of the Army, a prominent 
Whig and, moreover, the man charged with preventing a popular 
American invasion of canada in support of the annexationists. 
Wrote Crampton in a despatch to Palmerston, nNo doubt Gen1 Scott 
would discharge that duty honorably, but his present uncalled for 
avowal would impair his power of doing so with effect." Worse 
still, said Crampton, "his weight as an influential member of the 
party in power, tends to give to such a publication a certain 
significance in the eyes of the public at the present time." 55 
AmOng the Whigs, support for the annexation of Canada was not 
confined to a few eccentrics; there were plenty of sympathisers 
among the ranks of the administration's officials. One such was 8 
Harrmatt Norton. As a reward for running the Boston "Rough and 
Ready Association" during Taylor's presidential he 
received the potentially lucrative post of US Consul to Pictou, 
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Nova Scotia. Bursting with enthusiasm, his first serious despatch 
told of "the wonderful change" in the loyalty of the People to the 
Crown. 
From the first day of my arrival to the present 
time I have not heard an individual, whatever 
his position in life, but \\hat has been in 
favor of immediate annexation to the u.s. And 
could the vote be taken today, in this portion 
of the Province, not one hundred votes would be 
cast in the opposition. 
Indeed Norton, who in his first proper letter to his employer 
presumably wished to avoid subjects which might cost him an early 
recall, actually advocated the annexation of British North America. 
"Believing as I do," he wrote, 
that the whole Continent of America is destined 
at no distant day to come under the rule of the 
Anglo-American, I am of opinion, that 
facilities for frequent intercourse should be 
fostered by our Government ... By this 
intercourse, the manners and customs of the 
American People would be introduced, and by 
these means pave the way to a result which will 
prove of the highest importance to our 
Country.57 
Aired by an American official in British North America, such views 
could reasonably have been seen as prejudicial to Anglo-American 
relations. Yet Norton does not seem to have incurred the 
displeasure of the State Department. Though Pictou was his reward 
for supporting Zachary Taylor, Norton went on to serve under 
President Millard Fillmore and his Democrat successor, Franklin 
Pierce. Norton, though, was small fry compared to the man Taylor 
chose to fill the country's most important diplomatic posting. As 
a wealthy New England industrialist, Abbott Lawrence fully 
understood the need to preserve friendly relations with Great 
Britain. He, too, saw annexation as imminent and was unwilling to 
lift a finger to stop it. Writing soon after his arrival in 
London, he told Clayton: 
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With regard to the British North American 
Colonies, I have strong reason to believe that 
the day of Annexation to the United States will 
be moved at an earlier period than is generally 
expected. I mean the proposition from the 
Colonies to annex themselves to us - and with 
the consent of this Government.58 
There was no suggestion that the United States should either 
encourage or stop this; instead, Lawrence clearly favoured letting 
time take its course. This was entirely consistent with his 
attitude just before he left Boston for the Court of St James. He 
was treated to a visit by William Hamilton Merritt, the President 
of Canada's Executive Council, who tried to impress on him the 
importance of Reciprocity. But Lawrence wrote promptly to Clayton 
advising against taking part in any such measure. "It appears to 
me," he wrote, 
that it is merely a preparation for another 
rrore important er~sition~o_E_e~ade by the 
Colonies, to the Government of the·united 
States. It must end in the manner indicated by 
you when I had the pleasure of being in 
Washington. 59 
Clearly Clayton had expressed a firm opinion on the Annexation 
Crisis to Lawrence as he briefed him on his duties as Minister to 
Great Britain. But if the Secretary of State ever took the 
unlikely course of writing down a prediction about the outcome of 
the movement, it does not seem to have survived. Even so, a close 
look at his actions suggests very strongly that he - and Taylor 
were sympathetic towards annexation. The most compelling evidence 
for this is their decision to appoint a Special - some would say 
Secret - Agent to range over British North America during her 
period of torment. An even more important indication of their 
attitude was the background of the man they chose for this 




Appointing a special agent to gather information in a foreign 
country was nothing new to the State Department, but until 1849 
there had never been a Special Agent to British North America - not 
even in 1837 nor during the Oregon Dispute. But in May 1849 
following the burning down of the Montreal Parliament - Clayton and 
Taylor began to take a close interest in the Colonies. Hence when 
their consul to St John, New Brunswick was in Washington, DC on 
private business, they seized the chance to gain fuller 
information. The Consul, Israel de Wolf Andrews, later told 
SeCretary of State Daniel Webster, that Clayton sent a State 
Department official to Andrews' hotel to summon him to an 
interview. "I called the next morning," wrote Andrews, 
and this was the first time I had ever spoken 
to Mr Clayton .... He asked me many leading 
questions about the British North American 
Colonies, and made particular inquiries about 
the burning of the Parliament House in 
Montreal ... 
Mr Clayton sent for me in a day or two again, 
to go to the State Department where I found 
President Taylor & Mr Clayton with whom I had a 
long and confidential interview on Colonial 
affairs ... 
Whatever Andrews said, he seems to have impressed Clayton and, 
later, Taylor, for they offered him a succession of posts in 
Canada. At the initial interview, wrote Andrews, Clayton seemed to 
reappoint him Consul to New Brunswick, which Andrews declined. 
After talking with Clayton and the President, they offered him the 
post of Consul to canada and New Brunswick along with a request to 
write a full and confidential report to the State Department on the 
political and commercial state of all the Colonies. Andrews again 
declined, unless he was paid in full for his special service and 
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all incidental expenses. A few days later, Clayton accepted these 
terms, and Andrews became the first American Special Agent to 
British North America. 
This delicate appointment - made at such a volatile period in 
the Colonies' relations with both Britain and the United States 
was not based solely on Andrews' secret conversations at the State 
Department. At the first meeting, Clayton asked Andrews if he had 
any papers recorrunending him for office, to which he replied "None 
whatever." 60 However, on file at the State Department were reams 
of letters sent by Andrews from his Consular outpost at the mouth 
of the StJohn River. Overlooking the Bay of Fundy, with its rapid 
tides and huge stocks of fish, it was at the centre of New 
Brunswick's lumbering and ship-building industries. Here he put to 
energetic use his personal knowledge of and links with British 
North America. Born in Eastport, Maine - a home port for hundreds 
of American fishermen working the Colonial fishing grounds 
Andrews had grown up in an area with strong and ever-growing links 
with the Maritime Provinces. These connections were reflected in 
his family. His grandfather had left Massachusetts for Nova 
Scotia, marrying into an influential family in 1738. His son had 
reversed the trend, leaving Nova Scotia for Eastport, Maine, where 
Israel was born in 1813. Keeping up the family tradition, Andrews 
was to flit between the States and 







Appointed Consul to St John in 1843, he had little in common with 
those Consuls who saw their posts as lucrative rewards for 
political services and who were determined to keep their 
correspondence with the State Department down to a minimum. 
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Instead of simply ~ending quarterly trading statistics, as 
required, Andrews filled his letters with accounts of the 
commercial and political state of the Provinces and showed his 
initiative by trying to win favourable deals for his government. 
Indeed, his activities as a 'Mr Fixit' seemed to be directed mainly 
towards strengthening links between the States and the Provinces. 
In 1846, by then an experienced Consul, he tried to exploit the 
cross-border tension of the Oregon Crisis to secure for American 
fishermen the right to work the waters guaranteed to the Colonists. 
Though unsuccessful in his efforts, he had no doubts as to the twin 
advantages such an agreement would bring: "it would greatly add to 
the value of our Colonial trade", he told Secretary of State James 
Buchanan, "and remove many carriers to a closer union between the 
United States and the Colonies." Similarly, in March 1848 he 
travelled up the St John River to New· Brunswick's capital, 
Fredericton, as the successful representative of several American 
parties who wanted to build a telegraph line from Halifax, Nova 
Scotia to calais, Maine. But the most striking characteristic of 
his record as an official representative of the State Department 
was his interest in and support for the annexation of British North 
America to the United States. As early as 1846 he was convinced 
that the loyalty of New Brunswick was in steady decline. At the 
height of the Oregon Crisis, when knowledge of Britain's strength 
in North America was vital to Buchanan, Andrews wrote assuringly: 
If a war should unfortunately take place 
between the Governments of the United States 
and Great Britain, the people of this Colony 
would at the commencement undoubtedly bravely 
support the power of the Mother Country - but 
if the war should continue for a few years, & 
the Provincials should feel their share of the 
contest and be heavily assessed for the 
munitions of war &c &c I think they would 
change their flag and never return to its 
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11 . 62 a eg1ance -
By the summer, with the war clouds long since dispersed, 
Andrews was still convinced that in a few years New Brunswick would 
be peacefully annexed to the. United States. Replacing the cost of 
war as the spur was the 1842 Treaty of Washington. This, he 
claimed, had not only solved the border dispute between Maine and 
New Brunswick, but had also opened the Province up to Ame~icanising 
influences. When two years later the added pressure of a recession 
was beginning to test colonial loyalties, Andrews' confidence knew 
no bounds. In March 1848 he announced to the State Department that 
he would not be surprised "if the question of Annexation to the 
United States were to assume definite shape at the next general 
election." By then he had ceased to be a disinterested observer 
for he had made clear to his employers where he stood on this 
question. In the New Year he proclaimed: 
I shall feel gratified to see such a measure 
adopted that will produce such grand results to 
our country and surely lead to the prostration 
of foreign rule in this continent.63 
Nearly a year late~, as British North America became more restless, 
he was again unreserved in his praise of annexation. It would, he 
asserted, "contribute so much to the wealth and grandeur of the 
United States of America." 64 This, then, was the man Taylor and 
Clayton picked to represent the United States in British North 
America during the Annexation Crisis. 
Under Clayton, Andrews' views showed no sign of mellowing; and 
this seemed to suit the Secretary of State. In June 1849 - just 
before his appointment as Special Agent Andrews served as 
Clayton's unofficial adviser during the visit to Washington, DC of 
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canada's William Hamilton . 65 Mern tt. This senior Canadian 
politician had been sent by Elgin "to· aid Mr Crampton 1n his 
t . b . . . t "66 exer 1ons to o ta1n rec1proc1 y. Throughout the fitful 
negotiations marked by eagernes on Merritt's part and 
indifference on the Americans' - Clayton made sure that Andrews got 
copies of all the correspondence that passed between him and the 
British. Though operating in the background, Andrews seems to have 
used his knowledge of both British North America and the White 
House's opinions to shape Clayton's course of action. Near the end 
of Merritt's visit, Andrews wrote: 
This question has a two fold aspect -
corranercial and political - without regard to 
political considerations we might properly 
admit the agricultural productions of Canada 
free of duty in exchange for the fisheries -
but considering the political agitations of the 
Provinces it is unwise to enter with much zeal 
into any commercial arrangements - These 
agitations are aggravated by commercial 
embarrassments of the Provinces - and if we 
entertain the idea of annexation it is no part 
of our business to alleviate their condition. 
OUr policy for the present is, a "Masterly 
inactivityft or a negotiation judiciously 
protracted.67 
Presented with the best terms Canada could then have offered, 
Clayton followed Andr.ews' advice. On · the same day, he wrote to 
Crampton: 
The President declines to decide any question 
in relation to the matters upon which we 
conversed this morning, until the British 
Government shall have clothed their Minister 
with powers to treat of those matters.68 
. . "1 69 Merr1tt got a s1m1 ar curt message. No matter how the Secretary 
of State dressed up his actions, their effect was clear. Thanks to 
the difficulties of transatlantic communications, Clayton was 
delaying the progress of Reciprocity by at least six weeks. 
Knowing full well that economic hardship - which Reciprocity could 
100 
alleviate was fuelling the Colonial annexation movement, he had 
opted for a "negotiation judiciously protracted." 
Any doubts whether this meant Clayton was "entertaining the 
idea of annexation" were speedily removed by administration 
·newspapers. Three· days after Clayton had refused to deal with 
Merritt, the Boston Globe declared itself for Annexation. It 
argued that if Reciprocity failed, the Provinces would inevitably 
annex themselves to the Union. This, the paper maintained, was a 
desirable development. Hence, it declared: 
we oppose, all projects for reciprocal free 
trade, on this ground alone. We think the 
administration has had its thoughts directed to 
this view of the subject, and we have reason to 
believe it will pursue a line of policy in 
harmony therewith.70 
Of course, this paper may not have been reflecting the views of the 
administration it professed to support. Instead of seeking to 
foster annexationism, Clayton may have denied the Canadians 
Reciprocity for several pressing reasons. The Colonists may· not 
have been, in his judgement, offering enough concessions to 
persuade him to abandon his party's traditional support for the 
protective tariff .. But the conduct of Andrews, and Clayton's 
continuing support for him, give the lie to this view. 
Andrews' actions while Special Agent are particularly 
instructive because of the very vague nature of his orders. When 
Clayton and Taylor sent him back north in July 1849, his written 
instructions ranged from specific requests for information to 
cryptic references to conversations behind closed doors. With 
Canada pursuing a lively interest in Reciprocity, Andrews not 
surprisingly had to answer fifteen questions which sought detailed 
economic statistics concerning the industries, economies and 
commerce of all the Colonies. But his mission was not solely 
economic. Clayton also asked him to keep the State Department 
informed about: 
. 
the history, conditions'and future prospects of 
these Colonies, especially in connection with 
their present and prospective relations,_ 
commercial and political, with the United 
States. 
Yet there were no specific political instructions, no list of jobs 
to do or facts to find. All Clayton would say was that: 
On this subject I have had full and frequent 
conversations with you, in which I have 
explained the views of the United States, in 
reference to the neighboring Colonies, and the 
particular information which we desire to 
obtain through your instrumentality. 
Why the secrecy? Quite simply, the American Government did not 
want to put down on paper that it was interested in the political 
condition of annexationist British North America. After all, as 
Clayton admitted in his instructions to Andrews, "The duty is a 
delicate and important one." 71 
Once Andrews began sending his lengthy despatches from the 
Provinces, it was obvious why his agency was so delicate. He had 
been sent, in part, to learn the strength of the annexation 
movement. It was clearly a job he enjoyed. His letters were full 
of bold predictions that Annexation was imminent, especially if the 
Reciprocity initiatives failed. 72 His enthusiasm for admitting 
Canada - and her sisters - to the Union was also undimmed. In 
August 1849, only two months after Clayton had briefed him on what 
was acceptable to the United States, Andrews wrote expansively in 
an official despatch of "the great and important subject 
annexation, which when consummated will be considered the great 
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f h 1 . . 1 . "73 event o t e age, re ative to continenta Interests. Shaping 
his views was regular contact with the Annexationist leaders. 
Later, when trying to secure payment for his work from the State 
oepa r trnen t , he claimed never to have got involved in their 
. . . 74 
·actiVIties , but the evidence suggests that he was more than a 
passive observer. In New Brunswick, he had been in contact with 
the annexationists since at least March 1848 and while a special 
agent he not only met frequently with the Montreal activists, but 
also became a trusted contact. Three months into his mission, he 
reported from the chaotic canadian capital: 
I have had several private interviews with the 
leaders of the Annexation Movement and they beg 
of me to conjure you to protract the 
[Reciprocity] negotiations and finally refuse 
the terms offered by Great Britain.75 
A week later they enlarged on their message, using an argument 
which they clearly thought would appeal to both Andrews and the 
American Government. They urged the refusal of Reciprocity because 
"the passage of a law by Congress to that effect would annihilate 
them and indefinitely defer . "76 annexation. These despatches 
followed soon after the appearance of the Montreal Manifesto, which 
also proved that Andrews had won the confidence of the 
annexationists. Though an official of a foreign government, he got 
a sneak preview of the Manifesto. More to the point, so did the 
State Department. Andrews repaid the faith of the annexationists 
by immediately travelling to Washington, carrying "a copy of the 
Annexation address which had not then been made public." If he had 
tried to keep aloof, then, he had clearly failed. Whatever he had 
told his contacts, they certainly knew who to give the Manifesto to 
if they wanted it to reach the American Government. Nor did 
Andrews disappoint them. On his arrival in washington, he went 
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straight to Clayton and, in the course of a three-hour interview, 
read the Manifesto to h . 1 77. 1s emp oyer. Clayton's response was 
unequivocal. Far from chastising his 'Consul' for aiding and 
abetti~g the annexationists, Clayton promptly packed Andrews off to 
Montrea1. 78 The situation was hatting up, and he wanted Andrews at 
the heart of the furnace.· 
Throughout the winter, Andrews enjoyed Clayton's support, even 
after a November interview with Elgin which could easily have had a 
disastrous effect on Anglo-American relations. Having tracked 
Elgin down to Drummondville, between seething Montreal and the more 
loyal Quebec City, Andrews secured a private interview in his 
capacity as an American Consul. In it he could only have alarmed 
the Governor-General. The American Government, Andrews told Elgin, 
could not view the Annexation movement with indifference and, as a 
guide for its future conduct, he confidently referred him "to the 
history of half a century." Lest Elgin should forget the 
activities of the American Government and its citizens in that 
period, Andrews gave him a blunt reminder. The United States, he 
said, would face. "the difficulty of maintaining a strict neutrality 
and keeping our people quiet if measures were pushed to extremities 
by the Government or the Annexationists." From Elgin's point of 
view, matters could hardly have been worse. But Andrews' message 
had a sharper sting in its tail. In his narrative to Clayton, the 
Special Agent added: 
Nor did I hesitate to inform his Lordship, as a 
proof of my sincerity and candor that I had 
taken the liberty to give the leaders of the 
Annexation Movement in Montreal the same 
advice.79 
In short, Andrews admitted to Elgin that he, an American offical, 
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had been meddling in Canadian politics. He had mixed with and 
given verbal encouragement to the leaders of a movement which 
threatened the very foundations of the Canadian government and the 
Empire. Andrews had more or less told the Montreal Annexationists 
- who had turned the canadian capital into a no-go area for Elgin -
that if· they forced repressive action from the Imperial 
authorities, American support was likely. They therefore had no 
incentive to pursue a moderate course. Instead, they - and Elgin -
had every reason to expect a positive response from the United 
States should annexationism ever fully mature. 
In telling Elgin this, Andrews clearly did not go beyond his 
brief. Instead of being recalled to Washington where he could do 
no harm, he was left to continue his mission. What, then, were 
Clayton and Taylor hoping to achieve either ·through Andrews or from 
the Annexation Crisis? It is almost certain that they did not have 
a carefully thought-out policy. Instead, in the time-honoured 
tradition of their predecessors, they simply reacted to the 
opportunities and dangers thrown up by developments in Canada. 
Shaping their reactions were the twin pressures of domestic 
politics and the need to stay on friendly terms with America's 
greatest trading partner, Great Britain. But Clayton and Taylor 
had one other obligation: protecting the interests of their 
country. In 1849 this responsibility threatened to weigh heavily 
on them. For the first time since the formation of the Republic, 
Canada and her sisters personally demanded the attention of 
America's politicians. One year after Europe had been shaken by a 
series of revolutions, the Canadians looked to be heading towards 
their own revolution. If successful, they would have finished off 
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the work of washington and Jefferson by ejecting the British 
Colonial masters once and for all from the New World. This alone 
guaranteed that any American government would take an interest. 
But this embryonic revolution north of the border was not a private 
function. Instead, the Americans had an open invitation to get 
involved. First, the majority of the activists were advocating 
sincerely or otherwise - that Canada swap colonial status in the 
British Empire for statehood, and political maturity, in the United 
States' North American Empire. After decades of annexationist 
speeches - sincere or otherwise by American politicians, the 
Colonists were offering an answer to the prayers of the 
expansionists south of the border. Secondly, the economic hardship 
which most acknowledged to be at the root of the agitation meant 
there was an alternative to annexation: reciprocal free trade 
between the Colonists and the United States. At first glance, it 
seemed as though the United States could not lose. Either they 
would acquire British North America, and thus remove the one 
land-based strategic threat still posed by the Old World, or they 
could expand economically across the whole of North America. But 
successive American Governments had operated in blissful ignorance 
of British North America, and developments in the Provinces were 
rapidly dating the information they already possessed. It was 
essential, if these golden opportunities were not to be lost, that 
accurate information be secured - and swiftly. Hence, Andrews' 
instructions on his appointment as Special Agent were in some ways 
honest: Clayton did want this acknowledged authority on British 
North America to provide him with facts about the Colonies. Only 
then could the Government formulate a policy towards the Provinces. 
As Andrews himself put it: 
106 
It is a law of prudence, in this case at least, 
that we should know what others will do, and 
what we can do ourselves before we decide on 
important matters, or to advise those we 
serve. SO 
Without question, canadian matters were important. Putting 
aside the prospect of acquiring all of British North America for 
the Union, the interest of the Colonies in free trade with the 
States raised various possibilities. If the Secretary of State 
or Congress - were to conclude the most favourable deal, they 
needed detailed information on what the Colonies were willing to 
offer in return for Reciprocity. First, they needed to know 
whether only canada was interested or whether all the Colonies 
could be brought in. Second, what were the Colonies willing to 
discuss? Were the Maritimes' Fisheries or the free navigation of 
the St Lawrence available? If so, what would be the value of these 
concessions to the United States? And were there any attributes of 
the Colonies which either threatened the Republic, like their coal 
or ship-building industries, or of which the Americans were 
ignorant? These, and countless other questions, had to be answered 
before any deal on Reciprocity could be considered. Thus, Andrews 
had extensive instructions relating to the economic state of the 
Colonies and, though Canada was the only province involved in any 
Reciprocity negotiations when he was appointed, he was told to 
study each Colony in turn. Clayton obviously wanted to exploit the 
Colonial disquiet to get as much as possible out of British North 
America in any Reciprocity deal. 
But Clayton was after more than just economic information. 
Andrews had had detailed conversations with both the Secretary of 
State and the President on the political condition of British North 
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America and, when he headed north 1n July 1849, he knew precisely 
what their views were on annexationism and what information they 
were seeking. His enthusiastic accounts of the blooming 
annexationist flower, his covetous description of the Colonies and 
his close links with the annexationists give a strong indication as 
to the attitude-of Clayton and Taylor to the prospect of acquiring 
British North America. Yet, according to traditional accounts, 
sectional strife within the Republic was getting so fierce that it 
would have been suicidal even to contemplate annexing the vast 
acreage of British North American free-soil. This, however, may be 
reading history backwards. Though Clayton and Taylor knew they had 
to proceed carefully with any expansionist plans, in 1849 the full 
fury of sectionalism had yet to be released. Unquestionably 
tension was building up, but no-one knew just how divisive the 1850 
Compromise debates were going to be; and though talk of secession 
occasionally afflicted parts of the south, such talk was far from 
new and, in the past, it had come to nothing. Moreover, there were 
ways of annexing British North America without upsetting the 
precarious sectional balance. The most obvious was to bring the 
free-soil provinces in at the· same time as slave territory. By 
expanding the Slave Power and the free states at the same rate, the 
Republic could reasonably be expected to expand safely as a nation. 
It may well be, therefore, that Benjamin E Green's mission to 
purchase Cuba and Andrews' mission to canada were part of a 
speculative, but balanced, policy of expansion. Certainly, one day 
before Andrews received his official appointment as a Special Agent 
- by which time he had been working unofficially in this capacity 
for some weeks - Green was writing from Havana harbour that: 
If I can believe what I hear 599,999 out of the 
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100000 (sic) inhabitants of Cuba are eager for 
annexation to the U.S. and only want a 
favourable opportunity to move it.Bl 
About the same time both the Democrat and Whig press were carrying 
articles supporting the annexation together of both Cuba and 
Canada. The New York Herald, an administration paper, took the 
lead, claiming that the Cabinet was in favour of this balanced 
expansion. The response of the Washington Union, a Democrat organ, 
was confused. It seemed willing to accept the principle of 
simultaneous expansion to the north and south, but had strong 
political objections to its being carried out under the Whigs. At 
the proper time and in the proper manner, it wrote, 
both Cuba and the British Colonies ... will 
ultimately be annexed to the ... Union. But 
these great measures will be affected by the 
derrocratic party and a democratic 
administration and not by the Whigs.82 
What the Democrats seemed to resent was that Clayton and Taylor 
were usurping their role as the masters of national expansion. But 
the principle of admitting Cuba and canada at roughly the same time 
seemed quite acceptable. 
Clearly, though, the chances of annexing two entirely separate 
territories at the same time -and without alienating their Spanish 
and British masters - were slim. Yet the annexation of Canada did 
not have to be ruled out. Put before Clayton in this period were 
other methods of admitting all or part of British North America to 
the Union which would not upset the sectional balance. One such 
scheme came inadvertently from the pen of the distinguished British 
MP, Edward Ellice. When he wrote to his American friend August 
oavis in April 1849, this close contact of Prime Minister Lord John 
Russell and Foreign Secretary Palmerston presumably thought his 
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predictions about the outcome of the Annexation Movement would be 
treated in confidence. As an American patriot, though, Davis 
wasted no time in sending a copy of the letter to Clayton. From it 
Clayton learned that the British believed war inevitable in Europe 
as a result of the revolutionary movements. of the previous year, 
that the Canadians seemed set on leaving the Empire, and that the 
British Government would be "much obliged to them" for this. Their 
joining the United States or forming an independent republic would 
"allow us to withdraw from an unprofitable, & untenable position, 
we have no interest in the present connexion." Annexation was the 
obvious course, wrote Ellice, because it would end the conflict of 
the races in Canada. Moreover, he believed it could be achieved 
without causing any problems in the United States. There is, he 
claimed, 
nothing so easy as the course to be taken. 
Unite the part opposite to Main (sic), to the 
state of Main (sic) - that opposite Vermont, to 
Vermont - & the country from the River Chambley 
to the Upper Province Line, including the 
Island & Port of Montreal, to New York - The 
upper Province would make a separate & a 
homogenious (sic) state.83 
Though the admission of Upper Canada - modern Ontario - as a 
separate state wo~ld have upset the sectional balance, Clayton 
could see that all of British North America could be brought into 
the republican fold without creating new states. All he had to do 
was to join each Province to an existing state. Such a scheme 
might well have appeared as fanciful; but the seeds of the idea 
were there, and this meant that the annexation· of any of the 
British Provinces did not have to be rejected out of hand. 
Moreover, when Ellice's letter is added to Taylor's attempts to buy 
cuba, secure a naval base in the Caribbean and to woo the states of 
Central America, one thing is clear: there was no shortage of 
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options which made annexing British North America a possibility. 
Indeed, as long as Britain appeared willing to let the Provinces 
follow their own destiny and as long as the United States had a 
chance of acquiring southern territory, Clayton was interested in 
keeping in touch with British North America's annexation movement. 
And as long as this was the case, the professional relationship 
between Andrews and Clayton prospered. 
By the spring of 1850, though, the political climate was 
changing. At the centre of American domestic politics and American 
foreign policy, it was Clayton who adapted the quicker. And, as 
the warm weather brought winter's thaw, Clayton began to grow cold 
towards his Special Agent. Andrews first noticed this 
transformation on March 17, when he arrived in Washington with his 
long-awaited report on the Provinces. Accustomed to free access to 
Clayton, he found the doors of the State Department's most senior 
office effectively closed to him. On my arrival, wrote Andrews, a 
year later, 
I immediately waited on Mr Clayton and said I 
am ready with my report - He said to me he 
wanted to have a full Conference about the 
whole subject, to have the report explained to 
him &c &c- and that he would name a ... time 
for the interview. From that hour until May I 
called at the Department nearly every day but 
could not succeed in getting Mr Clayton to give 
me a hearing to name a day when he would take 
the report. 
It was not until the arrival of the Colonial delegates in the 
capital on May 29 to press for Reciprocity that Clayton renewed his 
interest in Andrews - but not in his report. In the end, Clayton 
never actually had the report 'explained' to him. The closest 
Andrews got to doing this was in late June - three months after he 
returned to Washington - but Clayton abandoned the interview after 
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, b f I, t , I 84 twenty m1nutes ecause o an 1n errupt1on . The Secretary of 
State's determination to distance himself from Andrews even 
extended to the settling of the bills he had incurred as Special 
Agent. This problem arose in July .1850, by which time Taylor had 
died and Vice-President Millard Fillmore had moved into the White 
House. Sending Fillmore a copy of Andrews' report, Clayton tcied 
to shift responsibility for paying Andrews to the Treasury 
Department, for whom the Special Agent had also worked. Clearly, 
if the State Department did not have to pay Andrews, then the links 
between him and Clayton were reduced. But Clayton went further. 
Though he praised the report, he said: "there is much unnecessary 
matter embraced in it." 85 Faced with a new President, Clayton was 
aware that much of the work he had asked Andrews to do could be 
embarrassing to the American Government and, as important in his 
eyes, to his own political reputation. He therefore suggested that 
in producing the more controversial aspects of his report, Andrews 
had exceeded his orders. In claiming this, Clayton was of course 
helped by the fact that he had never given Andrews written 
instructions about the political purpose of his mission. Instead, 
these instructions had all been verbal. But it was not simply the 
installation of a new President which had made Clayton so cautious: 
he had been distancing himself from Andrews for at least four 
months, since well before Zachary Taylor's death. 
Clayton's newly developed caution about Andrews is easy to 
understand. By the early spring, the Annexation Movement had 
ceased to be an imperial squabble promising rich pickings for the 
United States. Rather it loomed more as a minefield in both 
America's domestic and diplomatic policy. In the first place, the 
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true strength of the Annexation Movement had become clear. Put 
simply, it was a minority movement riddled with factions. Despite 
Andrews' enthusiasm - which by March 1850 must have seem misguided 
to Clayton - the Annexation Manifesto had not heralded the final 
overthrow of British rule. On the contrary: for the men who 
published and signed the. Manifesto, it represented the last, 
desperate roll of a dice which was already loaded against them. In 
a predominantly loyal colony, Her Majesty's subjects did not rise 
up. Instead, the annexationists and their American friends were 
forced to watch as the Loyalists and the British took centre stage. 
After Elgin's triumphal tour round Upper canada, the elected 
government - which enjoyed a three-to-one majority - declared that 
the Annexationists were their political enemies. And a week after 
the Manifesto, the Montreal loyalists issued their own declaration 
f t f h . 1 . 86 o suppor or t e Imper1a connect1on. ·When it came to the 
crunch, the Annexationists had failed to inspire support across the 
whole of canada, and the loyalists remained in firm control. 
Giving them full support was the British Government, with its 
policy of dismissing annexationists from office and demonstrating 
its corrunitment to British North America. These · acts, though 
intended largely for Canadian consumption, also had another 
audience in mind: the United States. Once Elgin had published Her 
Majesty's proclamation against the 87 Movement , the American 
Government knew that Britain would not surrender Canada without a 
struggle. Just as important, it also knew that most Canadians did 
not want a change of sovereignty. Any attempt to comply with the 
wishes of the annexationists, therefore, was unlikely to succeed; 
moreover, it would cause serious friction with London, if not war. 
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By the spring of 1850, another crucial influence was working 
against annexing canada: domestic sectionalism. When Congress met 
in December 1849, it took three weeks and 63 ballots just to elect 
: 88 the speaker of the House of Representatives ; and for the next few 
months there was little let-up in the sectional feuding. At the 
same time came threats from southern politicians of 'disunion' 
should slavery be excluded from the Mexican territories or should 
the capital's slave trade be abolished. 89 Once more, the stage was 
set for a classic compromise agreement to preserve the union, but 
it would take several months to secure this fairly inadequate 
agreement. Though it was a temporary success in that it brought 
tranquility to the States90 , the furious, bitter debates which 
preceded the settlement created wounds in the nation's unity which 
all knew would be slow to heal. The significance of all this for 
the annexation crisis was twofold. First, wh~n the annexationists 
were crying out for attention, the Americans were so deeply and 
desperately wrapped up in their awn domestic squabbles as to be 
past caring about what their northern neigbours wanted. Secondly, 
the source of all the agitation, the dagger at the heart of the 
union, was the new territory acquired as a result of the war with 
Mexico. Before the war, the balance between the two sections at 
least allowed the South to believe that it had control of its own 
destiny. As long as this balance was maintained, it could believe 
that slavery, and other economic interests and state's rights, were 
reasonably safe. But as soon as the status of slavery in the new 
territories became subject for debate, it raised the possibility of 
the sectional scales being tipped in favour of the free states. As 
a result, tension was bound to soar within the Union. Predictably, 
this spelled doom for the cause of the annexationists. True, 
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British North America could have been admitted without upsetting 
the sectional balance. Yet, by the spring of 1850 these options 
had effectively disappeared. Taylor's attempts to buy Cuba had 
drawn a blank, and he himself had prevented American adventurers 
from securing the island by less than legal means. With Britain 
and the States meeting head on in Central Ameri,ca, there could be 
no safe annexation of any Central American state as a 
counter-balance to canada. That left the possibility hinted at by 
Edward Ellice - admitting British North America to the Republic 
without creating any new free States. But by the spring of 1850 
the merest hint of annexing these Provinces without Southern 
equivalents would have driven the already paranoid South into a 
frenzy. This strife, and the failure of the 'Cuban option', did 
not just mean that America's interest in annexing British North 
America had to cease. It also meant that it would have been 
dangerous for the future of both Clayton and the States if the 
shadier side of Andrews' mission became linked with the Government. 
So it was that, with the horribly misnamed "Compromise" debates 
still raging, Clayton chose to distance himself from the man to 
whom he had previously granted such easy access. 
Andrews has justifiably been portrayed as a fairly cynical 
operator, ready to serve any Government that would pay him91 , but 
in John M Clayton he appears to have more than met his match. 
Although the Secretary of State unquestionably tried to keep his 
distance from Andrews in the spring of 1850, this did not mean that 
the Special Agent had ceased to be useful. He and Canada remained 
important, even though by then the focus of Clayton's attention lay 
not in the north, but in Central America. The reason for this 
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switch in outlook was twofold. The first and most complex reason 
lay in the desire of the United States for speedier communications 
with its newly acquired west coast. This quest - and the prospect 
of large profits - had spawned several exotically-named companies, 
all hoping to build railroads or canals across the Central American 
isthmus. The most impressive scheme of all proposed using the 
existing waterways of modern-day Nicaragua and Costa Rica to link 
the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Its intention was to make full 
use of the San Juan River and Lake Nicaragua to make it possible to 
sail from the caribbean to the Pacific in days rather than weeks. 
Here the problems began. Had the United States Government been 
dealing solely with native governments, there would have been 
trouble enough; but Britain also had an interest, and a say, in 
these Central American developments. Through a protectorate of 
dubious validity over the Mosquito Indians, ·the British had a claim 
to the eastern end of the proposed canal, the mouth of the San Juan 
River. Here there was a settlement which, in a naming controversy 
similar to that over the Malvinas/Falklands, the Americans called 
San Juan del Norte and the British referred to as Greytown. As a 
result, the British appeared as a major barrier to the construction 
of the canal, which was not surprising: they always seemed to be a 
barrier to American growth, be it territorial or commercial. The 
hostility towards Britain arising from this was very closely 
related to the suspicions widely held during the Texas annexation 
debates and the Mexican War that Britain was trying to prevent 
American expansion to the south and west. Many assumed that 
Britain's activities with the Mosquito Indians were a continuation 
of that policy. Britain hoped, the argument ran, to cause America 
to lose California and Oregon by preventing the canal or railroad 
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from being built. And, as always happened when British activities 
in the New World came up for debate, there was added indignation 
because.of Britain's repeated violations of the Monroe Doctrine, 
not alleviated by Britain's possession of parts of Belize, then 
known as British Honduras. A further complication was that neither 
Government seemed able to control its citizens and representatives 
in the region. 92 ·The friction between the two countries demanded 
settlement before either government or one of its irresponsible 
citizens provoked a conflict in the region. 
As the situation became increasingly ominous, Clayton got the 
opportunity he had been seeking for a peaceful solution. In 
December 1850 Washington witnessed the arrival of Sir Henry Lytton 
Bulwer. The new British Minister to the United States, Bulwer was 
senior to the Charge d'Affaires, Crampton, both socially and 
professionally. Sensing that at last he had someone of sufficient 
rank to deal with, Clayton pressurised Bulwer about Central America 
from the start of his mission. 93 Significantly, Bulwer came out to 
the United States armed with detailed instructions about 
Reciprocity, and securing this agreement was seen as one of his 
most pressing . 94 tasks. Moreover, the Americans had correctly 
anticipated this. In November 1849 Abbott Lawrence told Clayton 
from LOndon: "Sir Henry Bulwer. will soon be with you - What his 
instructions are upon Mosquito I know not - I think his first 
object will be to carry the Canadian reciprocity bill through 
Congress." As if he needed to, he added: "This Government is very 
anxious we should have free trade with their Provinces." 95 Yet for 
the first four months of his tour of duty in Washington, Bulwer's 
dealings with Clayton were almost entirely devoted to Central 
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American affairs. In fact, the Secretary of State only relaxed his 
pressure after the· signing of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty in April 
185o. 96 It was in the weeks preceding the signing of this treaty 
that Clayton suddenly started to avoid Andrews. The reason would 
seem to be obvious. When Andrews arrived in Washington in March, 
Clayton's negotiations with Bulwer had reached a very delicate 
stage. To have been linked with so overt an annexationist might 
well bave been the death knell of any agreement over Central 
America. And if these negotiations failed, Clayton faced the 
possibility of sharing the responsibility for either losing 
California or for creating the conditions for a third 
Anglo-American war. From being an asset, Andrews had become 
something of a liability. As Clayton was to tell President 
Fillmore four months later: "the existence of such an agency should 
not be made known th .t·. h Go n97 to e Br1 1s vernment. Yet Clayton was 
hypocritical. In a way, he wished to enjoy the· best of both 
worlds. He wanted to avoid any ass6ciation with Andrews which 
could have threatened his negotiations with Bulwer; but at the same 
time he felt that the agitation in Canada was an invaluable weapon 
in those negotiations. Moreover, without the work of Israei de 
Wolf Andrews, he was unable to know precisely how powerful that 
weapon was. Such views received an airing in the unsigned, undated 
memorandum, written in Clayton's handwriting, entitled "Command of 
the Isthmus." This memorandum stressed the importance of the area 
to the future of the United States' Pacific possessions, and the 
threat posed by Great Britain. Having considered annexing Central 
America, Clayton talks of playing England at her own game by using 
tenuous treaties advantageous to the. States. By so doing, he 
wrote, the United States would: 
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acquire that foothold on two of the most 
important points of the Isthmus which the great 
interests of the Republic, her.present 
necessities & future strength & prosperity, 
require that we should immediately gain for 
ever and keep. 
But he saved the most telling comment until last. "Finally," he 
concluded, 
this is the moment above all others in which to 
wage & end this rivalry with England. The 
awkward state of things in Canada will render 
her more than ordinarily cautious and patient 
under disappointment.98 
The canadian Annexation Movement, then, was a God-send to 
Clayton. Under normal circumstances, the United States was 
strategically vulnerable to the Royal Navy and diplomatically her 
hands were tied by America•s economic dependence on Great Britain. 
But in 1849 Britain•s Achilles Heel was there for all to see, and 
she lay right next door to the United States. For this reason, it 
was essential that Clayton knew the precise strength of the 
Annexation Movement; and even when admitting Canada to the Union 
had proved to be only a fleeting possibility, Clayton knew it was 
against his interests to remove the economic causes which had giv~n 
birth to the agitation. Thus, he refused to grant Reciprocity, 
both when Merritt came cap in hand to Washington on behalf of the 
canadians and when Bulwer carne across the Atlantic armed with 
British instructions specifically expected to produce an accord. 
Indeed, when Bulwer arrived, Clayton effectively washed his hands 
of the measure, leaving it as a matter for· Congress to vote on. 
This left Bulwer and Crampton with the impossible task of having to 
lobby not a handful of men - Clayton and his cabinet colleagues 
but the several bickering factions in the House of Representatives 
and the Senate, where the Government was in the minority. 
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Clayton's sole contribution to the British efforts was to promise 
not to oppose any Reciprocity Bill that they might secure. 99 But in 
his official dealings with Bulwer, the Secretary of State chose to 
ignore British North America and concentrate on Central America. 
True, other factors like the Whigs' traditional support for the 
protective tariff made reaching a Reciprocity agreement less than 
easy for the Taylor administration, but this ideologic~! commitment 
worked in Clayton's favour. Riven internally, Canada made Britain 
vulnerable and the United States of America diplomatically stronger 
than usual. And when it came to negotiating over Anglo-American 
tension in Central America, Clayton chose to exploit this trump 
card to the full. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE CLASH OVER THE FISHERIES 
For the next two years - from April 1850 to the summer of 1852 
Anglo-American relations enjoyed relative calm. Yet to the 
colonists who continued to press the United States for Reciprocity, 
these years were more like the doldrums. Despite their repeated 
trips to washington, despite the efforts of the British officials 
in North America, Reciprocity remained as elusive as ever. By 
November 1851, these endeavours had stuttered to a halt when John F 
Crampton, again left behind as Charge d'Affaires after Sir Henry 
Lytton Bulwer's return to Europe, learned that only through 
large-scale bribery could Britain hope to secure the measure. 1 
However, this non-descript period, marked by returning prosperity 
in British North America, was in reality_the lull before yet 
another transatlantic storm. When it came, the tempest was like 
the one most feared by the fishermen at the centre of the dispute. 
It crept up on the United States unnoticed and without warning. By 
the time the republic had woken up to what was going on, it had 
lost control, and could only drift along, reacting to whatever came 
its way. After years of vulnerability because of her Colonies, 
Britain had seized the initiative - and was using British North 
America to do so. 
In the ports of New England, especially in Massachusetts and 
Maine, the early summer of 1852 was much like any other. Keeping 
up a tradition which was older than the republic, vast fleets of 
American fishermen were preparing to work the rich fishing banks 
off the Maritime Colonies, a business employing between 2,500 and 
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3,000 American fishing vessels and about 27,500 men. 2 Braving the 
perils of icebergs and Labrador fogs, each of these vessels made up 
to three trips during the short summer season, landing "some 
thousands of valuable cargoes in the United States, adding 
largely to the wealth and prosperity of the people by the riches 
3 thus gathered from the deep." When the fishermen sailed north, 
they did so in great numbers, sometimes at great cost. Charged 
with caring for the American ·citizens shipwrecked on Prince Edward 
Island after a November storm in 1851, the US Consul to Pictou, 
Nova Scotia, B Hammatt Norton, found 100 ships had run aground from 
a fleet of not less than 900 vessels. 4 By this time, moreover, the 
Americans were heading north in larger numbers than before as the 
fishing grounds off their own coasts were being exhausted. 5 Their 
voyages in pursuit of cod and mackerel took them along the coasts 
and into the ports of Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, New 
Brunswick and Newfoundland. But in carrying out this dangerous 
industry, they were not alone. Though colonial fish~rmen 
occasionally worked on board American ships, the New Englanders 
were more likely to find themselves competing against the mariners 
of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Newfoundland for the richest 
pickings. Here the Colonists had the advantage. Apart from having 
home ports much closer to the fishing grounds, the Anglo-American 
Convention of 1818 had guaranteed them certain rights, the most 
important being exclusive enjoyment of waters within three miles of 
the British North American coast. Bound by no such rules, the fish 
swam where they wanted and, in the case of the more highly prized 
mackerel, the shoals regularly swam close inshore. Where they 
went, the fishermen of both countries· followed. 6 In normal years, 
this made for tense relations between Yankee and Maritime Loyalist 
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as the latter fumed at the trespasses of the former. But in May 
1852 the British decided to send "a small naval force of steamers 
or other small vessels to enforce the observance" of the 1818 
C 0 7 onvent1on. By July the Royal Navy squadron was in position and 
on July 5 Crampton formally told Secretary of State Daniel Webster 
of h o o 8 o t e new s1tuat1on. Within three weeks, Washington buzzed with 
rumours about the first British seizure of an American vessel, the 
schooner Hyades. Meanwhile, down in Massachusetts, Secretary of 
State Daniel Webster learned by telegram that "The British 
Devastation had frightened off all our fishermen in the Gulf" of St 
Lawrence. 9 The 1852-54 Fishery Dispute was under way. 
Inevitably, the British decision caused great excitement, 
particularly in the United States. Ominously, one of the first to 
spout off in an aggressive tone was Daniel· Webster. Two weeks 
after he became aware of the British decision, he announced the 
development to the nation, through an article in the Boston 
courier. He warned: 
[its] immediate effect will be ... a complete 
interruption of the extensive fishing business 
of New England, attended by constant collisions 
of the most unpleasant and exciting character, 
which may end in the destruction of human life, 
in the involvement of the Government in 
questions of a very serious nature, threatening 
the peace of the two countries.lO. 
The problem was twofold. First, as Maine Senator Hannibal Hamlin 
and others were only too ready to point out, Britain had given the 
0 1 ° fh 0 0 11 United States l1tt e or no warn1ng o er 1ntent1ons. 
the Baltimore Sun explained, Britain was at fault 
in conniving at a practice, until it has grown 
into a sort of prescriptive right, and then 
suddenly enforcing such a construction of the 
treaty as must involve thousands of our 
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Second, as 
citizens in heavy loss and expose them to great 
inconvenience.l2 
In short, Britain was back to her high-handed, deceitful worst. As 
rumours reached Washington that Webster and Crampton had begun to 
negotiate an end of the crisis, Members of Congress queued up to 
denounce such a move, with some drawing parallels with past British 
outrages. Among them was colourful Louisiana Senator Pierre Soule 
who asserted: "England has, from time out of mind, attempted to 
13 
arrogate to herself the supremacy of the ocean." 
But if certain .rne~ers of Congress were- or chose to be 
incensed by the British decision, the appearance of British ships 
off the colonies threatened to provoke an even sterner response 
from the American fishermen. Facing danger every day of their 
working lives, these mariners tended to be hardened characters who, 
even when not provoked, were capable of ruthless acts. In August 
1851, a vast fleet of Americans descended on a Hudson's Bay Company 
outpost in Labrador, inspiring a desperate plea for help from the 
fur company's agent. "For God's sake," he begged, 
send a Man of War here, for the Americans are 
Masters of the place, one hundred sail now 
lying in .this Harbour ... They have stolen all 
my fire wood, and burnt it on the beach, fired 
the woods about the House, and if any change of 
wind takes place, the Establishment will be in 
ashes before the morning. 
When they chose to fish in areas excluded to them, they deterred 
intervention by fishing in the most aggressive manner. 
one colonial report in January 1852: 
the United States Fishing Vessels from 
September to the middle of Novrmber fish close 
in shore from half a mile to 1 /2 miles of the 
Coast ... 
[TJhey have stout bowsprits-and double chain 
bobstays, and threaten to run vessels down, 
131 
Recorded 
which may interfere with them, - many of them 
are armed .... 14 
Such were the men that Her Majesty's Government had chosen to 
antagonise. Under normal circumstances any attempt to deprive them 
of part of their income would have been strain enough; but in the 
summer of 1852 the British mishandled their announcement of the new 
measure. By telling the colonists long before either the American 
people or their government, the British caused widespread confusion 
among New England's fishermen. Writing from Nova Scotia in July, 
Norton told Webster that many American fishermen were "entirely 
ignorant of the construction of the Treaty of 1818, as now 
promulgated by the present British Ministry", a fact confirmed a 
week later by the US Navy's Commodore M C Perry, writing from 
Eastport, Maine. 15 The inevitable outcome in the fishing ports was 
"much excitement" 16 , which various parties did their best to stoke 
up. In one Massachusetts fishing town, the local newspaper urged 
its already volatile readers to aggressive resistance. New 
England's fishermen were told by the Newburyport Herald to 
arm their vessels, and resist any violation of 
the legitimate and lqng established 
construction of the treaty. Let them sink 
every British cruiser which molests them 
outside these limits, or if overpowered by 
force, let their own vessels go down with their 
flags flying .17 
And when some Americans reportedly took such action, few, if any 
members of Congress condemned it. Instead, Democrat Senator Solon 
Borland was eager to condone it. On learning that the British had 
already seized one fishing vessel, he told the upper house with 
pride that 
in the spirit which belongs to and becomes our 
people, a sufficient number from other vessels 
organized and armed themselves, and pursued the 
marauders, and "cut the vessel out" again, 
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leaving her commander, it is said, still a 
prisoner.l8 
No wonder, then, that Webster saw the crisis as "a very serious 
b · nl9 us1ness. The potential for trouble between the two countries 
was great and the stakes were soon to increase. Those who saw the 
seeds of war in the arrival of the British fleet became further 
alarmed when President Millard Fillmore's administration gave in to 
Congressional pressure and sent a US Naval vessel to the Fisheries 
under the command of 20 Commodore Perry. No longer was the Royal 
Navy squaring up just to American fishermen; now the British and 
the American governments faced the prospect of a clash between 
their own men o'war. 
Clearly, the way in which this crisis developed depended very 
much on the response of the aggrieved party, the United· States. 
Happily, despite the public anger of some politicians, the American 
people and Government reacted with surprising maturity. Even the 
minority in Congress who replied with violent rhetoric were, on the 
whole, indulging in ritualistic posturing. In part, the abuse from 
the American side of the Atlantic ~as a natural act of defiance in 
the face of a foreign threat. Partly, the outbursts of men like 
Senator Borland were Democratic attempts to embarrass a weak Whig 
administration which, they claimed, had a poor track record in 
foreign affairs. Hence, Borland seized on Webster's decision to 
negotiate with Crampton in Massachusetts and not in Washington, 
claiming that he was making it "a matter of summer · n21 recreat1on. 
These charges were given added bite by the mounting presidential 
election campaign, whose nominations had left Fillmore a lame-duck 
President and the Democrats favourites to grab the White House. 
Thus, in late July the Democratic Washington Union linked the 
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British arrogance over the Fisheiies with Fillmore's inability to 
deter Britain's recent jaunts around Cuba and Central America. 
"The instruction to the British cruisers", claimed the Union, 
to keep watch on our coasts to guard Cuba from 
invasion, and the doings to which we have 
alluded in Central America, and the 
non-resistance of the administration in both 
these cases, will be suspected by many persons 
to have had their effect in producing this new 
English move at this time.22 
A week later it shouted that the best hope for the protection of 
American interests and rights from foreign interference "seems to 
centre in the fact that the days of the whig dynasty are numbered, 
and that the power of the Chief Executive will soon be held by a 
firm and well tried democratic hand." 23 The pressures of the 
election, though, could not entirely explain the aggressive nature 
of Daniel Webster's first public pronouncement on the crisis. 
Certainly, a stern response in the face of British aggression could 
do his fading presidential campaign no harm; and, despite his 
rejection at the Whig nominating convention in Baltimore, he still 
harboured ambitions for the presidency. But these ambitions, like 
his grasp on domestic and foreign affairs, were increasingly 
becoming clouded through illness. 24 Instead, the real reason for 
his apparent belligerence lay in his need to cater for two distinct 
audiences - Britain and the United States. In mid-July, he knew 
that he was going to have to negotiate with Britain over the 
crisis, and he also knew that he would be negotiating from a 
position of weakness. The British had caught the Americans 
unawares and forced the State Department to formulate a policy 
towards developments which seemed beyond its control. Moreover, 
the relative strengths of the British and American naval fleets 
meant that the Royal Navy would have the upper hand in any maritime 
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clash, as the British knew only too well. Domestically, too, there 
were problems. As each day took Fi llrnore closer to vacating the 
White House, the power base of the administration in which Webster 
served was being eroded. This spurred on the Democrats, and wore 
down the fragile links between Fillmore and the Whigs, many of whom 
wished to hitch themselves to a rising, ~ot sinking, star. Tying 
Webster's hands still further was Whig vulnerability to charges of 
weakness in foreign affairs. This reputation had to be fought if 
the British were not to become more arrogant and if the Americans 
were not to wash their hands of Webster's efforts. But he had 
another incentive to stand firm before the British threat. During 
a long Congressional career, he had often been accused of 
Anglophilia. Inevitably, the Fisheries crisis, coupled with 
election fever, brought this decades-old charge to the surface yet 
again. On the first day of the debate, Senator Borland said: 
in the war of 1812 ... the distinguished 
Secretary of State, then a member of the other 
House, denounced and opposed the war, and used 
terms of reproach against those who were 
engaged in it ... That gentleman then, and 
those adhering to him, denounced the war in 
terms which I will not disgust the ears of an 
American Senate, or an American people, by 
repeating .... 25 
Adding to this notoriety was Webster's role in negotiating the 
controversial Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842. Though it 
preserved peace with the British, it also surrendered large tracts 
of forest and mountain to British North America 26 , leaving Webster 
wide open to slurs against his loyalty to the United States. He 
therefore entered the Fisheries Crisis burdened with countless 
handicaps. It was vital to the success of the negotiations that he 
let the British and his fellow citizens know of his determination 
to protect the rights of the American fishermen to the point of 
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war. However, his bellicose statement in the Boston Courier did 
not reveal a desire for war. On the contrary, Webster drafted this 
article with the preservation of peace in mind. 
Fortunately, this objective was shared by the nation as a 
whole. One of the most sensible comments made during the early 
days of the Crisis. came from the Baltimore Sun, which rightly 
played down the threat of war. Ran its commentary: 
Now-a-days, it is hardly to be expected that 
any unsettled question between this country and 
England can possibly be disposed of without the 
"clink of armor" on the ear. Each country must 
"take a position", and then we get up the 
universal idea of "back out" on either side -
the upshot of which, but for circumstances 
which rule often more imperiously than men, 
would be the downshot of war.27 
The Sun was very acute in its analysis. It spotted, correctly, 
that much of the row was politically inspired and not to be taken 
as a harbinger of war. It also spotted, correctly, that 
circumstances, like Anglo-American trade, were ruling in favour of 
peace. But it could have gone further. Men, too, were ruling 
imperiously during this crisis; and they, too, were opting for 
peace. Thus, the true tone of the American response was not angry 
but calrr•. 'The hot air of Senator Borland apart, most Congressional 
colleag~es took the news of the British decision and its 
execution - soberly. They did not like the appearance of a foreign 
fleet against American citizens, and they liked still less the 
short notice the American government had received. But many of 
them urged caution. Virginia's Democratic Senator James Murray 
Mason and Maryland's Whig Senator James Alfred Pearce, faced 1n 
late July with a debate which could ha~e got out of hand, reminded 
their colleagues that they did net have the full fccts. Tte 
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debate was, therefore, premature and any fire-eating was, by 
. f . "bl 28 1n erence, 1rrespons1 e. Others conceded that American 
fishermen hac violated the 1818 .agreement. Even Lewis Cass 
acce~ted that Americans trespassing on waters less than three miles 
f h 1 . 1 d d . h 29 rom t e co on1a coast eserve pun1s ment. And Seward, 
presenting the case for the defence on behalf of the administration 
in the Senate, stressed that Britain was net really doing anything 
new in 1852: she had always kept ships off British North America to 
deter American and French encroachments on the Fisheries. In fact, 
he claimed, the British presence in 1852 was s~aller than in the 
previous year . .:o Such considerations led politicians to belittle 
the chances of war. Tennessee Senator John Bell referred to 
America's puny navy as one reason why peace would have to be 
preserved31 , while others dwelt en the factors restraining _Britain. 
Seward, keen to keep the Congressional peace as a first step 
towards keeping international peace, cited British North America as 
one guarantee of British goodwill. war with the United States over 
the fisheries, he said, would result either in the independence of 
the British Provinces, or in their annexation to the United States. 
Just as important a consideration, he argued, was the disastrous 
effect war would have on British trade with tr.e republic and 
. . h 11 32 Bnt1s ·commerce genera y. For such reasons, the Baltimore Sun 
confidently described the idea of war over the Fisheries as "very 
preposterous." "Can anybody seriously believe, for a moment," it 
asked, "that England would risk "the Derby" in that way?" 33 
Putting these glib remarks aside, the British policy carried 
undeniable risks. However, the British did their best to minimise 
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them, both before and after a~ncuncing their new decision. 
Possibly the most important aspect of the action was its ti~ing. 
Clearly an election year was not the best time to deploy warships 
off North America, but the presence in the White House of a man 
like Fillmore acted as a counterbalance to these dangers. The 
British were expert in judging what they could get away with, and 
in Millard Fillmore they had a President who cut an unlikely figure 
as a warrior. C:r.ce errbarked on a policy of exclusion, rroreover, 
the British went out of their way to appease the Americans. When 
Crampton formally told Webster of London's decision, he stressed, 
at Malmesbury's bidding, several mitigating factors. The British, 
he said, were doing nothing r.e~ ar.d ~ere not inspired by any 
aggression towards the United States. As evidence, he pointed out 
that the policy of Exclusion applied with equal force to the 
34 French. The British, he implied, were not picking on the 
Americans; they were simply continuing to enforce their rights 
against all foreign transgressions. As American records showed, 
this policy was well established and had claimed several American 
35 
vesse:·ls over tb.e past quarter century. When the crisis was under 
v;c.y, .Crampton kept up the peace initiative. On receiving a request 
from Webster to come to Massachusetts as soon as possible, Crampton 
promptly headed north for Marshfield. Shortly after his arrival, 
Webster rushed off a brief r.ote to the President, saying: "Mr 
Crampton is here and is willing to do anything to keep the 
36 peace." 
Yet all this goodwill would have crumbled had there been a 
-
clash on the fishing grounds. Whatever Webster and Fillmore might 
have wished, they could hardly have rrevented a war cry if an 
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American vessel had been sunk or an American citizen killed. The 
conduct of the British and colonial enforcement vessels was, 
therefore, critical to the preservation of peace. Here, too, the 
British were up to the challenge. The crders siven the Royal Navy 
were deliberately restrained. As a result, Crampton was able to 
tell Webster that the Royal Navy was 
specially enjoined to avoid all interference 
with the vessels of Friendly Powers, except 
when they are in the act of violating the 
Treaty, and on all occasions to avoid giving 
ground of complaint by the adoption of harsh or 
unnecessary proceedings when circumstances 
compel their arrest or seizure.37 
The British • ..;ere true to their word. When Comrrodore Perry, of the 
US Navy, opened his official correspondence with Admiral Seymour, 
he confirmed that he had "heard of no unnecessary exercise of 
rigour or harshness by the officers under your command." Instead 
they had displayed a~ "honorable" degree of ~forbearance." 38 They 
were unquestionably helped by the British decision not to enforce 
the more controversial aspects of the 1818 Convention. At the 
heart of the dispute was whether the Americans should be allowed 
within the great bays of the Provinces, or whether the British 
should claim exclusive rights to the waters behind a line drawn 
from headland to headland. But by late August Webster knew, 
courtesy of an official British despatch read to him by Crampton, 
that the largest and richest t~y of all, the Bay of Fundy, was open 
to his countrymen. 39 The other bays, moreover, also remained open, 
as a result of an appeal from Crampton to the Royal Navy to 
. mod . 40 pract1ce erat1on. Since the Americans disputed only Britain's 
interpretation of her ri<;t:.t tc the Bays, but respected the 
three-mile limit41 , by the end of August the diplomatic side of the 
quarrel was all but over. Physically, though, the crisis continued 
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on the fishing grounds. But despite all the row about their 
presence, the British vessels were, if anything, lax in enforcing 
exclusion. In 1852 the British seized only seven American vessels 
and, once arrested, these boats were not necessarily doomed. One 
of the first victims of the fishing season, the Helen Maria, was 
actually released on tr.e orders of the Lieutenant Governor of Nova 
Scotia. He.let it be known he was unwilling to press a severe 
construction of the law on the American captain because there was 
"reason to hope that friendly negotiation may, before long, adjust 
the Fishery questicns." 42 Faced with taking action which the 
Americans were sure to resent, the British opted to do so in the 
least offensive manner possible. 
Indeed, the British could have argued with some justice that 
thE:ir vessels had been sent to the colonial ·waters not to provoke 
.P.nglc-AJrerican conflict but to prevent it. One cf the chief 
threats to peace lay in British North American outrage at continued 
American violations of their fishing rights, coupled with anger at 
repeated American snubs to colonial appeals for Reciprocity. As 
pro~fE·rity returned anq cnnexationism evaporated, the colonists 
grew in self-confidence; and in this climate their indignation at 
American injustice began to bear ominous fruit. Some spoke of 
fighting American protectionism with Canadian protectionism, a 
trend that Elgin deplored and which never becamE: law. 43 But over 
the Fisheries, the colonies acted with an independence which may 
well have surprised both the British and the Americans. In the 
summer of 1851, a Toronto railway conference of delegates from 
canada, Nova Scotia anC: £\eY.• r.runswick - Y.'hch simply by taking 
place hinted at early steps towards colonial unity - took a stand 
140 
on the Fisheries. Canada pledged to help Nova Scotia protect the 
Fisheries "by providing either a steamer or two more sailing 
vessels to cruise the Gulf of St Lawrer:ce and along thE ccasts of 
Labrador." Nova Scotia was to employ at least .two other vessels, 
and New Brunswick was to consider deploying one vessel to patrol 
tr.e Eay of Fundy. These re$olutions, unusually, produced concrete 
results. In 1852 Nova Scotia laid on four vessEls, NEw Erunswick 
two and Prince Edward 44 Island one. From colonies which had 
traditionally resisted paying towards their own defence, this was a 
dramatic gesture. Quite graphically, the colonists gave notice of 
their frustration with the Aroericans - and with the inadeqcate 
protection of the Fisheries offered by Britain. Arr.cr.s 
Westminster-based advocates of colonial economy, this financial 
precedent might well have been cause for celebration; but the 
deployment of colonial-manned boats against the Arr.ericans promised 
as much for transatlantic p€2CE as bcrder raiC:s by Yankee Hunters 
Lodges. Untrained and hot-headed, the crews on the colonial patrol 
vessels were protecting their livelihood; many were driven by years 
of bitterness towards their American rivals. But they lacked the 
firepower, expertise and authority to enforce their interpretation 
of the 1818 Convention. If they were left to themselves, a violent 
clash with the equally unruly Americans was almost certain. It was 
therefore essential that the British took control of this volatile 
situatior. ThE presence of the Royal Navy and puclic 
announcements throughout the colonies of their purpose - went a 
long way to defusing the tension. Its mission removed one 
dangerous source of grievance by provin9 that Britain had not 
abandoned British North America or, rr.ore particularly, the 
Maritimes. P.lso, because they were not preserving their 
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livE·} ir.ood, the Royal Navy's officers could be more impartial and, 
as an official and especially powerful armed service of the British 
Empire, they had an authority which mc.c~E· enforcing exclusion that 
much easier. Significantly, cnce Seymour's squadron arrived, the 
colonial patrol vessels were put under the command of Royal Navy 
officers. Thus the journal, the New Brunswicker, was not being 
biased when it wrote: "It was to insure the continuance of peace, 
and prevent the possibility of hostile encounters, that the 
Imperial Goverrunent has dispatched its vessels to the shores of 
North America. " 45 / 
With great versatility, the British used this explanation of 
their acticn to try to boost rather than damage Anglo-American 
relaticns. They did this by striving to foster a spirit of 
Anglo-American cooperation during the crfsis. When Craiq::tc·n 
formally told Webster of the British decision, he all but invited 
the American Government to send its own vessels to patrol the 
fisheries. The British orders, ran the despatch from Malmesbury 
which Crampton presented to Wetster, were adopted against both 
American and French encroachments. Indeed, said Malmesbury, "a 
considerable proportion" of the British craft "were placed there in 
order to use means equally used by the French Govt to protect 
French Rights." This1 though, did not mean peace was at risk. 
~ow ~ith regard to such species of protection 
the Govts of Gt Britain and France have not 
been in the habit of evincing any national 
jealousy, or of considering that offence was 
thereby intended. On the contrary, both Govts 
have found that the surest mode of preventing 
misunderstanding was tc join in effectually 
protecting their respective lines of 
demarcation. 
There was, he added, a precedent for this cooperation. In the 
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· ...... 
English Channel French and British cruisers worked together to 
prevent encroachrr.ents, especially ty their own 46 countrymen. 
Though the American decision tc send Perry north was taken before 
this despatch arrived in Washington, its tone and spirit served to 
calm the ruffled feathers of the American Eagle. So too did the 
treatment given Perry and, in 1853, Commodore Shubrick when they 
took t:p their patrol duties. Before Perry had even arrived, 
Admiral Seymour had told Elgin: "I Shall be sl2d tc show him the 
attention I have always found the Superior Naval officers of the 
United States well entitled to." He did just that, exchanging a 
regular and friendly correspondence with his opposite number, and 
rr.eeting with him on dry land. Such was the cooperaticn between the 
tv..'c• rival navies that at Seymour's request the Admiralty sent Perry 
four books and 80 charts of the eastern seas in early 1853. 47 
Joining Seymour in giving Perry and, later,.Shubrick a red-carpet 
welcc~e were the colcnial officials. Writing in 1852, the Acting 
US Consul to Halifax told the State Department that Perry had been 
received with "the usual courtesies due to his rank by the Admiral, 
the Lieutenant Governor and the Military and Civil 
Authorities of the City", and "had every facility afforded him for 
the completion of his Mission in these Waters." The next year the 
new Consul to Halifax repcrted that Shubrick got the same 
48 
respect. In fact the colonies seem to have competed with each 
other to give the American naval commanders the best reception. As 
a result, the fisheries patrol was scarcely a hardship posting: the 
Americans enjoyed dinners all round the Maritimes. The St John 
News commented that the Commodore could not have been better 
received or more honoured had he been the President. "The first 
people have vied with each other to do him homage, plainly showing 
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that the best feeling exists " ThesE dinners- like one on 
Prince Edward Island in 1853 - werE cccc:."sions where the. top men 
publicly aired ttEir wishes fer a~ity and a peaceful settlement of 
the dispute. These men also stressed that the presence of the 
Royal Navy did not stem from ill-feeling towards the United 
States. 49 Such dist::lays clearly did much to coc·l tt:e passions ir. 
and off the Maritimes; they also helped scothe the Cabin€t ir. 
Washington, ~ince Perry informed his masters of the pacific intent 
of the colonists and the British. 50 The result of all this close 
and friendly contact was peace. Instead of clashes, there was 
increasing amity; indeed, the only broadsides were · those of the 
feasting British and American naval officers. 
But Perry and Shubrkk were, in the classic phrase, only 
follcwing orders. And like those sent to their British 
counterparts, these too were restrained. On his arrival off the 
Maritimes, Perry informed Seymour that re was there "tc warn the 
American fishermen net tc encroach upon" Britain's fishins rights, 
as well as to p·rotect law-at.idi ng American fishermen from British 
. 51 h d se1zures. T ese or ers reflected both the sen~itive nature of 
Perry's mission and the determination of the American Government to 
preserve the peace. In this the government cperated on several 
fronts: domestic, naval and diplomatic. Cne of their tcp 
priorities, wrote Fillmore, was to ensure that the "public mind 
should not be misled on this b . "52 SU JeCt. This was especially 
important in an election year. Thus, the Government used its own 
papers tc t:-lc:y down the seriousness of the dispute. The National 
Intel].jgence!:r for example, reported that all who tock part in the 
Senate's first Fishery detate "seemed to repel the idea that this 
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question could, under any circumstances, endanger the peace of the 
twc nc:tions. "53 This report was significant because it was not 
true. Arr=erican Senators v;oulC. r.ever have arsued for peace under 
any circumstances, and they did not on this occasion. Though the 
overall tone of the speeches was sensible, some did get fired up. 
Among them was the Maryland Whig, Thomas George Pratt, who saw a 
greater possibility of war over the Fisheries than he had over 
c4 
Dregon.- But the Whig administraticn knew that few people would 
pore through the Congressional Globe when it was eventually 
published and that their version of the debate - which would be 
printed in papers across the nation - would carry more weight than 
the truth. In their efforts to preserve the peace, Fillmore and 
his supporters Fresumably felt the odd white lie was justifiable. 
Also designed to keep the nation's passions on an even keel was 
Fillmore's decision to send the US Navy vessel to the Maritimes, a 
move also announced in the National Intelligencer. 55 This at once 
countered dangerous criticism that the Government was lettir.g 
Britain dictate event~, ar-d reduced the sense:· cf isolaticr. arrcng 
American fishermen which could have inspired them to desperate 
acts. Even so, the presence of just one vessel on so extensive a 
station could only be symbolic. As Perry's orders revealed, he had 
not gene to British North America to increase the tension; t:e was 
there to keeF the Feace. 
These deliberate efforts to maintain Anglo-Arr.erican harmony 
were the platform on which the American Government based its 
dealings with the British Government. Here, too, Fillmore and his 
men displayed a sensitive touch. He refused to allow his 
governrrent tc adopt a bullish, bellicose tcne. Ttere were no 
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Anglo~hcbic tirades or a~peals to a bloody ~atrioti~m. Com~crEc tc 
the rantings inspired in American politicians by previcus 
Anglo-American crises, Webster's statement in the Boston Courier 
was only mildly aggressive. Yet even this provoked a gentle rebuke 
from the PrEsident, who 'suggested' that the Secretary of State 
~rite sorr.ething more ~acific. In it, wrote the President, Webster 
could regret any misunderstanding between the American and colonial 
fishermen and stress that negotiations between the British 
American governments were imminent. 56 Within a week Fillmore 
and 
was 
even rr.cre conciliatory. Though he pledgee tc resist unjust arrests 
"by force if necessary", he told Webster that the Government cculd 
not refuse to submit to all of them "for some seizures might te 
perfectly legal and just." Moreover, 
a general refusal to subrrdt might Qe deemed a 
threat, that would unnecessarily stir up anger, 
cause popular asitation anc prerreture 
ccrr:rr:itrrents on t.cth sides, and finally place us 
in the wrong by appearing before the world to 
have claimed that to which we were not 
entitled. 
He telieved Britain was "right in her construction of the treaty", 
but favoured an "appeal to her magnanimity, her sense of justice 
and not to arms." ·He concluded: "I can r:ct believe an apt:eal ..._.ill 
b , . . "57 e maoe 1n va1n. 
Fillmore was right. His softly-softly appr~ach, coupled with 
Britain's determination to prevent a flare-up, helped preserve the 
peace. In fact, the reason for its survival was quite simple: 
neither country wanted war. Yet, if Britain had not wanted a 
crisis, why had she decided to send her ships to British Nortr. 
America at all? Here the picture becomes less sirrple. In pursuing 
this course, the British Government was playing an apparently 
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low-risk game where success promi~Ed several possible rewards. A 
top priority was to induce the Americans to grant Reciprocity by 
actually making them interested in this superficially uninteresting 
measure. But there was rr.ore, much more, to the British initiative. 
Above all, the new boldness over the Fisheries revealed the extent 
to which Britain sa~ the Colonies as a liability in foreign policy. 
Moreover, it showed how the British could use British North America 
as a diplomatic weapon. 
That Prime Minister Derby hoped exclusion would lead tc 
Reciprocity is not in doubt. The Russell admini~tration had spent 
years trying to persuade the Americans to grant North American free 
trade, but had never come anywhere near success. Once in office, 
Derby opted for a more aggressive policy of coercion. The theory 
behind his new policy was convincing: the enforcement of British 
fishing rights had been so lax in the past that the Americans had 
had no incentive to opt for a Reciprocity agreement which opened 
the Fisheries to them. But if the British enforced their rights 
or demonstrated their ability to do so - the Americans might at 
last appreciate the. economic boon that was on offer. Thus, as he 
made his t:lar:s for the Royal Navy's North American station, Derby 
tcJd Colonial Secretary Pakington of the importance of "cringing 
Brother Jonathan to his senses". On August 5th, Foreign Secretary 
Malmesbury wrote: "I understand our decision to defend the 
fisheries as having for its principle (sic) object the attainment 
of other privileges denied to us." 58 However, for the sake of 
transatlantic calm, he put this view ovtr rr:ere diplomatically in a 
desFatch to Webster via Crampton. Stressing the need to preserve 
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friendly Anglo-American relations, MaJrresbury expressed the 
governrrent' s hope that: "the atter.tion ~,o;hich has tru~ bE·er. drawn to 
the subject cf the Fisheries should lead to an adjustment, by 
aw.icable r.egctiations, upon a satisfactory footing, of the System 
of Ccmrr£rcial intercourse between the United States and her M's 
. . h . c 1 . 1 Po . " 59 Ncrt Amer1can o cn1a sse~s1ons. 
And in their "amicable negotiations" with the Americans after 
opting for Exclusion, successive British governments made full use 
of the Fisheries as a bait. In defiance of the American wish to 
have separate settlemer.ts on fishing rights and Reciprocity60 the 
British insisted on one all-encompassing Fishery and Reci~rocity 
61 
agreement. Aware of the need for a permanent agreement over the 
Fisheries, the Americans wanted an arrangement that was not tied to 
an economic treaty vulnerable to changing commercial or 
international relations. But the British, aware that in the 
Fisheries they had the only wea~cn which coulc tring the Americans 
to book, held out successfully until the summer of 1854 for a joint 
rr.easure. 
The British interest in securing Reciprocity may seem strange, 
however. During the dark days of the Annexation crisis, 
Reciprocity appeared to both the British authorities and large 
numbers of the colonists as the only measure which could preserve 
the British connection. But by 1852, to the chagrir. of Israel de 
Wolf Andrews, all this was beginning to change. "wnen the sutjEct 
was first considered," he wrote in 1853 and 1854, the "Lower 
Colonies would have surrendered, without any other equivalent, a 
full right to the Colonial fisheries." But, he added, "Since 1850 
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the British North American Cclor.iE·!: have enjcyec a c€-sree of 
prosperity increasir.s year ty year, and still on the advance such 
as they . have never before ~assessed, and scarcely dreamed of 
attaining." As a result, their appeals to the American Government 
for reciprocal trade became less urgent until 1852, when they 
ceased altogether. At present, he concluded, "the Colonies, on the 
whole, are quite indifferent about the IT8tter." 62 A barometer cf 
the changing atmosphere was ~ew Brunswick, traditionally less 
protective of the fisheries than Nova Scotia. In December 1852 the 
~ew Brunswick Executive Council ceclared that "no concession could 
be made by the Government of the United States which would be at 
all equivalent to throwing open its fisheries to the Arrerican 
fisherrren." Jt did, ho~,o,·ever, Conceee that in the WidEr intErEStS 
of all the Prcvinces it wight consider a British North American 
. . t 63 Rec1proc1ty agreernen . Even in canada, where the yearning for 
North American free trade had burned the strongest and longest, 
Reciprocity seemed to be less popular. In April 1852 Elgin wrote: 
"As tc the state of feeling which exists in Canada with respect to 
this measure ... [t]here is not assuredly the heat en the sutject 
that there was some. time ago." In fact, Canada was heading intc 
the arms of the protectionists. Reci~rocity was, therefore, a 
curious measure for the British to risk war over. 
As was often the case, the British had valid reasons for 
takins such chances. Most important, they knew the colonies were 
not truly indifferent to Reciprocity. Although in April 1852 Elgin 
warned Crampton cf Canada's waning interest in the measure, he 
rounded off his letter by asserting: "Nevertheless there are 
certain classes and certain districts where the feeling is 
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strong." 64 And in May 1853, with colonial prosperity still r1s1ng, 
Andrews qualified his description of the hostility to Reciproc1ty 
in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick by stressing that "Canada, 
Newfoundland and Prince Edwards IsJand are not disposed to pres~ 
unreasonable demands." 65 Indeed, most of the canad.~an threats of 
protectionism revealed just how strongly they st1ll wanted 
Reciprocity. Though some sincerely advocated closing the border to 
An~rican goods, many more hoped that a spell of protEctionism - or 
even the threat of it- would remind the United States of the value 
of its trade with the Colonies. This, in turn, would persuade the 
Doubting Thomases in Washington of the merits of . . 66 Rec1proc1 ty. 
Similarly Canada and Prince Edward Island cooperated in barring the 
Americans from the Fisheries largely in the hope that this would 
inspire fresh, and successful, Reciprocity . . 67 negot1at10ns. The 
British, therefore were wise not to take Colonial Protectionism at 
its face value. They were also wise to continue to press for 
Reciprocity. At the root of their policy was a determination to 
prevent a revival of Annexationism and to avoid negotiating again 
from a position of weakness with the Americans. Throughout 1848 
and 1849 Elgin had repeatedly told Grey that Annexation was the 
automatic recourse of the dissatisfied in the Provinces. As the 
British had learned to their cost, there was nothing like a 
depression - or even a mere recession - to cause dissatisfaction 
and, hot on its heels, Annexationism. Though in 1852 loyalty went 
hand in hand with prosperity, everyone knew this economic success 
could not last indefinitely. The best way for Britain to soften 
the blow of any future downturn - and thereby prevent a return to 
Annexation ism was to secure Reciprocity in a period of 
prosperity. Such a healthy economic climate was doubly auspicious 
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for any Reciprocity negotiations. In 1848 and 1849 the 
rE-cession-insr:ired clarrour for Annexcticn had crippled British 
efforts to obtain the cure-all, Reciprocity. The Americans had 
revelled in Britain's discomfort and tried to exploit it by naming 
an unreasonable price for the measure. But if Bri ta.l n chose to 
negotiate when the Colonies were loyal, calm and a shade 
anti-American, her chances of reaching a sensible deal with the 
Americans were much greater. Thus, having once struggled to cure 
British North America of the malignant imperial illness, 
~nnexation, the British chose to avoid a r:otentially fatal relapse 
through a long-term policy of prevention. 
While revealing that Britain still valued her British North 
Arrerican possessions, this course also proved that she ·saw thE 
colonies as a I;XJtentiaJ threat to her diplonatic affairs. ShE did 
not pursue the I;XJlicy of exclusion merely to avoid yet another 
round of embarrassing Reciprocity negotiations in the distant 
future. As a world power Britain was rightly determined to 
eliminate any prcblems which might leave her vulnerable to the 
seemingly insatiable ambitions cf her rising young rival. The past 
had shown that whenever the loyalty of British North America 
wavered, two things happened. First, Britain appeared much less 
formidable to the United States and, second, the United States 
became much more confident in her dealir.gs v;ith Great Britain. It 
was therefore sound policy for Britain to do aJl she reasonably 
cculd to keep British North America loyal. The sending of the 
fishery protection fleet and the continued pursuit of REciprocity 
wen: both calcuJ a ted lc do t:-hi s. One of the biggest probleJlls 
facing Britain was that the Provinces felt the Mother Country 
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always £acrificed their interests on the altar of AngJo-American 
relations. Reinforcing this suspicicn were the frequent staterr~nts 
from British poJ iticians which seerred· to underline treir hostility 
to Empire. But the announcement of the policy of exclusion helped 
heaJ these wounds. Coming after years cf coJonial lcbbying, it 
showed conclusively Lhat Britain still trea~ured British North 
America and that the Provinces could still influence British 
foreign pclicy. ~oreover, denying the Fisheries to the Americans 
served to unite the Frovinces both with each other and with the 
Mcther country against their traditional foe. This v•as clearly on 
Derby's mind in Cctcber 1852, after exclusion's first summEr. "I 
have no doubt", he told the Foreisn Secretary, "that the part we 
have taken.will do us good in our most important colonies, and will 
have widened the breach between them and Jonathan, so as to· afford 
1 . 1 h . h . . . "68 1tt e appre ens1on on t e annexat1on quest1on. 
Eut the fishery policy of 1852 had an even wider significG~nce 
in British foreign policy. Despite slew communications, th~ 
British had lcng been adept at playing pressure politics with the 
United States. They were always looking for fresh diplomatic 
advantage, and in 1852 they chose British North America as a key 
~eapon in their game of bluff. The colonies were useful because at 
th~t time the claims ar.d counter-claims of fishermen off the 
Mariti~s WE're not the only source of Anglo-American tension; just 
as volatile was the rivalry between the two countries over Cuba and 
Central America. More to the point, this rivalry h~d been coming 
to a head long before Derby opte·d for his new, imrroved fishery 
policy. Since the autumn of 1851 at the latest the CUban issue had 
become particularly sensitive. On several occasions in the late 
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1840s and early 1850s, the large island.off the Florida Keys was 
rumoured to be the target of lawless, American-based filibustering 
expeditions. To a beleaguered American South, absorbing a 
territory where slavery was still a basic economic prop had obvious 
appeal; but to the British, the annexation of the Spanish colony 
would have been one strategic step too many in the ominously rapid 
territorial growth of the United States. As such, Britain had 
taken determined steps to prevent Cuba falling into - or being 
seized by - American hands. On at least two occasions British 
officials had advised the State Department of impending 
American-backed invasions of Cuba, and in September 1851 the 
British Government risked a worsening of Anglo-American relations 
over the .issue by taking international law into its own hands. 
"Her Majesty's Ships of war on the West Indian Station",· Crampton 
told Webster, "will have orders to prevent by force any adventurers 
of any nation from landing with hostile intent upon the Island of 
Cuba. "69 Seven months later, as the British Government formulated 
the fishery policy, it turned the Cuban screw more tightly. 
Malmesbury ordered Crampton to read an official despatch to Webster 
which formally declared that "Her Majesty's Government could never 
see with indifference the Island of Cuba in the possession of any 
Power whatever but Spain." And the Foreign Secretary backed this 
up by putting the American Government on the spot with regard to 
Cuba. Included in this unwelcome despatch was a cordial invitation 
to the Americans to help guarantee Cuba's independence. The United 
States could do this, said Malmesbury, by joining with other 
governments in agreeing to "bind themselves severally and 
collectively to renounce, both now and hereafter, all intention to 
obtain possession of the Island of Cuba and to discountenance all 
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attempts to that effect on the part 
viewpoint, this proposal for a 
70 
of others. from Webster's 
so-called Cuban Tripartite 
Convention was an alarming prospect. Britain was threatening both 
to extend her policing role in the caribbean and to limit the 
territorial growth of the United States. Not only did she have the 
gall to suggest that the Americans work to extend her influence 
while reducing their own, but she had the backing of a third party. 
And there was the rub. For joining Britain 1n this scheme was 
France, Britannia's traditional enemy and the United States' 
partner in the two previous Anglo-American conflicts. Webster's 
response was as unconvincing as the Anglo-French ploy was cunning. 
Denying any American interest in possessing Cuba, he declined to 
join the Convention. His bolt-hole - dug for him and countless 
Secretaries of State by George Washington was America's 
established policy of avoiding entangling alliances. 71" This 
response was predictable· but, in view of American misbehaviour over 
Texas, Oregon and california, his claims of uninterest in Cuba must 
have rung hollow. The clanging echoes carried all the way to 
London, and they arrived as Derby was finally deciding whether to 
send the ships of the West Indian Station on a summer patrol of the 
British North American fisheries. 
Over Central America, too, there was stalemate. After months 
of negotiating, Clayton and Bulwer enthused about their 1850 
72 
agreement , but this vague treaty had merely won both countries a 
breathing space. Certainly it had settled nothing. By 1852 the 
Americans' interest in a trans-isthmian canal was still as strong 
as their fears about British ambitions 1n the region. These 
concerns grew as reports reached washington of the Union Jack being 
154 
raised in two parts of Central America - on Tigre Island in the 
Gulf of Fonseca and on the Bay Islands off Honduras. These rumours 
were offensive in several ways. They violated the spirit of that 
solid plank of American foreign policy, the Monroe Doctrine, which 
in 1823 had warned the Old World that the Americas were no longer 
open to colonisation. The raising of the Union Jack also 
heightened suspicions that Britain was set on hindering attempts to 
secure the Atlantic-Pacific link which many believed to be crucial 
to retaining California. And to those Americans who saw Britain as 
an inveterate and scheming foe, the two islands were the latest 
pieces in an encircling British jigsaw. Thus, in the early days of 
the Fishery Dispute, when most papers were focussing on New England 
and Nova Scotia, one editor reacted angrily to reports of a British 
colony on the Bay Islands. These islands, ran the editorial, 
constitute a capital naval station, for depots 
of supplies, &c, in the event of war; for, with 
the island of Jamaica on the opposite side, in 
their occupation, the British navy may now shut 
up the southern outlet of the Gulf of Mexico 
almost completely, between Cuba and Yucatan, or 
render it certainly very hazardous for an 
American vessel to pass through those straits. 
At the northern pass, a fleet of observation 
between Cuba and the Florida Keys would lock up 
the Gulf entirely, and reduce our vast commerce 
therein,.at both extremities to the pressure of 
a practical blockade.73 
In a sense, this was all a fuss about nothing. Neither 
country seriously wanted to colonise any part of Central America; 
but neither country trusted the other. So it was that Britain 
continued her protectorate of the Mosquito Indians, even though its 
validity had been questioned years earlier by some of Russell's 
b . 74 ca 1net. Meanwhile, the Americans continued to read the worst 
possible interpretations into this British behaviour .. So important 
was the issue that it continued to occupy the time of Crampton and 
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Webster. And in April 1852 the two of them sat up late into a 
spring night, not retiring until they had .. reached an agreement over 
Nicaragua. Flushed with success, Webster told Fillmore: "The 
English Govt never has been, & never will be, in a better temper 
for adjusting these difficulties than it is now." So convinced was 
he that a final settlement was in his grasp that he said his 
Government should "use some urgency with Nicaragua & costa Rica, to 
induce them to bring the whole matter to a conclusion." 75 Webster 
was to be disappointed. The Nicaraguan Government did not share 
his enthusiasm and rejected the scheme. He also misjudged the 
British. Though Crampton, a footsoldier in the front line, was 
willing to cooperate, his general, 3,000 miles from the action, was 
not. And in June Malmesbury made this perfectly clear. Through 
another official despatch to Crampton, he told Webster that Britain 
could not surrender her protectorate over the Mosquitos unless the 
.b . 76 tr1 e got proper compensat1on. Thus, as Britain prepared for the 
squalls arising from her fishery policy, she in no way softened her 
line on Central America. 
In taking this course, Britain enjoyed two trump cards - the 
Royal Navy and the current warm relationship with France. One of 
the appeals of the Exclusion policy, moreover, was that it allowed 
Britain to lay these cards firmly on the diplomatic table. And 
this, of course, exposed the very poor hand that·the United States 
had been dealt. Most obviously, the revamped protection of the 
Fisheries allowed Britain a legitimate display of her impressive 
naval power within striking .distance of the United States. At the 
same time, this demonstrated the crippling inadequacy of the puny 
us Navy. But Britain's goal was not just a Fisheries settlement. 
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She also hoped her policy would inspire the Americans to cooperate 
over other issues. Hence, in a fairly subtle way, the British 
tried to link their stance over British North America with their 
position over Central America. They did this from the start. On 
July 5, when Crampton brought Webster the bad news of Exclusion, he 
apparently tried to soften the blow by stressing that it was also 
directed at France. But by adding that France was cooperating with 
Britain in enforcing the policy - as she was in the English Channel 
- Crampton found a fresh opportunity to remind the Secretary of 
state of Anglo-French cooperation over other . 77 lSSUeS. 
Significantly, during the Fishery Dispute there was no let-up in 
British pressure on the United States. Malmesbury's refusal to 
abandon the Mosquito Indians kept Central America on the boil, and 
over Cuba Crampton managed to be even more explicit. Only three 
days after he announced Exclusion and barely two months since 
Webster's original refusal - he again pressed the United States to 
join the Cuban Tripartite Convention. This, he said, ingenuously, 
would have but two objects: "the one a Mutual Denunciation of the 
future Possession of Cuba, - the other an Engagement to cause the 
Renunciation to be respected." The only way to enforce such a 
"Renunciation", though, was by using powerful navies. Thus, for 
the second time in three days Crampton reminded the Americans of 
their naval impotence and of Britain's virility. Just as loaded, 
though, was a comment he made later that day.· Referring to the 
possibility of a trans-isthmian conmunication, he then spoke of 
Cuba. That island, he said, "is so placed geographically that the 
Nation which may possess it, if the Naval Forces of that National 
should be considerable, might either protect or obstruct the 
78 
commercial routes from one ocean to the other." 
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Superficially harmless, these musings could have been read 
another way. They could also have meant that a nation - or nations 
-with a considerable navy could easily blockade the United States, 
a tactic widely expected to be adopted by Britain in any future 
Anglo-American war. And if, as the Convention suggested, Britain 
had France by her side, there would be very little that the 
Americans could do to stop her. The message, then, was clear: 
Britain was not going to compromise over Cuba or Central America 
and, if Webster wanted to know why, all he had to do was look to 
the waters just north of Maine. There, a short voyage from New 
York, was the Royal Navy. Freed from its traditional fears of 
France, it could concentrate its attention on the United States 
and that was precisely what it planned to do. 
There was nothing new in the British Government using British 
No.rth America to pressurise the United States, but this may have 
been the first time that the colonies had been dragged into a 
dispute which did not directly affect them. In 1838 Westminster 
had responded with unusual speed to an official Nova Scotia 
petition complaining about American fishing encroachments and 
"praying for additional naval protection to British interests." 
Lord Glenelg's reply was heartening: "It has been determined for 
the future, to station, during the Fishing season, an armed force 
on the coast of Nova Scotia, to enforce a more strict observance of 
. f h b . c· . n 79 the provisions o t e Treaty y American Itizens .... This 
swift, decisive action was not, however, aimed solely at protecting 
the fisheries. The navy almost certainly went to the Maritimes to 
protect British North America generally - and Canada in particular 
- from the United States. The Nova Scotian appeal had coincided 
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with the tail-end of the Canadian rebellions of 1837-38, which got 
new life from open American support. The British badly needed to 
strengthen their ability to defend British North An~rica, and they 
also needed a show of force which would deter further American 
interference without escalating the crisis. The defence of the 
fisheries was an ideal pretext. Thus, between January 1838 and the 
spring of 1839, the number of regular soldiers in canada grew from 
2,000 to 10,500, and between New Year's Day and November 1, 1838, 
the naval strength of the North American and west Indian Station 
grew from 27 to 41 vessels. Then came the decision to use these 
vessels to drive the Americans from colonial waters. 80 Only three 
years later, Britain put the colonial waters to similar use to try 
and influence the verdict on Alexander McLeod. On trial for his 
life in New York State after boasting that he had killed the one 
fatal victim of the 1837 caroline incident~ this British citizen 
became the focal point of deepening Anglo-American tension. 
Indeed, the crisis found Foreign Secretary Palmerston at his 
aggressive best. With unconscious irony, he told AndrevJ Stevenson, 
the American Minister to London, that "Speaking not officially but 
as a Private friend ... if McLeod is executed there must be war." 
The tension survived the arrival of Peel's new administration which 
put Aberdeen in the Foreign Office. Though he was more cautious 
and conciliatory, his Government decided on a show of strength. 
Here again British North America provided the opportunity. The 
First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Haddington, successfully 
recommended that Canada's new Governor-General, Sir Charles Bagot, 
go out 1n a battleship. This, argued Haddington, was "a very 
useful way of having a great ship in these waters without giving 
81 the least offence." 
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This was the value of the Exclusion policy. It could, of 
course, be argued that if Britain had wanted to exert more pressure 
on the United States over either Cuba or Central America, then she 
would not have been so obscure as to send ships to British North 
America. Instead, she would have sent them to the heart of the 
problem: to Cuba and Central America. But, as Malmesbury revealed 
in September 1851, British vessels were already operating in this 
area, on the look-out for CUban-bound filibusters from the United 
States. The reaction of the White House to this, however, revealed 
that Britain could intensify such action only at her peril. 
Fillmore's response was clear: he believed these orders 
could not be carried into effect without 
leading too probably to abuses & collisions 
that wd. constantly jeopard & might seriously 
disturb that peace & good Will which he 
sincerely wished to see cultivated & made 
perpetual between the United States & Great 
Britain.82 
Deep down, the British must have known that he was right. To send 
more ships to neutral waters to interfere with the activities of 
foreign nationals was a risky policy and only advisable as a last 
resort. If a show of strength was all that was needed, it was much 
safer to send the Royal Navy on patrol in British waters where they 
had every right to be. The goal of this policy, after all, was not 
to provoke the Americans, but to remind them that Britain was a 
power to be reckoned with. This, Derby and Malmesbury hoped, would 
aid negotiations over Cuba and Central America. These tactics, 
moreover, were clear to one clerk at the Foreign Office in 1852. 
That this man, Lord Stanley, was also the son of the Prime Minister 
adds weight to his testimony. Ideally placed to know what was 
going on that summer, he wrote in his diary: 
My Father's object in mooting the question, was 
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not so much to protect our colonists against 
competition, as to make America feel that there 
were some rights which, if we were willing to 
cede, she might find it for her interests to 
buy ... We have also in hand a plan of 
convention between England, France, and 
America, for the purpose of checking designs on 
CUba.83 
In short, for years British North America had been to Britain a 
diplomatic liability and an asset for the Americans. But in 1852 
the boot was at long last very firmly on the other foot. 
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CHAPI'ER FIVE 
RECIPROCITY: THE ROCKY.ROAD 
In 1854, two years after the Fishery policy was introduced, Lord 
Elgin returned from leave in Britain on a special mission to 
Washington. His task: to secure Reciprocity. It was, by any 
standards, a tall order. For the past eight years British and 
colonial officials had been trying - with varying degrees of 
urgency and the same lack of success - to persuade the United 
States to adopt this measure. In fact, by 1854 the efforts of the 
Imperial authorities had dragged on for so long that the colonies, 
Newfoundland apart, had largely lost interest in free trade with 
the United States. In 1854 Britain was also negotiating from a 
position of weakness. The Crimean War made it very clear that she 
was in no position to be heavy-handed with the United States. As 
long as she was fighting a European war, she had to avoid trouble 
in North America, not foment it. Yet in 1854 there was cause for 
optimism about Reciprocity, and most of it lay in the United 
States. Whereas for the past eight years domestic American 
political conditions had worked against the measure; in that year 
the conditions were ripe for a settlement. And the best way to 
understand why the clouds parted in 1854 is to study the fog that 
bedevilled the British efforts in the previous years. 
First, an understanding of the economic problems and clashes 
of interest besetting Reciprocity is vital. When first broached 
half-heartedly in 1846, the measure was intended to be limited in 
scope. It would have brought free trade between its instigator, 
Canada, and the united States, allowing the colony to export its 
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timber, corn and other agricultural products to the Republic duty 
free - and allowing the same products to travel in the opposite 
direction. As an added incentive, the Canadians offered the free 
navigation of the Saint Lawrence and its canals to the Americas. 
But as the recession bit deeper, other colonies complicated the 
issue by pressing for inclusion. Prince Edward Island, largely an 
isolated farming community, knew the value of North American free 
trade through years of supplying American fishermen with fresh 
food. To Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, also hit by a decline in 
world trade, the United States offered even greater potential as a 
trading partner. 
allowed the more 
and, possibly, 
Provinces, the 
Free access to the American market would have 
competitive export of timber, fish, coal, iron 
colonial built ships. But to these Maritime 
United States was also a commercial threat, 
particularly if Reciprocity threw open the jewel in their crown, 
the Atlantic Fisheries. 
In the United States, too, Reciprocity offered both 
competition and promise. On the negative side, the wheat growers 
of the Midwest, Maryland and Virginia, the coal and iron 
industrialists of Pennsylvania and Virginia and the shipbuilders of 
New England had reason to fear colonial competition. And across 
much of the Deep South, the remoteness of British North America 
gave Reciprocity faint appeal. Yet the Midwest could see benefits 
in a new market for its agricultural produce and access to the St. 
Lawrer1ce, the traditional rival of New York's Erie Canal. Traders 
in the states bordering British North America had every reason to 
welcome free trade, and the lumber men of Maine could see in 
Reciprocity the promise of a removal of duties on timber cut in the 
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United States but floated down the river system of New Brunswick. 
Finally, the fishermen of New England had sound commercial grounds 
for backing any agreement which would let them fish on equal terms 
with their colonial rivals. 
Yet a quick glance at the late 1840s and early 1850s suggests 
that the British could have saved their efforts. In simple terms, 
the conditions were never suitable in the United States for the 
passage of Reciprocity. Presidential elections ln 1848 and 1852 
meant that in those years Congress effectively lost interest in 
passing legislation and, when it turned to such humdrum matters, it 
was politically dangerous for any party with its eyes on the White 
House to start backing measures which might appear favourable to 
America's Old Enemy. Compounding this was the death of President 
Taylor in 1850, which led to the introduction of a new President and 
a new cabinet. For virtually the whole of its career, moreover, the 
administration of 1849-53 lacked a majority in Congress and was 
therefore to a large extent impotent. This impotency also afflicted 
the Democrat administration in 1848, especially after it became clear 
that President Polk was not standing for a second term. From then on 
the members of his cabinet were at least as interested in furthering 
their own political careers as in acting as a government. Once Cass 
lost the election, this Democratic administration was stripped of 
real power, a severe blow to the friends of Reciprocity because in 
Robert H Walker they had a Secretary of the Treasury sympathetic to 
the measure] Worse still, the new Whig government was 
move heaven and earth for Reciprocity. Though the 
longer rigidly committed to the tariff, it was 
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unlikely to 
party was no 
the American 
political grouping least friendly to free trade. Wrote Crampton 1n 
March 1849: 
As far as the Govt of the United States is 
concerned I fear our prospe·cts have not been 
improved by the late change of Administration -
Mr Clayton the new Secretary of State when in 
the Senate was I understand opposed to the 
measure - he is a protectionist though not as 
strict a protectionist as others of his party. 
Such was the pressure of the tariff men on Taylor's minority 
administration that in July 1849 Clayton told Crampton: 
the present Administration of the US wont 
(sic) have any thing to do with the matter 
unless they can get such a quid pro quo for it 
as will make it go down with their own party, 
the Protectionists, save themselves from the 
appearance of inconsistency, and at the same 
time do something which would make them some 
political capital with the American people 
generally. 2 
Nor did matters improve under Taylor's successor, Millard Fillmore. 
Within a short time of his taking over in the White House, the Whig 
press was denouncing Reciprocity, and, by the spring of 1851, 
Fillmore's position was that the United States had nothing to gain 
from reciprocal free trade in agricultural products because Canada 
and the United States were economic competitors. And in October 
1850 Bulwer predicted a bleak future for Reciprocity because of a 
rising tide of American protectionism. 3 
Another major handicap was the rise in sectional tension. 
This served as an obstacle to North American free trade in three 
main ways. First, so much time was spent on debates about slavery 
that other matters were neglected by Congress, and only the most 
pressing stood any chance of receiving attention, let alone a final 
vote. In fact, in 1848, 1849 and 1850 Congress failed to act on 
Reciprocity largely because it ran out of time due to the nation's 
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obsession with 4 slavery. Secondly, ~he sectional feuding 
heightened SOuthern suspicions about attempts by the 'abolitionist' 
North to whittle away their power and their right to retain 
slavery. This was unfortunate because Reciprocity was widely 
believed to be the first step towards political union between the 
Colonies and the States. 5 It was thought that 'commercial 
annexation' would hasten 'political annexation', a fear which 
encouraged many southerners to be at best suspicious of the 
measure. The British were painfully aware of this problem. 
"Caution is most necessary," wrote Bulwer in February 1850. "The 
south will oppose reciprocity if they think it favors annexation. 
The North supports it, because they think it defers but prepares 
the way for it." 6 Hence, a great supporter of Reciprocity, John A 
Dix, probably did more harm than good when he spoke of Reciprocity 
and Annexation in the same breath. 7 Finally, relations between 
North and South became so embittered that many SOuthern politicians 
would oppose any measure which seemed especially to favour . the 
. 1 . 8 r1va sect1on. Reciprocity was especially vulnerable to this 
charge because the states which traded most heavily with the 
Colonies were in the north. 9 
There were, then, several factors working against Reciprocity, 
most of which were beyond the control of the British. Yet 
political principles are usually very flexible; if the powerful can 
be convinced that a measure is in their interests, they will 
usually find some reason for supporting it. Here lay the biggest 
problem facing Reciprocity: it was difficult to arouse any 
enthusiasm for it among American politicians. Time and again, the 
issue failed to arouse the sort of interest needed for it to 
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succeed in Congress. Indeed, a constant theme of Andrews' 
correspondence with the State Department was the need to overcome 
American indifference to Reciprocity. For every member of congress 
who opposed it, there were several who did not care whether it 
failed or not. Like the vast majority of Americans they knew 
little about British North America and cared even less. All they 
knew was that they had got along quite well without Reciprocity so 
far, and could probably manage without it in the future. 10 If they 
were undecided, the.thought that they might be helping Britain out 
of her difficulties would often swing them towards opposing the 
measure. There they were joined by the economic groups who felt 
threatened by Reciprocity. Chief among these were the wheat 
growers of Maryland and Virginia, the coal miners of Virginia and 
Pennsylvania, and the ship builders of New 11 England. Others 
believed that the proposed Reciprocity measures not only threatened 
specific American interests, but also offered America nothing in 
return. Reciprocity was embracing, wrote the Philadelphia Enquirer 
in 1852, "only those articles of which the people of the British 
provinces have a surplus, and carefully excluding all articles 
which we might find a market, with them." 12 Such opponents 
for 
were 
adept at discovering pretexts for blocking Reciprocity. One of the 
favourites was the claim that it was a violation of the 
Constitution to control commerce by treaty, an argument rehearsed 
by President Fillmore in 1852: 
The express power having been given by the 
Constitution to Congress, to regulate commerce 
with foreign nations, and to lay and collect 
duties, has this deprived the treaty-making 
power of authority so to regulate commerce, 
as to declare that no duty shall be collected 
on a particular article imported into the 
country from abroad? 
And, even if the Senate were allowed to pass commercial measures, 
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would this not threaten existing commercial arrangements with other 
countr ies?13 
The cause of Reciprocity was not completely hopeless, though. 
There were strong supporters who were motivated by the benefits 
they expected Reciprocity to bring to their own particular 
districts. This was especially true of the four main American 
advocates of North American free trade: John A oix, Joseph 
Grinnell, Stephen Douglas and Israel de Wolf Andrews. Senator Dix 
came from New York State, near the border with Canada, a region to 
which Reciprocity was likely to bring a massive expansion in the 
already growing trade with the Provinces. Representative 
Grinnell's Massachusetts constituency depended on the exploitation 
of the colonial fisheries and could only benefit from any agreement 
which gave freer access to these northern waters. Douglas hailed 
from Illinois and, like many in the Midwest, had his eyes on the St 
Lawrence waterway. In summer this was the swiftest route to the 
Old world for what was already becoming the wheatbowl of Europe. 
Andrews, though, was the most active petitioner for Reciprocity. 
Raised on the Maine/New Brunswick border and from one of the 
busiest ports of America's north-eastern fishing fleet, he knew all 
about the potential of free trade with the Provinces. Moreover, as 
a land speculator, he had material interests of his own that he 
wished to develop in 14 the Canadas. But between .1848 and 1852 few 
supporters for the measure could be found whose constituencies were 
not directly involved in trade with the Colonies. This, Douglas 
explained to Crampton in 1851, was the Reciprocity movement's 
greatest weakness. "This is a measure," he said, 
for, or against which, there cannot be got up 
any national or even party feeling - we cannot, 
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therefore, hope to carry it by a- hurrah! It 
is one which requires great study to understand 
its advantages or even its bearings on the 
different interests of the Country: -- its 
supporters are friendly to it, not on any 
general principle, but from various local and 
peculiar consideration - the opposition to it 
is of the same varied character, the only means 
we have of getting at it is therefore one which 
involves great knowledge of men's characters 
and of their local and personal interests and 
prejudices - Great knowledge of the question in 
its bearings on each of their interests - great 
tact in the manner of approaching the subject 
with different men - and above all - great 
labour in keeping account of the "ayes and 
noes" - and when we are assured of a majority, 
keeping it up to the mark at the moment 
required - I have ... carried measures in this 
way myself, and I know the hard work it 
requires.l5 
It was ironic that Douglas, of all people, should advise 
Crampton on how to secure the ratification of Reciprocity because 
he, along with other Americans, had helped kill off possible 
agreements through sheer greed. One object of lust in some circles 
was the use of the St Lawrence, and, once these Americans got the 
merest hint that it might be on offer, they would not let go. This 
Bulwer learned to his irritation in early 1850. The previous year, 
he told Elgin, Crampton had innocently lent Dix a private despatch 
from London stating .that Her Majesty's Government would not block 
any Canadian wish to open the waterway to the Americans. 
Unfortunately, Dix had promptly shown it "to half the world". 
What has followed has been that Mr Douglas, a 
Senator, in order to obtain popularity,. by 
acquiring for this Country what he supposes we 
are willing to concede, has brought forward a 
reciprocity bill in the Senate, including the 
Navigation of the St Lawrence, and a motion has 
been made to recommit the bill in the House of 
Representatives for the purpose of making a 
similar addition ... I have seen and talked to 
Douglas, but he says that unless the St 
Lawrence is granted, the bill will not pass; 
and it is probable that as an expectation on 




Greed even reared its ugly head among those groups least friendly 
to Reciprocity. When William Hamilton Merritt visited washington 
in June 1849 to press for Reciprocity, Clayton sought advice from 
his resident expert, Andrews. Though Andrews was an advocate of 
Reciprocity, he was a past master at telling his employers what 
they wanted to hear. His inclination, for political reasons, was 
to do nothing about the measure in the summer of 1849. But, faced 
with the possibility of an agreement between the United States and 
Canada alone, Andrews urged Clayton to hold out for more if he 
started negotiations with the British. 
If the Government decide to entertain favorably 
the proposition of the Canadian Government I 
propose that we exchange the articles named in 
Mr Dix (sic) bill, except lumber, on reciprocal 
terms - provided the Imperial Government 
guarantee to our Citizens the right to enjoy in 
common with British subjects the sea and coast 
fisheries of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia -
Prince Edwards Island, and Newfoundland. The 
abolition of the export duty in New Brunswick 
upon Lumber cut on Lands owned by Maine and 
Massachusetts on the headwaters of the St John 
and floated down that river to the sea. With 
an explicit understanding that this Government 
is not by this offer commdtted to adopt a 
similar policy with the other Colonies.l7 
In short, Andrews felt that the United States should not settle for 
a simple agreement with Canada. The rest of the Provinces had so 
much to offer that even a pro-tariff administration could find 
something appealing in a free-trade agreement with all of British 
North America. This, presumably, was what Clayton meant when he 
told Crampton that any Reciprocity agreement had to give his 
administration 'capital' with the American public. Certainly in 
that same month Crampton reported to Palrnerston the rising price 
demanded by Clayton for any deal on North American free trade. 
Though Clayton could not recommend to Congress a deal on 
reciprocity between the States and Canada and New Brunswick, 
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it was, he said, not to be inferred that the 
American Cabinet were opposed to the principle 
of a more unrestricted commercial intercourse 
between the US and the neighbouring British 
Colonies; on the contrary,.- the US Govt were 
sincerely desirous that an arrangement of that 
nat·ure should be made, which should embrace not 
only Canada and New Brunswick, but all the 
other Colonies on the northern frontier, more 
particularly those which possess any exclusive 
Rights with regard to the fisheries, - it being 
understood that the abrogation of such 
exclusive Rights should be made an 
indispensable condition of the arrangement, for 
which concession he doubted not that proper 
equivalents could be found by the US.lB 
For his own political reasons - both diplomatic and domestic 
Clayton was largely bluffing. His goal was not to secure a 
Reciprocity agreement but to cause delays in any negotiations 
without offending the British. Yet had Britain called his bluff 
and granted him all that he sought, Clayton would almost certainly 
have found it fairly easy to sell the deal to the American· people. 
But until either such a wide-ranging measure was available or 
different pressures began to work on both the American Government 
and nation, there was little reason for the States to agree to· any 
form of free trade with British North America. Instead the 
American Government was in the pleasant position of being able to 
name its price while knowing that it did not matter if the British 
refused to pay up. 
Giving successive American Governments every encouragement to 
adopt this arrogant attitude was the behav·iour of the Colonists 
themselves. The different squabbling factions north of the 
American border did much to block Reciprocity by their actions both 
at home and in the States. The most obvious obstacle to 
Reciprocity was the stance of the annexationists. The burning of 
the Canadian Parliament and the Annexation Manifesto were the most 
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powerful symbols of the annexationists' strength and persuaded many 
Americans that unlimited concessions could be wrung out of the 
teetering Province. But the annexationists were also working in 
subtler ways. Believing that the United States wished to admit the 
colonies to the Union, they told American officials that to grant 
Reciprocity would kill off annexationism. They also painted a 
glowing picture of the benefits that annexation would bring the 
United States. 19 Yet the annexationists should not shoulder all 
the blame for the repeated failure of the Reciprocity negotiations. 
Some of the biggest villains were the colonists who actually 
advocated the measure. The problem was simple: though Britain 
controlled the colonies' foreign policy, she could not control the 
colonists' actions inside and outside their Parliaments. The 
dangers inherent in this became clear in October 1849. In an 
effort to keep the pressure on the British Government, the New 
Brunswick Executive council issued a minute stating that if the 
efforts to secure Reciprocity failed, "a stern necessity will ere 
long impel the public mind to seek for relief by an incorporation 
with the neighbouring Republic". This sort of action repeated 
throughout the colonies, posed all sorts of problems for the 
British. Grey described it as a "direct inducement" to the 
Americans to refuse Reciprocity "if (as can hardly be doubted) the 
real wish of the people of the u. States is to increase their 
territory by adding to it Bsh. N. America."20 such actions by the 
colonists were a hindrance in other ways. They demonstrated very 
clearly to the United States that, during the annexation crisis in 
particular, the governments of British North America were so 
desperate for Reciprocity that, in return, they would surrender 
almost anything. Indeed, in July 1849 Andrews was able to report 
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that the Maritime Provinces were "in favor of yielding the 
fisheries to the Americans and in addition will give anything else 
they have for free trade with the United State". He was encouraged 
to believe this by private conversations with colonial officials 
who had, in the space of a year, abandoned a zealous defence of the 
fisheries in favour of using them as bargaining counters for free 
trade. 21 This sort of irresponsible gossiping went on throughout 
the Anglo-American negotiations and, claimed Bulwer, it was fatal 
to his efforts. 
The conviction [in the United States) that we 
must have it, or that the Colonies will 
separate from us, & that if it is so much 
desired by the Colonies, it must be very 
prejudicial to the U.S. has gained upon public 
opinion here.22 
The colonists did more than make it hard for Crampton and 
Bulwer to negotiate new agreements. They also helped to scupper 
arrangements that were near completion. The British had at first 
sought free trade exclusively between Canada and the United States, 
partly because the Canadians had been the first to press for 
Reciprocity and partly because the Annexation movement was 
strongest in that Province. Moreover, the British felt that it 
would be easier to get a limited Reciprocity agreement and expand 
it later than to get one including all the colonies from the 
b . . 22 eg1nn1ng. But the agitation in the Maritimes ended all hopes of 
this. Thus, in the summer of 1848, with an agreement between 
canada and the States close, the vis.it to Washington by Woodward, a 
member of the New Brunswick Legislative Assembly, spelled disaster 
for Crampton and Canada. Once in washington, Woodward visited 
several Senators to tell them that New Brunswick wanted to be 
included in the proposed settlement. Single-handedly, noted 
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Crampton, Woodward had wreaked havoc among Congressional supporters 
of canadian Reciprocity. 
I observed that many Senators who were before 
favourable to the Canada Bill appeared now to 
hang back, & hints were made of an equivalent 
being desirable from New Brunswick in an 
extension of a right of fishing in the Bay of 
FUndy.24 
The bill, due before the Senate, was instead returned to the lower 
house for reconsideration - adding to the already interminable 
delays the negotiators had faced. The reason was simple. Once the 
Americans knew that the other colonies were clamouring to be 
included and, what was more, they were offering more sparkling 
jewels than the St Lawrence, they sensibly held out for a better 
deal than trade with Canada alone. At the same time this allowed 
Clayton to prolong Britain's North American embarrassment by 
delaying negotiations on Reciprocity still 25 further. . Small 
wonder, then, that early in his mission Bulwer found "negotiations 
here are the very devil: I should know privately & they (the 
colonists} should not say publicly what they desire and what 
sacrifices they will make to obtain it."26 But say it they did 
and, like Woodward, many of them travelled to Washington 
specifically to do so. To the great annoyance of Bulwer, hordes of 
colonists flocked to the Capitol at their own expense whenever 
negotiations reached a critical point. Instead of leaving the 
affair to the diplomats, these naive would-be lobbyists promptly 
launched into amateurish if well intentioned attempts to influence 
Congress. Predictably, they did more harm than good. Representing 
conflicting interests, they confused those members of Congress who 
would listen by recounting their differing views on Reciprocity. 
Moreover, by appearing overly keen on North American free trade, 
these colonial subjects merely aroused American suspicions. In 
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despair, Bulwer watched these eager men undo the patient, 
professional lobbying he and Crampton had carried out with the help 
of colonial officials sent by Elgin. It was all too much for him. 
Hence in Late February 1850 he protested to the Governor General: 
I hear more gentlemen are coming to urge the 
reciprocity bill on. Another and another. 
God forbid! In such case, I wash my hands of 
the consequences. Of course I know you cannot 
prevent the calamity, and I shall do my best to 
control it; but you have no idea of the 
mischief it produces.27 
By autumn 1851, though, the political climate was changing, if 
only slightly. True, the United States still lacked any real 
incentive to take Reciprocity seriously, but Britain's main 
weakness in the negotiations - her desperation for the measure 
had long since disappeared. The return of prosperity to the 
Provinces had destroyed the economic base of annexationism by 
demonstrating that economic upturns did not depend on trade with 
the United States. Yet a further American barrier remained: 
Congressional corruption. This came to a head in November of -that 
year when Crampton was considering Reciprocity's prospects 1n the 
coming session. From a political associate of Illinois Senator 
Stephen Douglas, Crampton learned that payment of E20,000 to a 
group calling itself 'The Organisation' would secure the passage of 
the Reciprocity bill. However, he was also told that non-payment 
of this fee would ensure the bill's failure in Congress. The 
proposal, stressed Crampton, was genuine. 
The truth is that what they call the 
"Organisation" has within the last five or six 
years been brought to such a system that what 
may be called the outside Congress is more 
powerful than the Congress itself - and there 
is scarcely a measure the passage or 
obstruction of which is not previously arranged 
by mutual compact long before it comes before 
that body and even before the Session begins. 
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... I will only say that knowing who they are-
and what are the means at their_disposal I am 
fully convinced that they can pass this Bill if 
they choose; and that they can secure its 
rejection if they choose; - indeed, even their 
inaction would ensure that; 
In short as things now stand I fear that we 
have not the smallest chance of getting the 
question settled by fair means.28 
With this, Britain's pursuit of Reciprocity ground to a halt. It 
would be uplifting to learn that the British government declined to 
take these matters any further on a point of principle; that, 
reared in the honourable traditions of 'The Mother of Parliaments', 
it refused to interfere 1n the domestic politics of a foreign 
country through bribery. However, when it suited them, British 
officials were quite happy to contemplate and practice 
corruption. Bulwer considered bribery at least twice and in 1850 
the British had pressed for Reciprocity in Congress by 'jobbing' 
or "canvassing this individual member of Congress or the other". 
Moreover, both the British and Canadian Governments readily 
contributed to Andrews' funds, believing he could secure the 
f . . 29 passage o Rec1proc1ty. In truth there was nothing noble about 
Britain's decision not to pay 'The Organisation' in 1851. The 
truth was that the British avoided bribery because Reciprocity's 
prospects were so bleak that the British believed they would be 
wasting their money. Moreover, with the colonies at long last 
prosperous, and quiet, there was no need for such desperate 
measures. 
Yet the summer of 1852 brought a signal change to the 
Anglo-American negotiations over Reciprocity. At long last the 
United States did have an incentive to take the measure seriously, 
and it was an incentive which could bend the sternest of political 
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principles: the threat of war. The British decision to enforce the 
colonial fishing rights guaranteed by the Convention of 1818 
inspired the American hawks to talk boldly, but they also led to 
three serious negotiations in the States between John F Crampton, 
newly promoted to British Minister to washington, and three 
different Secretaries of State. 
If the British had adopted the policy of exclusion in an effort to 
concentrate the minds of the American cabinet on Reciprocity, they 
would have been pleased with Fillmore, who responded by expressing 
his characteristic desire to avoid trouble. Knowing that 
was on his way to Boston to see the Secretary of State, 
Crampton 
Fillmore 
expressed the hope that the two 
line ·Of proceeding that will 
would be able "to agree upon 
allay the present excitement 
prevent any bloodshed." The course he favoured was the 





subject of the Fisheries and the Canada trade at once, as matter of 
negotiation". Even here, Fillmore was hardly decisive. The 
"reciprocal trade between us and the British Provinces is one which 
I greatly prefer should be settled by legislation," he wrote. "If 
however that cannot be done, it may be best to settle it by a 
treaty for a limited time". Basically, Fillmore was so worried 
about the prospect of war that he wanted peace at any honourable 
price, and he was convinced that Britain's price was Reciprocity. 
Thus, after years of stalling by the United States, there at last 
seemed some hope of success. By July 24 Crampton had arrived at 
Marshfield, Webster's Massachusetts home, as had telegrams from 
Andrews recounting the great excitement among the American 
fishermen. Six days later Andrews, too, was at Marshfield 
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reporting on the state of the fishing grounds and putting his 
considerable knowledge of British North America at Webster's 
d . 1 30 1sposa . 
Despite this urgency and Fillmore's willingness to negotiate 
on Reciprocity, such a deal was never feasible in the summer of 
1852. The immediate concession of North American free trade would 
have left the government wide open to accusations from both the 
opposition and its own supporters that it had capitulated in the 
face of British cannon. Even Fillmore admitted that "I am rather 
averse to negotiating upon this subject under a state of things 
that looks a little like coercion on the part of Great Britain, in 
f f . h . " 31 re erence to our 1s er1es . Only the day before in the Senate 
Whigs and Democrats, Northerners and Southerners, had spoken out 
against giving in to Britain's tactics. The statement of Texas 
Senator Thomas Jefferson Rusk was typical. "It seems to me," he 
said, 
that the conduct of Great.Britain in this 
business should be met promptly, on our side. 
It is supposed by some Senators to be designed 
to bring about an enactment for reciprocity of 
trade on our part with the British colonies. 
If that be. so, I will never give a vote for 
such a measure under such circumstances, no 
matter what may be the consequences. I will 
never yield to any threats made by the British 
Government, and cannon will be found to be the 
least available argument that could be used .... 
can we negotiate at the cannon's mouth? No, 
sir, I would not negotiate, nor would I. 
sanction a negotiation, nor stop to inquire 
into the justice of a negotiation brought about 
under such circumstances ..... I would not 
submit to this domineering spirit which has 
manifested itself too much in all the conduct 
of Great Britain with other nations.32 
This pressure inevitably affected the negotiations between Webster 
and Crampton. wrote the latter on August 4: 
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I have done all I can to persuade Mr Webster of 
the most conciliatory disposition on our part. 
This is not difficult as far as he is 
concerned, but Congress seems I am sorry to see 
inclined to take matters in an angry tone - The 
Protectionist & more particularly the "Scott 
Whighs (sic), with I believe the notion of 
increasing his General Scott's chances of 
success by showing that the Country may be in 
need of a military President, have joined [the 
oe~crats'] Young America in an absurd war cry 
ab the fisheries.33 
But party political manoeuvring was not the only hindrance to 
negotiations in the immediate aftermath of the Admiralty's orders 
concerning the Fisheries. American national honour also ruled out 
any real hope for Reciprocity in July and August 1852. Among the 
many papers expressing this view was the New York Herald. The day 
before Crampton's troubled letter to Elgin, the journal trumpeted: 
The course now adopted by England, is, 
doubtless, with a view of forcing the whole 
matter upon the executive as a subject now 
proper for negotiation; and the attempt will be 
made to carry the reciprocity measure by 
treaty .... A more fatal mistake was never made 
- Whatever chance that measure might had had it 
is now out of the question.34 
Instead, the negotiations degenerated into attempts to 
preserve the peace rather than to secure Reciprocity. Here the 
British were partly to blame. Their pacific attitude belied 
American claims - or fears - that they were practising brinkmanship 
for all it was worth. Crampton, who rushed straight to Webster's 
Massachusetts home at the Secretary of State's request, made it 
clear that Britain "was willing to do anything to keep the peace". 
By July 30 Webster was able to report to Fillmore that Crampton had 
given evidence of Britain's peaceful disposition by writing to 
Elgin and British North America's Lieutenant-Governors urging 
moderation. Because the order to exclude Americans from the 
Fisheries had caused excitement in the States, wrote Webster: 
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and as there is apparently with us, some 
disposition to settle the whole matter, either 
by Act of Congress or Treaty, he recommends to 
them, to use all their diligence and best 
judgement, to prevent any collision between 
British armed vessels and the American 
Fishermen.35 
While this greatly boosted the cause of peace, it also reduced 
the pressure on the United States' government. But even had 
Crampton pressed to the utmost of his power, little could have been 
achieved. The obstacle was Daniel Webster. Though an Anglophile, 
Webster's first loyalties were to himself and the United States. 
And in July 1852 his private and political lives were in turmoil. 
Along with President Fillmore and the Mexican War hero, General 
Winfield Scott, Webster had been a front-running candidate at the 
Whig nominating convention in Baltimore. But on June 21, after 
several stalemated ballots, Webster's bid for the one political 
prize which had eluded him came to an end when he withdrew his 
candidacy. This defeat deeply depressed him. Despite the efforts 
of political friends to cheer him up with dinners and glittering 
receptions, Webster seemed shell-shocked. Among the people Webster 
dined with in Washington on his return from the convention was 
Rufus Choate. He likened their meeting to the "first meal after 
the return from the grave, when the full force of the bereavement 
seems to be realized". 36 Webster chose to lick his wounds away 
from the oppressive climate and scheming of Washington and headed 
for New England; which is where he first heard of the Fishery 
dispute. But even in the first flush of the crisis, Webster 
clearly did not have his heart in the labours of his office. While 
Fillmore was hoping for advice about how to handle the question, 
b h . . . . 37 We ster was Inting at resigning. However, Webster avoided the 
rather dramatic and dangerous act of quitting in the middle of an 
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ominous international dispute and instead tried to sort out the 
affair. Freed from the electoral need of playing to the galleries, 
he was theoretically in a position to conduct foreign affairs as he 
saw fit. But the Whigs failed to unite around Scott, and by the 
middle of July a movement was underway in Massachusetts, presenting 
Webster as an independent Whig candidate. Though this campaign was 
to spread to at least five states, Webster preferred to be left 
alone. Even so, his public position was ambiguous. On August 4 he 
let it be known that he would neither invite nor encourage his 
promotion as an independent candidate. However, he would not 
"interfere to prevent any portion of the people casting their votes 
for him, if they should see fit to do so". Thus, well into the 
crisis, Webster's hands were still tied by his life-long 
involvement in the 'Great Game' of American politics. Indeed the 
presidential election profoundly affected the negotiations over the 
fisheries. Whoever won the battle of the White House, the failure 
of Fillmore to secure the Whig nomination meant that within s~ven 
months he and his Cabinet would be out of office. Just as 
debilitating was Webster's conviction that Scott could not lead the 
Whigs to victory in November. In Webster's eyes this was a 
significant obstacle to a lasting agreement over the Fisheries and 
Reciprocity. He wrote; "I confess that I have very little hopes 
from Congress, now or next session. Many of its members are 
opposed to the whole project, and others who favor it, prefer to 
leave its final disposition to the next administration." 38 
In other words, the supporters of the rival candidates for the 
Presidency would not allow this lame-duck administration to end on 
a high note; they wanted the credit for any international 
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settlement to go to the successors of Fillmore and Webster. More 
cynically, they wanted the Fillmore administration to fail. 
Echoing Crampton's alarmed letter to "Elgin on August 4, that same 
day Webster sent a very worried note to Fillmore. "I have been 
informed of the flare-up in the Senate, yesterday, respecting the 
Fisheries", he wrote. "I have very considerable alarm on this 
subject. Your enemies, and mine, among the Whigs, and the Young 
Americans, among the Democrats, are very like to join in opposing 
the Administration, and in embarrassing the state of our affairs 
with England."39 With a presidential election well under way, any 
issue was fair game to the candidates. The Democrats wanted to 
humiliate their rivals by highlighting their weak handling of 
foreign affairs, while the Scott Whigs wished to contrast the 
bungling of the Fillmore administration with the promise of their 
own strong government. More important, since circumstances were in 
any case working against Webster's chances of even securing an 
agreement, the constant talk of electioneering did much to sap .his 
energies. And by the summer of 1852, the seventy-year-old 
statesman had precious 1 i ttle energy left. Summer was always a bad 
time for him, bringi_ng annual attacks of chronic catarrh. It was 
partly because he believed this condition to be exacerbated by the 
steaming Washington summer that he had returned to New England. 
This year his catarrh·attack held off for a fortnight; yet his 
health was in rapid decline. He reluctantly managed a three-week 
stint in Washington in August, and fitted in desultory negotiations 
with Crampton, held up as much by the vagaries of the Atlantic mail 
as by Webster's illness. But by September, when he had returned to 
Marshfield, death was fast approaching. Inevitably, the business 
of the State Department rapidly slipped into arrears, with letters 
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about the Fisheries written from LOndon 1n August remaining 
unanswered until December 40 As a result, foreign affairs were 
left in the hands of a man who was remote from Washington and, 
increasingly, remote from all but his closest friends. Such a man 
was not one who could have solved the Fishery dispute and the 
rising pressure for Reciprocity. 
Webster's death at 2.37 am. on October 24 was mourned across 
the nation41 ; but it also.brought to the State department a man who 
was ideally qualified to settle the Anglo-American crisis. 
Following Webster into the quagmire of foreign affairs was his old 
friend and colleague, Edward Everett. Another Anglophile, Everett 
had been the US Minister to Great Britain in the 1840s and had 
established close relations with several of the most prominent 
British politicians of his generation. Indeed, his correspondence 
reads like a 'Who's Who' of British politics. When Joseph 
Ingersoll sailed to Britain to replace Abbott Lawrence as the US 
Minister, Everett gave him letters of introduction to, among 
others, _Lord Aberdeen, the Earl of Derby and Lord Brougham, and 
urged him to see a close friend, Dr Henry Holland, the personal 
physician of both Aberdeen and Palmerston. So close were Aberdeen 
and Everett that when the former became Prime Minister, their 
letters crossed in the post, Everett congratulating Aberdeen and 
Aberdeen congratulating Everett on his appointment as Secretary of 
State. The most telling phrase came from the ageing aristocrat, 
who spoke of "my great satisfaction at your official elevation, and 
the advantages which I expect from it to both our countries". 
Three days before he penned this in London, Everett was trying to 
take advantage of their friendship, bypassing Crampton and the 
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British Foreign Secretary to write direct to Aberdeen about the 
Fisheries and Reciprocity. 42 Political contacts aside, Everett's 
appointment was promising for another, perhaps more important 
reason: he was well acquainted with the agreements between Britain 
and the States· over the Fisheries. As a young man, Everett had 
actually worked on the terms of the 1818 Convention which was now 
in dispute between the two countries, and in the 1840s, when he was 
the US Minister to Great Britain, the Fisheries had been the 
subject of "a long and interesting correspondence with Lord 
Aberdeen, the Foreign Secretary". Included in the exchange of 
notes was the subject at the heart of the current dispute, the 
definition of 'Bays'. Nor had Everett lost touch with matters 
since his return from London ten years earlier. He had been one of 
a handful of men who had given Webster expert advice in the early 
d f h . . 43 d f ays o t e cr1s1s an rom mid-July onwards had worked hard to 
keep himself informed. He sought out a list of documents on the 
Fisheries given by the President to the Senate, asked Cass for a 
copy of his speech on the Fisheries, prepared a letter to The Times 
of London and a Fisheries article for another newspaper and 
conferred with an .acknowledged expert on the subject, Lorenzo 
Sabine. In addition to bringing all this expertise to the State 
Department, Everett brought much-needed continuity to the handling 
of American foreign affairs. A sincere man, he took on the job out 
of respect for the memory of his old friend .and political 44 ally , 
which made it unlikely that he would use the crisis to make 
political capital for himself. Thus, as Everett embarked on his 
mission to iron out the many foreign difficulties bequeathed to him 
by Webster, it seemed as if at last the United States had the right 
man for the moment. 
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Any optimism on the part of the British was well placed. Soon 
after his appointment, Everett wrote with great authority about the 
Fisheries, assuring the new US Minister to Great Britain, Joseph 
Ingersoll, that he hoped 
in a very short time to be able to enter upon 
the negotiation with Mr Crampton, and it is the 
President's desire that it should be conducted 
on the footing of the most liberal reciprocity. 
He will deem it a piece of good fortune if, 
among the last acts of his administration, 
should be a measure calculated to strengthen 
the friendly relations of the two countries.45 
Everett was as good as his word. On December 15 the Cabinet 
authorised him to open negotiations with Crampton about the 
Fisheries and Reciprocity; only two days later he was able to 
report that they had agreed on the basis of a Convention. 46 Their 
success was possible because the negotiations were indeed conducted 
in a liberal manner, with the Americans making the most significant 
concession: dropping their insistence that the Fisheries and 
Reciprocity be treated separately. 47 Such was the determination on 
both sides to reach a settlement that after the first day's 
haggling Everett enthusiastically noted in his diary: 
Agreed upon the basis; & promised to meet again 
tomorrow to consider the project. I doubt if 
as much was ever agreed on, at one meeting, in 
time of peace. 
News of the progress naturally found its way into Everett's 
informal, congratulatory letter to Aberdeen. "The Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs," wrote Everett, 
will find that Mr Crampton & myself have agreed 
provisionally on an arrangement of the 
questions of the Fisheries & Canadian 
Reciprocity. There is the best disposition 
here to consummate the arrangement ... the only 
difficulties concern details. 
The details, indeed, st"ill had to be sorted out, but other, sharper 
swords hung over the treaty. The most fatal was the Convention's 
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timing. The first of two death blows was the collapse of the Derby 
administration in December, news of which reached Everett and 
Crampton in'early January. In one way, this change was beneficial. 
As well as bringing Everett's friend Aberdeen to 10 Downing Street, 
it also removed Malmesbury from the Foreign Office. This brought 
cheer to Everett because the two men had been at loggerheads ever 
since the British Foreign Secretary had accused Webster of using 
the Fisheries for electioneering. 48 However, the change in 
Government came just as Everett and Crampton were preparing to sort 
out the finer points of their agreement, and the uncertainty 
surrounding the position of the new administration was clearly a 
major hindrance. 
Foreign Office. 
More so were the comings and goings at the 
Malmesbury's replacement, Lord John Russell, 
stayed just long enough to return the Convention to Crampton before 
resigning in favour of Lord Clarendon. 49 Ministers take time to 
read themselves into their office, and by the time Clarendon had 
mastered his brief, time had run out for Everett in the United 
States. Just as the British Government fell in the middle of the 
negotiations, so had Everett's administration received a short-term 
death sentence before the negotiations had even begun. When 
Everett was sworn in as Secretary of State on November 6, Pierce 
had already trounced Scott at the presidential polls - and Everett 
knew that he only had until March 4 to iron out any difficulties in 
foreign affairs bequeathed to him by Webster. By the time Crampton 
received Russell's new draft on February 1, time was running out. 
Even had Everett and Crampton been able to agree final terms on 
February 1, there would have been insufficient time for the two 
governments to approve the convention and give Everett the chance 
to present it to an uncooperative Congress before he vacated the 
192 
State Department. Yet there were still minor difficulties with the 
agreement sent out by Russell - and they had to be sorted out. 
Confided Everett to his diary on Febr~ary 3: 
I am satisfied that it is impossible to 
negotiate a convention before the rising of 
Congress. There are points on which new 
instructions must be had by Mr Crampton & there 
are difficulties in the way of passing a bill 
which cannot be overcome. 
To his credit, Everett worked to the end in a bid to allow the 
Fillmore administration to finish on a triumphant note, but his 
problems were best illustrated by his activities on February 28. 
That Monday he sent the correspondence on the Fisheries to the 
Senate, but nothing was done about it. The reason was simple. 
That evening President Fillmore was giving a "great state dinner" 
for his successor, Franklin Pi·erce. 50 Quite clearly, the power and 
influence of the government in which Everett was serving had long 
since been surrendered and with them vanished any chances of 
success for the Eve~ett-Crampton Convention. Spurred on by the 
desire to preserve the peace between their countries, the pair· of 
diplomats had made rapid progress 1n the most unpromising 
conditions but they had, quite simply, run out of time. 
Even so, they had laid the foundations for a future agreement, 
if only there had been willingness to pick up from where they had 
left off. Everett did his best to pass on the baton, but saw 
Congress let it drop at his feet. Appearing before Congressional 
Committees on Foreign Relations, he continued to press the need for 
a settlement, but Washington was more interested in the activities 
of the new, Democrat administration than in the opinions of an 
outgoing, Whig, Secretary of State. The frustration began to tell 
by mid-March when Everett wrote that the Senate had failed to take 
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any action because it lacked a quorum. 
There is no disposition on the part of the 
Senate to do business. Many of the members are 
light & frivolous persons without feeling of 
responsibility; - more are absorbed in 
President making & general electioneering. The 
public good is the last tho't of theirs.51 
The truth was, however, that Everett had had his chance- and, 
through no fault of his own, he had missed it. Now the 
responsibility for negotiating a settlement fell to Everett's 
successor, William Learned Marcy. Like Congress, though, Marcy was 
unable to build on Everett's agreement. In a sense, this was 
surprising. As Secretary of War under President Polk, a term which 
covered the conflict with Mexico, Marcy was no stranger to the 
pressures of the Cabinet. As a former New York Governor and an 
experienced Washington hand, Marcy was a veteran of many a 
political fight at both the state and national level. In addition, 
he had supposedly been a senior member of The Organisation, the 
powerful group which, according to Crampton and others, had 
controlled the success and failure of Congressional legislation· in 
52 the early 1850s. But, as he freely admitted, his biggest problem 
at the State Department was his inexperience of foreign .affairs. 
As late as August 1853 - five months after taking office - Marcy 
complained to a friend: 
I had not given until recently much attention 
to our foreign relations and really was not 
qualified for the position assigned me. I have 
been obliged to make up this deficiency - with 
really no leisure to do it and without much 
assistance from any quarter.53 
Marcy, to be fair, worked hard to overcome his acknowledged 
weakness, seeking and obtaining advice from the more experienced. 
His advisers were not just Democrats. Predictably, James Buchanan, 
the newly appointed Minister to London, was free with ideas, 
194 
drawing on expertise gained as Secretary of State under Polk. 54 
Perhaps more surprising was the regular correspondence Marcy had 
with recent Whig Secretaries of State John M Clayton and Edward 
Everett, both of whom answered his appeal for support in the 
t . 1 . 55 na 1ona Interest. The greatest cooperation came from Everett, 
who, as the outgoing official, probably had the most to offer. 
While this action showed that Marcy had an admirable appreciation 
of his own limitations, it inevitably slowed down the impetus 
towards Reciprocity built up by Crampton and Everett. Instead of 
deciding what he should do, he spent a lot of his time finding out 
what other men had done and what they would do in his shoes. As 
many of his advisors were rival politicians, it was hardly a 
satisfactory situation. weakening his commitment still further 
were the weather, the shortage of staff and, at the end of August, 
the death of his son Edmund. 56 When Marcy did find time to work on 
foreign affairs, he seemed inclined to concentrate on Central 
America. Nevertheless, at the end of July, Marcy did slip away 
from Washington, leaving visitors no forwarding address, to spend 
five days negotiating with Crampton. 57 In the Virginian spa town 
of Berkeley Springs, the two escaped· the grim summer conditions 1n 
the District of Columbia which damaged Marcy's health, but could 
not settle the differences between their countries. They were both 
willing to compromise, but, as ever, they got bogged down in 
detail. According to Marcy's diary, they began by comparing the 
sketch treaty produced by Everett and Fillmore with one proposed by 
the British government. Refreshed by their spell in the hill 
country, Marcy and Crampton managed to overcome sticking points 
concerning the fisheries - largely by making the treaty's language 
more precise - but ground to a halt when trying to decide which 
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products should be included in the reciprocal free trade between 
the United States and the Colonies. Wrote Marcy: "The great 
difficulty in negotiating the Treaty has been to agree upon the 
list of products." During the next five days, they haggled over 
whether to include goods like coal, iron, rice, unrefined sugar, 
stone and unwrought marble and whether the United States government 
should continue its payment of a bounty to its fishermen. By the 
second day, Marcy was convinced that "the only obstacles to the 
immediate conclusion of the Treaty" were "the coal Registry and 
Bounty." But even the arrival of the State Department's trusty 
British North American expert Israel de Wolf Andrews, on August 3 
could not overcome th~se hurdles. They were.made unsurmountable by 
two crucial factors. The British government failed to give 
Crampton the power to act on his own initiative and negotiate a 
treaty which he thought his political masters would accept. 
Instead, he had to refer all Marcy's proposals to a higher 
authority in London and, as a result, the negotiation was scuppered 
by the painfully slow communications between Britain and America. 
On thr.ee occasions Crampton seemed willing to agree to points in 
principle but would not do so formally until his government gave 
him firm instructions. This inevitably frustrated Marcy. On only 
the second day, he had worked out where they were- or were not 
heading: 
It is evident that Mr. C. does not see· any 
serious objection but will not assent to these 
propositions until he is instructed so to do. 
He is daily expecting a reply to his 
communication to the home government. 
But while they were in Berkeley Springs, this reply failed to 
arrive; and the talks went the way of all previous . . 58 negot1at1ons. 
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Nevertheless, the five days at the Virginia spa town yielded one 
concrete result - a draft treaty sent by Marcy to Crampton on 
September 1. It was, put simply, unlikely to win the heartfelt 
thanks of the British government or its colonial 
Marcy's formal despatch he added several conditions. 
charges. In 
The United 
States demanded the right of free access to British North America's 
Pacific fisheries in return for allowing the colonists to fish off 
California and Oregon. The Americans also insisted on including 
Newfoundland in the Treaty and then followed these demands with a 
series of refusals. They would not, said 
bounty paid to American fishermen. This 
Marcy, abolish the 
would not affect 
cod 
the 
colonists, he claimed, because they were not active in the cod 
fishery. Nor would the Americans admit colonial-built vessels to 
the American registry when they had been bought by citizens of the 
republic. Such a clause, wrote Marcy, would provoke opposition 
from groups whose support was essential to Reciprocity's success. 
He refused to admit colonial seamen to America's east-west coasting 
trade and insisted that coal be left off the list of enumerated 
articles in the free-trade agreement. Though to Nova Scotia the 
inclusion of coal in Reciprocity was essential compensation for 
opening her fisheries to the Americans, Marcy feared that 
opposition of American coal-producing states like Pennsylvania, 
Virginia and Maryland. Marcy did make one concession, accepting 
the exclusion of American sugar and tobacco from the free-trade 
list. But even here he demanded something in return: the expansion 
of the list to include rice, tar, pitch and turpentine, all 
products of Southern states. Without this, he argued, the treaty 
"has the aspect of being an arrangement for the almost exclusive 
benefit and accommodation of the British Provinces and the Eastern 
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and some of the Middle States." 59 
Such a stance did not promise a successful outcome, especially 
when presented to a man as politically impotent and remote as 
Crampton. Indeed, six months after his September 1 letter, Marcy 
was still waiting for a reply from Crampton's bosses in 
Whitehal1. 6° Clearly what Reciprocity- and the Fishery dispute 
needed were not negotiations between the Foreign Office in London 
and the ·secretary of State in washington or Berkely Springs. What 
they needed was a special mission from a man with a wide ranging 
brief who could make decisions on the spot. Hamstrung by the 
Atlantic and his inferior social origins, Crampton was not this 
man; indeed, in the summer of 1853 such a man did not exist. 
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59 Marcy to Crampton, September 1, 1853, Foreign Legations. 




LORD ELGIN GOES TO WASHINGTON 
If progress were to be made, then, negotiations needed a fresh 
impetus. It was at this point that Lord Elgin took centre stage 
with remarkable success. In May 1854 he set out from London for 
Washington with Reciprocity as his goal. After he and his 
flamboyant entourage had been wheeling and dealing around the 
Capitol for but a short time the breakthrough so long sought after 
by Britain and the Colonies came. At midnight on June 5 the 
Canadian Governor-General and the elderly William Learned Marcy 
met, along with assorted helpers, in the State Department. To 
Elgin's precocious assistant, Laurence Oliphant, it was both an 
historic and comic scene. In his memoirs, he described how Marcy's 
aides read out the proposed treaty, and, in the meantime: "the aged 
man listens, while he picks his teeth with a pair of scissors, or 
cleans out the wick of a candle with their points, which he 
afterwards wipes on his grey hair." This, though, was a prelude to 
the one action which Elgin had pursued since his arrival: Marcy's 
signature to the agreement which would at a stroke solve the 
fishery dispute and bring reciprocal free trade to North America. 
With his teeth-picking and candle-cleaning finished, Marcy signed 
and, wrote Oliphant in his journal: 
Thus was concluded in exactly a fortnight a 
treaty to negotiate which had taxed the 
inventive genius of the Foreign Office and all 
the conventional methods of diplomacy for the 
previous seven years.l 
Such lightning work clearly deserves credit - and in most 
traditional accounts of the summer negotiations, Elgin receives 
generous praise. The most detailed study, Donald Masters' The 
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Reciprocity Treaty of 1854, argues that Elgin's skill, diplomacy 
and tact were "probably the deciding factor in the success of the 
· · n2 negot1at1ons. On the whole, accounts of his success in 
Washington are tributes to his cunning and charm, portraying the 
British aristocrat as outwitting a naive and faction-ridden 
Congress. Elgin, so the story goes, came out to Washington posing 
as a tourist, apparently without a care in the world. He adopted 
this approach deliberately: to have come publicly in search of 
Reciprocity would have put the Americans on their guard and 
hindered his efforts. Once there, he embarked on a vigorous social 
whirl of parties, parties and more parties, and, as the alcohol 
flowed, he cultivated influential members of Congress. He was 
helped in this by the sharpening of sectional divisions 1n the 
aftermath of the Kansas-Nebraska Act. In the past, the friction 
and distrust between North and South had always been a problem for 
Reciprocity. In both sections, Reciprocity had long been linked 
with annexation, the assumption being that the measure would pave 
the way for admitting British North America into the United States. 
But, during his visit, Elgin was able to exploit the uncertainty 
about the likely effects of Reciprocity. He could argue that 
Reciprocity would prevent annexation by guarding against the 
economic dislocation that produced the agitation. Equally, he 
could claim that Reciprocity was a form of economic annexation and 
could lead to political annexation. The former argument, of 
course, appealed to the South; the latter to the men of the North. 
"Thus", wrote Masters, 
was afforded the amazing spectacle of two 
groups of men, the north and the south, sitting 
in the same House and supporting the same 
measure for contradictory reasons.3 
Once Marcy and Elgin had signed the Treaty, Elgin's job was done. 
204 
; 
He accordingly returned to British North America to resume his 
normal duties as Governor-General, knowl"ng that Marcy and his 
administration would secure the ratification of the agreement by 
Congress. Elgin's visit to Washington, DC, was, therefore, a 
triumph of his charm and political skill. 
This version is attractive for several reasons. It has a hero 
without any villains and, because Elgin helped avert a possible 
Anglo-American war, it has a happy ending. To the glee of the 
reader, it personalises a potentially dull subject- negotiations 
for an economic agreement and, throughout the drama, the main 
actors perform in the way that their stereotypes demand. 
aristocrat arrives in the capital of the New World and, 




dances his way to the solution of an ominous· crisis. At the same 
time, the boisterous but well-meaning Americans fall victim to 
their own vices - their love of alcohol and socialising, their 
constant divisive bickering over slavery, and their naive respect 
for British upper-class charmers. Better still, by only securing 
the measure he came out for, the charmer does not take advantage of 
the Americans' weaknesses; instead, he nobly takes only what is 
fair. Then, his job done, he retires to the Colony whose interests 
he has served so well. In the meantime, Anglo-American cooperation 
receives a much-needed boost through the actions-of the ageing, but 
responsible, Secretary of State who works to guarantee the Treaty's 
passage through Congress. It all reads like a romantic novel 
which in many ways it is. And like the best of such novels, this 
story is based firmly on the truth, but misses the point in several 
vital areas. The pity is that, in so doing, it also misses an 
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equally good yarn, full of pretty girls, parties and political 
skullduggery. 
The first part of the myth to overcome is that Elgin fooled 
the Americans by pretending to be travelling through the States on 
his way back to Canada .. This was certainly the image the Foreign 
Secretary wanted Elgin to give. He said so in his instructions to 
the Earl; and he also completely fooled the American Minister to 
the ~ourt of St James, James 4 Buchanan. However, the American 
government in Washington was under no such delusions. Andrews had 
worked out Elgin's intentions and informed the State Department; 
moreover, Special Agent Andrews had even suggested an 
inter-colonial meeting in Halifax or New York as a prelude to the 
visit. There, he thought, the colonists could hammer out what they 
were willing to concede and what they wanted in return. 5 The fact 
that Elgin had banned such a meeting as likely to be 
counter-productive also gave the lie to the purpose of his . . 6 VlSlt. 
Moreover, when he came to the capital, he was both preceded and 
accompanied by colonists - hardly the company he would have kept on 
a pleasure visit. Especially revealing was the presence of Francis 
Hincks. The State Department knew he had been in England with 
Elgin before they sailed together for the States, and they believed 
he was very influential. According to Marcy in March 1854, the 
Canadian Inspector-General "has heretofore been ·much consulted on 
the subject of this Treaty and great consideration has been given 
to his opinions." 7 Finally, if the American Government had failed 
to take note of all these tell-tale signs, Elgin soon put a stop to 
their ignorance. On his arrival in Washington he went to Marcy and 
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Pierce and told them the object of his mi$Sion. 8 
The second plank of the myth 1s the credit that falls to 
Elgin. Unquestionably, he deserves praise for having known what 
had to be done to get Reciprocity through Congress and having then 
worked singlemindedly to achieve it. The speed with which he 
worked was also remarkable: in his instructions, Clarendon supposed 
that even under the most favourable circumstances Elgin could 
scarcely be expected to "finally conclude an arrangement at 
Washington within the limited time to which in the first instance 
your stay there must necessarily be restricted .... " Clarendon 
thought Elgin would stick to discussing general terms and deal with 
specifics on a second trip. 9 Elgin surprised everyone including, 
perhaps, himself. Yet his achievement, though remarkable; would 
not have been possible but for the work over the years by several 
other men. John F Crampton and Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer, for 
instance, receive criticism when they should have had a little more 
praise for their work since 1846. Bulwer, it is true, was often 
ill. Moreover, he had been sent to the United States as a 
punishment for his activities in Spain, and was eager to return to. 
h 1 hab . f v . . d . 1 10 Europe, t e natura 1tat o a 1ctor1an 1p omat. Yet he, 
like Crampton, worked diligently for Reciprocity. The failures of 
their negotiations before Elgin's arrival owe far more to the state 
of American domestic politics and the actions of the colonists than 
to their supposed indolence. Crampton, in particular, does not 
warrant accusations of laziness. It is true that he liked a good 
social life - he offended Everett by some of his actions, like 
smoking in the street. 11 Yet he worked hard and carried out the 
duties of Britain's Minister to the United States even though his 
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promotion to that post came only in 1852. His main problem, it 
seems, was not indolence, but a lack of clout 1n the Foreign Office 
. . 1" 12 stemming from his non-ar1stocrat1c 1neage. With Bulwer, he had 
kept alive American interest in Reciprocity, a measure most 
Americans found unappealing. At the same time, both had liaised 
regularly with Elgin and the Foreign Office on the state of the 
negotiations, worked with visiting Colonists, and attended to the 
other duties of their office, including lengthy Central American 
diversions. Unlike Elgin, who visited Washington for about a 
fortnight, they had had to carry out this work in the capital's 
appalling climatic conditions. Described twelve years earlier by 
Charles Dickens as "the headquarters of tobacco-tinctured saliva", 
the city was "scorching hot in the morning, and freezing cold 1n 
the afternoon, with an occasional tornado of wind and dust." 13 
There had been little improvement by 1854: Washington, wrote 
Oliphant, 
is a town without a population, and exists only 
by Jirt~e of its being the seat of 
Government ... this is a most relaxing and 
depressing place, close muggy air - Kandy [in 
Ceylon) temperature exactly - and streets 
silent and lifeless. The last place in the 
world, notwithstanding the pretty girls, that I 
should choose as a residence.l4 
If Bulwer and Crampton at times appeared less than dynamic, it was 
no wonder; like members of Congress, they were keen to spend as 
little time as possible in the marshlands of the Potomac. But in 
the past few years, they had not been the only men to have been 
working for Reciprocity in washington. Also struggling against a 
tide of indifference were Canadians like William Hamilton Merritt, 
and Francis Hincks, representatives from the Maritimes, and, of 
course, Israel de Wolf Andrews. They, too, had worked with members 
of congress like John A Dix, Stephen Douglas and Joseph Grinnell. 
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If no agreement had been reached, they had at the least laid the 
foundations for Elgin's success. Crampton, for instance, had come 
close to finalising a Treaty in the winter of 1852-53 with Everett, 
.and the summer had seen him come close with Marcy. Immediately 
preceding Elgin's mission, Merritt had been in washington preparing 
the way. Moreover, after Elgin's departure, much of the work which 
secured the treaty's passage before Congress rose in August was 
15 
carried out by Andrews. 
Equally important to Elgin's success was the deliberate way in 
which the British Government had turned the tables on the Americans 
from late 1853 by affecting a lack of interest in Reciprocity. 
Thus, in March 1854 a very frustrated Marcy wrote to Buchanan that 
negotiations had been suspended for more than five months "in 
consequence of the delay on the part of the .British Government to 
act upon the project of a treaty which I submitted to Mr Crampton 
early in September last." Britain's excuse was that she had to 
"ascertain the views of the several provinces on the subject" but 
Marcy knew that in that time she had done little. Instead she was 
now becoming very choosy about the treaty she would accept. 
Indeed, wrote Marcy, 
Within a few days past Mr Crampton read to me 
part of a despatch from Lord Clarendon from 
which I infer that there is no desire on the 
part of the Home Government to conclude the 
proposed Treaty. The despatch stated that the 
Provinces were now prosperous and much less 
solicitous than they had been for reciprocal 
free trade with the United States. 
To Marcy's distress, this confirmed information coming to him from 
Andrews who reported from British North America that the colonists, 
thanks to the economic upturn, were less keen than ever before on 
Reciprocity. A novice at foreign affairs, Marcy walked straight 
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into the trap the British were building for him. With no 
settlement 1n sight, "a collision" seemed inevitable over the 
. h . 16 F1s enes. Though he was determined to uphold American rights 
over the Fisheries, he found himself wanting Reciprocity more than 
the British apparently did: It is also a mistake to see Elgin's 
visit as a negotiation. By the time he arrived, the details of 
what was possible were already clear. As a negotiator, he was also 
hamstrung because on one aspect of Reciprocity, Newfoundland, he 
did not receive his instructions until he was about to 17 leave. 
Though he did have to iron out problems in the proposed agreement, 
his task and his achievement was to create "an atmosphere of mutual 
goodwill" between the countries. 18 In this climate, opposition to 
Reciprocity would wilt as rapidly as the belles at the balls 
attended by Elgin to promote the measure. 
Yet Elgin had considerable barriers to remove 1n order to 
create a mood of goodwill conducive to the success of Reciprocity. 
Masters underestimates these barriers and fails to explain how 
Elgin set about removing them. The assumption 1n traditional 
accounts seems to be that the biggest obstacle before the 
Governor-General was sectionalism. However, the sectional strife 
that racked the Union may well have been one of Elgin's greatest 
allies. When he arrived in Washington, the Kansas-Nebraska 
compromise debates were at last drawing to a close, and Elgin went 
with his party to watch the closing session. In the long term, the 
Act was to help drive a wedge between North and South by drawing a 
furious response from Northern voters, by weakening the national 
organisation of the Whigs and by stimulating the organisation of 
the Republican party. 19 This, however, was for the future. Elgin, 
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out on a brief, speculative mission, was interested only in the 
present. By pure chance he arrived on the day when the United 
States had scraped over another hurdle when to have stumbled could 
·have led to Civil War. The relief that followed was enormous, 
particularly aoong the bickering oeoocrats who saw the Act as a 
party triumph. Cannons were let off in the capital 20 and, though 
Congress had another ten weeks left to run, politicians were caught 
up in an end-of-term mood. After months of anxiety, they were 
ready to relax in style. As it was already the height of the 
0 1 21 h" soc1a season , Was 1ngton unwound through a series of parties. 
And these crinoline-rustling festivities, Oliphant discovered, went 
on round the clock. 
At two o '·clock our whole party went to a grand 
luncheon at a senator's. Here we had every 
sort of refreshing luxury, the day being 
pipingly hot, and dozens of champagne were 
polished off. Several senators got screwed, 
and we made good use of the two hours we had to 
spare before going to the French ambassador's 
matinee dansante at four. Here the same thing 
went on, with the addition of a lot of pretty 
girls whom I had before rret, and who bullied 
one to dance, and were disgusted if you did not 
flirt with them. Everybody drinks champagne 
here, and there was a bowl on the table in 
which you might have drowned a baby, of most 
delicious and insinua-ting concoction. Then 
there were gardens, and bouquets, and ices, and 
strawberries, and bright eyes till six, when we 
had to rush off and dr~ss for a grand dinner at 
a governor's. Here we had a magnificent 
repast. The old story of champagne, besides a 
most elaborate and highly got up French cookery 
dinner, lasting from seven till ten, when we 
left the table, having been eating and drinking 
without intermission since two. We then 
adjourned with a lot of senators to 
brandy-and-water, champagne, and cigars till 
twelve, when some of us were quite ready to 
tumble into bed.22 
In this atmosphere of revelry and relief, Elgin's hosts were 
always likely to be receptive to a man "of brilliant repartee and 
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racy anecdote." 23 But what did Elgin tell the Americans? Almost 
certainly he impressed on his hosts ··the many benefits that 
Reciprocity would bring. Fortunately, he could do this without 
getting bogged down in the details of the Treaty. The clearest and 
the most important advantage was that Reciprocity would end the 
risk of war which hovered over the Atlantic as a result of the 
Fishery Dispute. Further, it would improve relations generally 
between British North America and the United States. However, when 
studying his visit to Washington one can more easily pick out what 
he did not say. The idea that he told the South one story about 
the links between Reciprocity and annexation and then told the 
north the exact opposite is hardly credible. The North and the 
South were not monolithic political bodies, thinking as two 
separate groups. Southerners did not mix solely with Southerners; 
nor did Northerners keep to themselves. Certainly, the south may 
have resented the abolitionists and at times felt that the whole of 
the North was lined up against it. Nevertheless, in May 1854 the 
two main political parties, Whigs and Democrats, were still 
national organisations, with members in both sections and in all 
states. Consequently, men from the same party but different 
sections still mixed and worked with each other. Moreover, members 
of the different political factions also met socially to debate the 
great issues of the day. Nor were they worried about doing so in 
front of strangers. Hence, after one party, Oliphant wrote: 
Our host ... belonged to the Republican, or, as 
it was then more generally called, the Whig 
party. Notwithstanding the divergence of 
political opinion among many of those present, 
the merits of the all-absorbing measure 
[Kansas-Nebraska), and its probable effects 
upon the destinies of the nation, were being 
discussed freely. (Among those speaking was) 
SenatorToombs, a violent Democrat ... 
212 
Similarly, on May 26 Oliphant went with Elgin to another lunch and 
"Sat between a Whig and a Democrat senator, who alternately poured 
abolitionism and the divine origin of slavery into the ear they 
24 
commanded." Clearly 1n such a close-knit, incestuous and 
gossiping community, it would have been fatal to tell two different 
stories to rival groups who met regularly in the no-man's land 
provided by parties. Elgin would have been caught out immediately 
and forced to leave Washington with his reputation in tatters and 
his mission an abject failure. That he returned to British North 
America in triumph points to his having adopted a different 
approach. 
Instead, Elgin almost certainly avoided playing one section 
off against the other. Having seen members of Congress arrive at 
the Kansas-Nebraska debates armed to the 25 teeth , and having 
watched America's internal wrangling from north of the border since 
1847, Elgin must have known that to play with sectionalism was a 
dangerous game. Fortunately, he did not need to interfere in this 
way. Despite the furore about the status of slavery in Kansas and 
Nebraska, his biggest problem was not the rift between North and 
South, but the rift·s within the Democratic party. On his arrival, 
Elgin went to see Pierce and Marcy to announce that Reciprocity was 
his object. They told him 
that it was quite hopeless to think that any 
such treaty as he proposed could be carried 
through, with the opposition which extended to 
it on the part of the Democrats, who had a 
majority in the Senate, without the 
ratification of which body no treaty could be 
concluded. His Lordship was further assured, 
however, that if he could overcome this 
opposition, he would find no difficulties on 
the part of the Government.26 
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Elgin, therefore, was in a strange situation. The administration, 
which was Democrat, in principle favoured Reciprocity, but the 
Senate, also controlled by the Democrats, opposed the measure. 
Elgin could have been forgiven for thinking that Marcy was tricking 
him into doing all the hard work needed to get Reciprocity through 
Congress, but the Secretary of State was not bluffing. His 
problem, and that of the Pierce administration as a whole, was the 
Democrats' popularity at the polls. They had learned to their cost 
that landslide victories are not necessarily advantageous. On the 
coattails of their presidential triumph in 1852, the Democrats had 
been equally successful in the Congressional elections. With a 
two-thirds majority in the House of Representatives and similar 
dominance of the Senate, the party should have been celebrating. 
But, without the pressure of a vigorous opposition, the Democrats 
struggled to maintain unity. Pierce's Cabinet, too, fell foul of 
the huge Congressional presence of its supposed supporters. With 
more factions to please than most presidents, Pierce faced an 
impossible task when distributing office. The result was a 
catastrophe, according to Michael F Holt: "by trying to please 
everybody, he alienated all factions." Indeed, many members of 
Pierce's own party were so disgusted by his appointments that they 
began to vote against him. Worse still, the Democrats' large 
majority gave individual members the freedom to pursue their own 
interests rather than those of the party. Instead of working 
together in Congress, the Democrats allowed themselves to be 
governed more by what they believed would be popular in their own 
constituencies. Local issues, more than was normally the 
dictated behaviour in national politics. 27 In short, at the 
case, 
very 
time when the Democrats should have been enjoying the fruits of 
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their electoral success, they were blunting the power of their own 
President. Hence, Marcy was in no position to promise to get 
Reciprocity through Congress. In fact, the success of Elgin's 
·mission depended to a large extent on Marcy and Pierce keeping a 
low profile. The best thing they could do to help Reciprocity was 
neither to sponsor it during negotiations nor to oppose it when it 
was before Congress. Eager to end the fishery dispute, this, in 
effect, was the course they chose, and they left Elgin to work on 
their wayward Senatorial colleagues. This Elgin did with a 
vengeance, observed throughout by Oliphant. Elgin and the rest of 
the British party went to receptions attended by senators opposed 
to the treaty and over the first ten days of their visit they kept 
meeting and charming the influential men and women 
Washington. But, to Oliphant, it was all very confusing. 
Meantime, to my inexperienced mind; no progress 
was being made in our mission ... At last, 
after several days of uninterrupted f.estivi ty, 
I began to perceive what we were driving at. 
To make quite sure, I said one day to my 
chief -
"I find all my most intimate friends are 
Democratic senators." 
"So do I," he replied, drily.28 
of 
Elgin had established which political group held the key to 
Reciprocity's future and then done all he could to get that group 
to open the lock. But another, dangerous, hurdle remained: 
hostility to Great Britain, an unpredictable force which could 
easily have undermined any Anglo-American agreement. Never far 
from the surface in mid-nineteenth-century American politics, at 
the time of Elgin's visit this hostility rose steaming from the 
pot. Providing the heat was the Crimean War, which from March 28, 
1854 saw Britain fighting alongside America's traditional ally, 
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France, to protect the Turks against Russia. Wrote Edward Everett 
to an English friend: "The popular feeling in the grand European 
struggle is with the Turks against the Russians; but our Admn 
dislikes Your alliance with France & believes that it has ulterior 
bearings against .. 29 us. Significantly, the administration's 
Washington mouthpiece chose the second day of Elgin's visit to air 
these views and it did not spare its language. Under the 
headline "THE WAR BE'IWEEN RUSSIA AND TURKEY. OUR INTERESTS 
REQUIRE THAT THE FORMER BE SUCCESSFUL" a front-page article raged 
against Britain and France while praising the Tsar. What worried 
the paper - and the Pierce administration - was the long-term 
effect of an Anglo-French victory over Russia. 
Having kept the czar landlocked, with such 
.fleets as the world never saw, what shall 
prevent these merchant kingdoms, with their 
eyes resting on their pacific commerce and the 
narrow isthmus from which at Central America it 
is separated from Atlantic communication, 
taking their stand on cuba, the Gibraltar of 
the Gulf of Mexico, and saying to Republican 
America, Thus far shalt thou come, and no 
further. 
This led the author to a predictably Anglophobic conclusion: 
the immediate discomfiture of the Russians and 
termination of the war would be events that 
might prove in the sequel very inconvenient to 
us. With a navy at their command resistless by 
any power we possess, flushed with recent 
victory over Russian absolutism and expansion, 
the occasion to strike at American liberalism 
and progress would be too opportune not to be 
adverted to. 
For one, the writer dares avow that he wishes 
success to Nicholas, and that if he should not 
prevail now, he will fail only after his 
enemies, wearied by a long and exhausting war, 
shall cordially desire repose and peace.30 
The tone of this article was entirely in keeping with the 
brief sent by Marcy to Buchanan 1n March which, though mocking the 
"happy accord" between France and Britain, revealed very clearly 
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his anxiety about the future goals of this alliance. 31 Throw into 
the pot the continuing uncertainty about· the fishery dispute, and 
there was enough to keep Anglophobia bubbling away well into the 
future. Elgin's job, therefore, was to take this pot off the boil 
for as long as was needed to secure an agreement and then get the 
agreement through Congress. The way forward was not to launch into 
long-winded defences of Britain's Crimea policy but to create 
general good-will towards Britain and her North American Colonies. 
Elgin therefore found himself in the role of Britain's public 
relations manager and, with Crampton's help, promptly gave the 
Americans what turned out to be a very tempting taste of their own 
razzmatazz. No time was wasted. Only two days after Elgin arrived 
in Washington - and on the same day as the Washington Union carried 
its Anglophobic article about the Crimea - Crampton turned on the 
charm. The British Minister gave .a widely publicised 
"entertainment at his residence, in honor of the birthday of 
England's Queen, which, it is said, will be a magnificent 
affair." 32 It lived up to all expectations. Held in the cooler 
climes of Georgetown, it overcame a thunderstorm to be a sparkling 
social success. Papers excelled themselves in describing the 
elegance of the affair. Wrote the Washington Star in an article 
that was reprinted all over the States: 
There were foreign ambassadors, cabinet 
ministers, grave senators, army and navy 
officers, heads of bureaus, authors, artists, 
savans and philosophers. Embroidered coats and 
bespangled uniforms of high officials afforded 
3 gllLtering contrast to the plain black suits 
of the distinguished civilians. As for the 
lacle.s present, our pen falters in t'.:<> nrt.empr. 
to do justice to their charms. 
Yet, even in this exalted company, there was no argument abouL whu 
was the star of the event. 
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Amid the soft footfalls of fairy feet - the 
graceful sweep of $500 dresses - the glittering 
of jewels - the sparkling of eyes which shot 
forth alternately flashes of lightning and love 
- were two gentlemen who appeared to be the 
'observed of all observers'. One was the Earl 
of Elgin, and the other Sir Charles Gray.33 
But the evening was not just a social success; according to the 
Star, it produced political rewards. By bringing everyone together 
at a spectacular social occasion - in honour of the head of state 
of the country with whom the United States was in dispute - Elgin 
helped defuse the tension between the countries. And, as the guest 
of honour, he was able to mingle freely with the capital's key men 
and point out the benefits of Reciprocity. Thus, the Star's 
reporter proclaimed: 
More was accomplished last evening in the way 
of negotiation than has been accomplished from 
the days of Ashburton to the advent of Elgin. 
We regard the fishery question as settled, both 
parties having partaken freely of the bait so 
liberally provided by the noble host. 34 
Such claims were premature: Elgin had several more days' 
lobbying before him. It is likely that he used this time to 
impress on his contacts the many benefits of Reciprocity. 
Throughout, he behaved in the way expected of him, playing the 
urbane diplomat, while at the same time never standing aloof. As 
senators 'got screwed on champagne', he stayed sober by pretending 
to drink with them- without touching a drop. 35 Thus, he appeared 
to enter into the spirit of the parties without losing his dignity 
- or his sense of purpose. This performance did the trick. By the 
end of the week his popularity with Democratic senators was so 
"unbounded" that "they ceased to feel any restraint in his 
company." After one late-night jaunt around town, Elgin's hosts 
paid him probably the highest honour they could. In the small 
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hours, they declared that it was a great shame he was not born an 
American, because that prevented him from becoming President. 36 
Having thus won the approval of the Democrat senators, Elgin was 
confident that there was now enough support for the measure in 
Congress. At last, wrote Oliphant, 
after we had been receiving the hospitality of 
washington for about ten days, Lord Elgin 
announced to Mr Marcy, that if the Government 
were prepared to adhere to their promise to 
conclude a treaty of reciprocity with Canada, 
he could assure the President that he would 
find a majority of the Senate in its favour, 
including several prominent Democrats .... 
Nothing remained for us but to go into the 
details of the tariff, the enumeration of the 
articles of commerce, and so forth ... For the 
next three days I was as busily engaged in work 
as I had been for the previous ten at play.37 
The final form of the Reciprocity Treaty38 reveals just how 
well Britain understood the obstacles to its success. Broadly, 
Elgin and March produced an agreement which, unlike previous 
drafts, had a strong chance of passing. They did this by ensuring 
that the Treaty either met the desires of various critical groups 
or compensated the discontented. Some groups could not be bought 
off, but the terms of the Treaty ensured that they could not defeat 
it. Yet perhaps most important of all, if the Treaty did not bring 
an economic boon to a lobby or section, it often did not harm their 
interests either. The Treaty, therefore, represents a skilful bid 
for success by the negotiators. They strove to produce a vessel 
which could chart the treacherous waters between the day they 
agreed terms and the day of its final ratification by Britain, the 
United States and British North America. 
In the Provinces, the most important group to placate were the 
fishermen. Of all the groups affected by the terms of the treaty, 
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they probably had the most grievances. Reciprocity delighted the 
mariners of New England by throwing open the colonial fisheries to 
American endeavour; but this inevitably threatened the livelihood 
of the Maritimes' seamen. Under Reciprocity's terms their American 
rivals could at long last: 
take fish of every kind, except shell-fish, on 
the sea-coasts and shores, and in the bays, 
harbors, and creeks of Canada, New Brunswick, 
Nova Scotia, Prince Edward's Island, and of the 
several islands thereunto adjacent, without 
being restricted to any distance from the 
shore,-wi th permission to land up:m the coasts 
and shores of those colonies and the islands 
thereof, and also upon the Magdalen Islands, 
for the purpose of drying their nets and curing 
their fish. 
The only restrictions were on the salmon, shad, river and estuary 
fisheries, which the Treaty reserved for the British; the Americans 
also had to respect the property and rights of the colonists. Such 
sweeping legislation had to be balanced, if Nova Scotia were ever 
to support it. Accordingly, the British secured for the Provinces 
the right to export their fish duty-free to the United States. 
Though this free trade, as with all the items on the duty-free 
list, was reciprocal, that clause was unlikely to benefit American 
fishermen as much as Nova Scotians. Also, in return for opening up 
the colonial fisheries, the Americans opened up theirs to the 
colDnists, with one significant exception: the waters South of the 
36th parallel. This kept the fisheries of virtually the entire 
South - from Cape Hatteras down - in American hands, and respected 
Florida's determination to keep the British abolitionists 40 out. 
As the American fisheries were not highly prized by the colonists, 
who were spoiled by the bounty of the seas lapping their own 
territory, this reservation ang~red few in the Provinces, while 
pleasing many in a suspicious South. 
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Just as important a boon to the colonists was the inclusion of 
all raw timber on the enumerated list. Though the fisheries were 
the staple of Nova Scotia's economy, they were nevertheless a 
seasonal occupation. OUt of season, one of the main forms of 
alternative employment for Nova Scotian fishermen was lumbering. 
Across.the water in New Brunswick, the attractions of the Bay of 
Fundy found fierce competition from the Province's healthy timber 
industry, which had its eyes on the lucrative American market. 
Yet, for the American timber lobby, the Treaty raised the 
unappealing prospect of competition from the abundant - and cheaper 
- supplies of colonial lumber. Here, again, there was a pay-off. 
One of the key areas of the New England timber industry was Maine, 
and in particular the area on the border with British North 
America, where the St John River provided access to the sea via New 
Brunswick. A long-established source of ·bitterness was that 
American lumber cut in Maine and floated down the St John was 
subject to colonial duty before it could reach its native market. 
The Treaty changed all this. In Article IV, the signatories agreed 
that 
no export duty, or other duty, shall be levied 
on lumber ·or timber of any kind cut on that 
portion of the American territory in the State 
of Maine watered by the River St. John and its 
tributaries, and floated down that river to the 
sea, when the same is shipped to the United 
States from the province of New Brunswick. 
Another daunting set of rapids facing the negotiators was the 
inclusion of "grain, flour, and breadstuffs, of all kinds" on the 
free list. But they sailed neatly round them thanks to the St 
Lawrence seaway. TO Canada, the right to export wheat duty-free to 
the United States and to mill American grain in Canada 
underpinned its support for Reciprocity. Yet, to American grain 
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producers, notably in the Midwest and Maryland, this was a far from 
attractive prospect, raising fears of a home market flooded with 
canadian wheat. The British fought this resistance on two fronts. 
In Congress and through the American press, Andrews worked hard to 
1 . . 41 p ay down the econom1c threat. By then working as much for the 
British as the Americans, he claimed that Canada rarely produced a 
wheat surplus. But far more effective - because it won over the 
Midwest and isolated Maryland - was Article IV. This agreed that 
the citizens and inhabitants of the United 
States shall have the right to navigate the 
River St. Lawrence, and the canals in Canada 
used as the means of communicating between the 
great lakes and the Atlantic Ocean, with the 
vessels, boats and crafts, as fully and freely 
as the subjects of Her Britannic Majesty, 
subject only to the same tolls and other 
assessments as now are, or may hereafter be, 
exacted of Her Majesty's said subjects ... 
At a stroke, the Treaty gave the Midwest an economic advantage it 
had long sought. To the farmers - and particularly the wheat 
growers of that fast developing section, the St Lawrence 
represented the most direct summer route to Europe. But, just· as 
important, the waterway was a rival to New York's Erie Canal. This 
had dominated their trade for so long thanks to protectionism, 
Drawback Laws and, in winter, a more favourable climate than that 
of the St Lawrence. Now, though, the Midwest had every reason to 
hope that competition with the Canadian route to Europe might lead 
the Erie Canal to lower its tolls. And with the support of the 
Midwest - which could be almost as sectionalist 
the opposition of Maryland ceased to matter. 
42 
as the South 
Perhaps a more considerable foe was .Pennsylvania, whose 
mining industries were sure to resist the Treaty because of the 
inclusion of Nova Scotian iron and coal on the free list. The 
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trade-off here is less clear. The British and Andrews stressed 
that the British coal was of a different quality and had a 
different market to that f P 1 . 43 rom. ennsy van1a , but such 
hair-splitting was a weak argument to put before men defending 
their livelihood. As a result, the British had to accept that 
Pennsylvania was unlikely to support the Treaty. Consequently, 
they had to ensure that no other groups took offence. They did 
this by not including requests which could have alienated a whole 
region. Thus, both Elgin and Marcy resisted strong pressure from 
the powerful Maritimes ship-building industry to have their vessels 
p.1t on the Arrerican registry when bought by Americans. Though a 
reasonable request, it would have been too much for New England's 
shipwrights who had good -reason to fear colonial competition. 44 
Without this threat, Reciprocity was fairly safe in New England 
thanks to the support of the region's fishermen. Equally, Elgin 
was determined that Reciprocity should not appear as a 'British' 
question, that is, a measure which could benefit Britain. 45 If 
that occurred, it would have been very easy for the Treaty's 
.enemies to use Anglophobia to whip up an artificial opfX)sition. 
Hence, Elgin abandoned British pressure to have their own merchant 
vessels admitted to the coasting trade between the United States' 
Atlantic and Pacific coasts, usually described as the east-west 
coasting trade. In the past, the British had intermittently used 
the Reciprocity negotiations and the repeal of their own 
Navigation Laws - as levers for this concession. Their argument 
was that Parliament had thrown open to American shipping the 
carrying trade between Britain and her colonies, and that this was 
similar to the 'coasting' trade between New England and California. 
An American vessel carrying British cargo between London and 
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Bombay, they claimed, was no different from a British vessel 
carrying American cargo between New York and California. The only 
difference was that the former was allowed and the latter was not. 
But, said the British, neither voyage could be justifiably 
described as 'coasting•. 46 However, such attempts to use 
Reciprocity to produce economic concessions for Britain were, on 
the whole, speculative. The British always met with - and probably 
expected - refusals. But in return for Britain abandoning the 
pursuit of concessions over the coasting trade and colonial-built 
ships, the Americans accepted the Treaty without the right of 
sending their manufactured goods duty-free to British 
America. 
North 
As an attempt to please or placate as many voters as possible, 
the Treaty was a success; but part of this success was because it 
did not offend people who would not benefit from it. For most of 
the South, for instance, the Treaty was of minimal economic 
importance. Their trade with British North America was either 
small-scale or non-existent, and Reciprocity hardly heralded a new 
commercial dawn for the section. But to the South the Treaty was 
innocuous. Though it could not change Canada's image as a haven 
for fugitive slaves, it contained nothing which could threaten the 
South's economy. In fact, it made some concessions, like including 
rice, cotton-wool and tobacco on the duty-free list and leaving the 
Lower South's fisheries exclusively to the Americans. 
But throughout the negotiations, one problem continued to cast 
its shadow over the affair. On returning to British North America 
from Washington, Elgin told the Foreign Secretary: "In coming to 
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an understanding with the Government of the United States on the 
Provisions of this Treaty the main obstacle which presented itself 
47 
was the case of Newfoundland." To be more accurate, the 
difficulties concerned the rich fishing grounds which lay off the 
poverty~stricken island. For as long as the British had pursued 
Reciprocity, the Americans had wanted access to these fisheries 
included in any agreement. 48 This was still the case in the summer 
of 1854, as Elgin found to his annoyance early in his visit. For 
sound reasons, he - and the British Government - were keen to keep 
Newfoundland out of any agreement. Elgin found Marcy 
unsympathetic. "Mr Marcy ... expressed much unwillingness to adopt 
this course, feeling apprehensive, as he alleged, that it might 
lead to embarrassing discussions in the Senate." 49 Newfoundland, 
clearly, was seen by the Americans as vital to the success of 
Reciprocity. Moreover, the islanders themselves had pressurised 
Britain to include them in any free-trade dea1. 50 Yet the British 
believed that the inclusion of Newfoundland would threaten the 
success of any agreement. The problems were several - and all 
difficult to overcome. On a personal note, Elgin was handicapped 
because he- spent most of his time in washington without 
instructions regar.ding Britain's position on the Newfoundland 
fisheries. Indeed, he had to wait until the last two days of his 
short mission before Clarendon's despatch regarding the island 
. d 51 arnve . This may in part explain why Elgin devoted the first 
ten days of his visit to drumming up support in the most general 
and frivolous way - and the last three days to the more detailed 
work of negotiation. 
Once under way, the talks about Newfoundland had several 
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potential sticking points. The first involved Britain's relations 
with France. The French - Britain's allies in the struggle against 
the Tsar - had long ago secured by treaty exclusive fishing rights 
off certain areas of Newfoundland. Even Britain was barred from 
these areas, even though all acknowledged Newfoundland to be her 
colony. To add to the confusion, the rights of the French were the 
subject of a dispute between London and Paris, and for some time 
the two Old World governments had been negotiating to resolve their 
differences. Stirring matters up still further were old and 
apparently ignored treaties under which the United States enjoyed 
fishing rights in areas now claimed solely by the French. Clearly 
the British had nothing to gain by alerting the Americans to rights 
they had long since forgotten. 52 The claims of Newfoundland to be 
included in any agreement, then, posed countless headaches for 
Britain's diplomats. They were reluctant to·open these fisheries 
to the Americans, fearing this would jeopardise Britain's sensitive 
discussions with France. 53 And, keen to secure a speedy 
Reciprocity settlerrent, the Foreign Office naturally wished to 
avoid any peripheral subjects which could either hold up or kill 
off negotiations. 
The difficulties caused by Newfoundland, however, were not all 
of an international nature. Just as tricky were local issues. 
Poor and with a tiny population, Newfoundland raised a paltry 
£60,000 a year through revenue. Of this, £20,000 came from duty 
levied on imports which were under Reciprocity, to be on the duty-
free list. Clarendon agreed that it would be ruinous for the 
island to lose at a stroke one-third of its limited revenue. One 
possible solution - proposed by the islanders themselves - was to 
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allow Newfoundland, unlike the other colonies, to keep reduced 
duties on specified articles. In other words, Newfoundland wished 
to join in an international free-trade agreement while retaining 
-limited protectionism. Such a plan, conceded Clarendon, was 
fraught with dangers. The United States, he noted, was unlikely to 
agree to such preferential treatment and, once the other colonies 
learned what Newfoundland was seeking, they might start claiming 
similar favours. Having at last forced a semblance of unity onto 
the other Provinces, the last thing Britain wanted was for each 
colony to start pursuing its own selfish ends once again. But even 
if Elgin was able to secure a treaty including Newfoundland, 
Britain's problems with the island would not be over. As a result 
of the granting of r-esponsible goverrurent to Canada, Nova Scotia 
and New Brunswick, any treaty had to be ratified by the 
legislatures of all the colonies involved: Since the proposed 
convention was with British North America as a-whole, and not with 
individual colonies, the refusal of one Province to accept the 
terms offered would have destroyed the agreement for everyone else. 
Of all the Provinces, Newfoundland was thought the one most likely 
to reject the treaty. Partly this was because her requirements 
were so special that there was little hope that they would be met 
in full. Partly, it was because Newfoundland's unsuccessful bid to 
secure fully responsible government - in line with other Provinces 
- had made her politicians unpredictable ana resentful. But 
Clarendon was determined not to allow this sparsely populated 
island to hold up an agreement which was so important to the rest 
of British North America and to a Mother Country with more pressing 
business in Europe. "It is impossible," he wrote 
to make the settlement of the embarrassing 
question in regard to Colonial intercourse 
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which the British Government and that of the 
United States are equally desirous of 
effecting, dependent on the cont"ingency of the 
assent of the island Legislature which there is 
every reason to suppose it would be withheld.54 
This, then, was the thorny problem to which Elgin had to 
devote much of his time to solving with Marcy and the State 
Department. But with both countries wanting a solution to their 
difficulties, a compromise was possible. Hence, having stated in 
Article V of the treaty that it would come into effect as soon as 
the Congress and the Imperial and Provincial Parliaments had passed 
the necessary laws, Elgin and Marcy inserted an escape clause, 
Article VI: 
And it is hereby further agreed that the 
provisions and stipulations of the foregoing 
Articles shall extend to the island of 
Newfoundland, so far as they are applicable to 
that colony. But if the Imperial Parliament, 
the provincial Parliament of Newfoundland, or 
the Congress of the United States shall not 
embrace in their laws, enacted for carrying 
this treaty into effect, the colony of 
Newfoundland, then this Article shall be of no 
effect; but the omission to make provision by 
law to give it effect, by either of the 
legislative bodies aforesaid, shall not in any 
way impair the r-emaining Articles of this 
treaty. 
Understandably, Elgin returned to British North America in triumph. 
Yet, as he headed north, he knew the hard work was just beginning. 
Before the celebrations proper could start, the treaty had to be 
ratified - in Britain, in the United States, and in the provincial 
legislatures of British North America. With the Crimean War 
demanding North American calm, an easy passage was expected in the 
Imperial Parliament; but the reactions of Congress and the Colonies 
were impossible to predict. Consequently, Elgin still had to 
ensure ratification on his side of the Atlantic. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
RATIFICATION IN NORTH AMERICA 
From the day he left Washington to the final ratification of 
the Reciprocity Treaty in November 1854, Elgin was a bit like a 
dancer on a tightrope. If his efforts in Washington were not to 
have been in vain, he had to make sure that congress and the 
colonial parliaments ratified the Treaty. Action, then, was 
essential, but every move was fraught with danger. An accomplished 
political acrobat, he got round his problems by avoiding extreme 
movements and shuffling quietly to safety. But in doing so, he 
demonstrated his understanding of American and colonial politics 
and the lip service the British paid to colonial self-government. 
With regard to Congress, Elgin's hands-were tied. He- and 
all the British officials - could not interfere in the internal 
politics of the United States. Not only would that have been 
improper, but it could have aroused American suspicions by making 
the Treaty seem vital to Britain and her colonies. Hence, in a 
review of the negotiations, Elgin wrote: 
When Mr Marcy had signed the treaty I said to 
Mr Crampton that as the credit of the Gov. of 
the U.S. was now to a certain extent at least 
engaged in procuring its passage through 
Congress [nothing] as it appeared to me could 
be more injurious than that either he or I 
should seem to meddle in the matter. In 
pursuance of the opinion w. wh. he entirely 
concurred, I left Washington by the first train 
after the treaty had been signed.! 
Hence, when Elgin was besieged with complaints from Andrews that 
Crampton was doing nothing to help get the Treaty 




instead, following orders. But this policy of inaction required 
strong nerves. Though Elgin placed some reliance on the support of 
President Pierce and Secretary of State Marcy, their influence vias 
far from strong. The administration was, after all, no stronger 
after the Treaty was signed that it was during the British mission. 
Then the internal divisions of the Democrats had made it essential 
"} 
that Elgin, and not Marcy, should sing the praises of Reciprocity. J 
But without Elgin to prolong the mood of goodwill towards both 
Britain and the Treaty, resistance threatened to grow. According 
to American Special Agent Andrews, Reciprocity faced two related 
hurdles: "the Weakness of the Administration 'and an 
indisposition among even its professed friends to do anything to 
make it more popular and more respectable. '"4 Adding to 
Reciprocity's problems in Congress was the huge backlog of 
legislation caused by the Kansas-Nebraska debates. When Elgin left 
washington Congress had. only two months left to sit and, 
occasionally, it looked as though it might rise even before the 
first week of August. This left little time to get the Treaty 
through, particularly as the members of Congress were showing more 
interest in measures specifically related to the United States or 
their own constituencies. The chief rival for a place on the 
Congressional agenda was the River and Harbour Bill, but 
Reciprocity was fighting with countless other bits of legislation. 
In truth, the Treaty was caught up in "the last struggle for the 
Governmental bills, Appropriations &c &c and of Land bills, Steam 
bills, and of innumberable private bills, on which the fate of some 
5 Mr Smiths or Mr Browns election hangs." 
Sitting on the sidelines, Elgin could do little directly to 
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secure the American ratification of Reciprocity. Yet he could 
still pull a few strings to smooth its progress through Congress. 
Perhaps his most important decision was not to shun the shady 
advances of Andrews. By 1854, Andrews was well known to Elgin. 
The two had met during the Annexation Crisis in Canada, and since 
the summer of 1850 the American official had been writing to the 
Governor-General on various subjects, particularly Reciprocity. 6 
These letters appear to have been unsolicited, but this did not 
deter Andrews. By 1853, still serving as the United States' 
Special Agent in British North America, he began to work, at least 
unofficially, as a double agent. In June of that year, for 
instance, he told Elgin that James Buchanan, the newly appointed 
American Minister to Britain, would sail for London in July with 
"full instructions on the Central America subject which is to be 
7 
settled in England." Andrews thereby let ·Elgin and the British 
government know that r-1arcy was retaining control of the Fishery 
dispute and that he would not link Reciprocity and Central America 
in any negotiation. Andrews had, therefore, established his 
credentials as a valuable source and as an obvious American 
authority on British North America. Elgin, however, did not hold 
the venial Andrews in high esteem, and the two clashed on the eve 
of Elgin's mission when the Governor-General vetoed the 
inter-colonial conference on Reciprocity which the American was 
trying to organise. But, claimed Elgin one year later, Andrews 
decided to cooperate once he saw that Elgin's mission looked likely 
8 to succeed. Having invested several years in the pursuit of 
Reciprocity and, it transpired, large sums of money on bribery and 
promotional materials, Andrews stayed in washington after Elgin 
left and, at the request of Marcy, worked hard at persuading 
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members of Congress to support the measure. Despite Marcy's 
apparent defeatism9 Andrews lobbied editors and had articles 
favouring Reciprocity published in the capital and around the 
country. He met Senators to tell them of the Treaty's importance, 
wrote speeches for the·m favouring Reciprociti0 and saw his efforts 
rewarded when the treaty passed with minimal opposition in both 
houses on the last day of Congress. 
But throughout this Congressional battle Andrews sa\v himself 
as working for both the British and the Americans. As Elgin later 
admitted to Foreign Secretary Clarendon, Andrews "kept up a 
constant fire of letters & telegraphic messages" outlining the 
state of the Treaty in Congress. This placed Elgin in a difficult 
position. He suspected that Andrews was trying "to obtain from me 
something which he could construe into an authority to incur 
indefinite expenditure" to promote Reciprocity. Such a use of 
imperial funds Elgin could not and would not agree to and, 
accordingly, he did not reply to any of Andrews' coiTOllunications. 
However, Elgin knew silence to be dangerous. "It was impossible," 
he wrote, 
to throw over Mr Andrews altogether as his 
hostility might have been dangerous, and in 
acknowledgement of his voluminous 
correspondence one or two notes of 
encouragement were written to him by Mr Ross [a 
Canadian official]. 
Elgin also turned a blind eye to payments made by the Canadian 
authorities to Andrews for his services. Elgin knew that between 
1849 and 1854 the Canadian government had already donated £2,000 to 
a fund directed by Andrews to 'enlighten' the public mind about 
Reciprocity, and in 1854 the government paid him another £2,000. 
The Governor-General allowed this by directing all his 
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corrununications to Andrews through Canadian Ministers. They, Elgin 
explained to Clarendon, "could deal only with Provincial funds & 
... could not sanction any expenditure ... which they were not 
prepared to justify in the local Par[liamen)t." In this way Elgin 
was able to influence events in washington without spending any 
imperial money and without appearing to meddle in the domestic 
politics of the United States. For in Andrews he had a useful, 
though far from perfect, ally. Andrews was not only an American 
citizen, but an official of the American government. He was, 
moreover , an acknowledged authority on British North America and 
Reciprocity in a country which was woefully ignorant about both. 
These different qualities, coupled with years of working for 
different American administrations, had given him access to the top 
men in Washington. Venial he might have been, but in the short 
term he was also very valuable. Elgin, moreover, acknowledged this 
in the account he gave Clarendon of his relationship with Andrews. 
Superficially, this despatch was carefully worded, designed to 
protect Elgin from charges of improper behaviour. But this did not 
stop him recommending that Andrews be rewarded from imperial funds 
for his services. "As your vlashington Treaty" he wrote, 
which has relieved the north American fleet, 
and deprived Her Majesty's subjects in the 
British Provinces of their only pretext for 
desiring annexation to the United States on 
commercial grounds, has cost, special Mission 
and all included, ony about £400 perhaps you 
might afford to give a helping hand. 
As a sum, he suggested the difference between the cost of securing 
the Reciprocity Treaty and the 1842 \'lebster-Ashburton Treaty. 
Either way, he stressed: "I should be greatly rejoiced if Andrews 
11 
claims could be settled." 
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While Andrews was working on Congressional orinion, Elgin was 
also able to influence the passage of the Treaty in the United 
States by his actions in British North America. One of his first 
actions - in agreement with the Foreign Office - was to instruct 
the Fishery protection vessels to adopt a particularly gentle 
approach to their duties. He followed this up by effectively 
bringing the Treaty into effect before Britain, the United States 
or British North America had ratified it. 12 His goals were simple 
- and obvious. First, the treaty had been negotiated, at least 
from the American viewpoint, as a means of avoiding a 
war-threatening collision on the colonial fishing grounds. 
Britain, already in one rrejor war, shared this pacific sentiment. 
By putting the treaty into immediate effect, calm could return to 
the fisheries and the clouds of war could begin to disperse. This, 
in turn, would reduce the chances of a clash bn the fishing grounds 
which could only have destroyed the mood of Anglo-American goodwill 
Elgin had worked so hard to create. Second, the implementation of 
the treaty was likely to boost its chances of ratification by 
Congress and British North America by showing off its many 
commercial benefits. Just as imp::>rtant was Elgin's decision to 
control the response of the colonies to the Treaty. As recommended 
l3 by Andrews , he ensured that the Colonists did not make the 
Americans think they had been duped by going overboard with their 
public praise of Reciprocity. Hence, though he returned to the 
Provinces in triumph, he refused to publish the details of the 
Treaty until after it was ratified by . 14 the American Senate. In 
this way, he reduced the number of articles in the Canadian press 
praising the agreement and the chances of a colonial outburst 
against it which could have persuaded the Americans that 
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ratification was pointless. With a mass of bills before Congress, 
all competing for very limited time, it was essential that the 
Treaty's opponents had no excuse for shelving it. Having learned 
from his experiences during the Annexation Crisis, Elgin was 
determined that no colonist should provide Washington vJith such an 
excuse. 
If Elgin could operate only indirectly 1n the States as 
Congress prepared to ratify the treaty, he was able to exert more 
influence over the legislatures of British North America. He was, 
moreover, prepared to be ruthless. The crux of the problem was 
that for Reciprocity to come into effect, each province had to pass 
the necessary laws. Even before Elgin had left for Washington, 
Clarendon had decided that, if necessary, Britain would overcome 
this barrier by imposing a treaty on the Provinces. Thus, in his 
instructions to Elgin, Clarendon wrote:· 
It is clear that if the Provinces on the one 
hand and the United States on the other refuse 
to abate any portion of their pretensions, it 
is useless for her Majesty's Government to 
negotiate any further; but in such an extreme 
case, and more particularly if it originated in 
the pertinacious adherence of the provinces to 
their demands, Her Majesty's Government might, 
however reluctantly, be compelled "to look 
rather to Imperial than to Colonial interests 
alone, and as in the case of Newfoundland, ... 
be driven to consider whether it were right to 
sacrifice the former for the latter.l5 
Such action, though, was clearly undesirable. One goal of 
Reciprocity was to strengthen ties between Mother Country and 
colonies by removing the financial sources of discontent which in 
the past had led to annexationism. If this agreement could only be 
secured by imposing the treaty on a Province against its will, 
relations with that colony would be put in jeopardy. Moreover, 
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responsible government was still 1n its infancy and, as the 
Canadian Annexation Crisis had shown, the colonists had still not 
adjusted to all its implications. For Britain to ride roughshod 
over the new system would have been to risk its long-term survival 
for the sake of short-term imperial interests. Hence, Colonial 
Secretary Sir George Grey informed Elgin: 
it is scarcely necessary to say that to enforce 
that power would be contrary to the principles 
on which the Government and Legislature of this 
country have long acted towards the inhabitants 
of Her Majesty's Colonial Dominions. It will 
therefore be advisable to apply, in addition, 
to the several Colonial Legislatures, as has 
been assumed by Your Lordship in framing the 
Treaty.l6 
With Newfoundland's power of veto already removed, Elgin could 
make this application to most of the colonies with confidence. 
canada was, on the whole, overwhelmingly in favour, and gave Elgin 
an almost royal reception on his return from washington. According 
to Oliphant, "All the way from the Canadian frontier to Montreal 
arches were erected, addresses presented, and all the paraphernalia 
of a triumphal progress exhibited." EVen Montreal received Elgin 
well as he made his way to the state opening of Parliament in 
Quebec. 17 Prince Edward Island, too, welcomed the Treaty. This 
tiny Province had been a consistent advocate of Reciprocity and was 
willing to use the fisheries as bait for the Americans. Though it 
was an island, it had little direct involvement in the fishing 
industry. Instead, it had long played host to large fleets of 
American fishermen, making a living by supplying them with bait and 
services in return for American goods. 18 Thus, rather than wishing 
to deny the United States access to the colonial fisheries, it 
wanted to encourage them. It had even supported the Nova Scotian 
inspired exclusion of the Americans in 1852 as the most effective 
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f . . . 19 means o secur1ng Rec1proc1ty. Not surprisingly, therefore, 1n 
June 1854 Elgin was convinced that the island would support 
. . 20 Rec1proc1ty. 
But deeper into the Maritimes, support for the treaty became 
less reliable. New Brunswick, which shared the fish-rich Bay of 
Fundy with Nova Scotia, was less than committed to the measure. 
Wrote the new Lieutenant-Governor, J Henry T Manners Sutton, in 
October 1854: "Objections are of course raised to particular parts 
of it by different Interests, who think ·(however wrongly) that 
better terms might have been obtained, or should have been insisted 
on." Nevertheless, even here, resistance was lukewarm. 
The People generally, are, I am confident, 
strongly in favour of the Treaty as a whole, 
· ... Your Lordship may I am confident rely on my 
assurance that the Treaty is safe, as far as 
this Province is concerned.21 
The newly-arrived official was as good as his \oK>rd. Three weeks 
after Prince Edward Island and a month after Canada had taken the 
action needed to bring Reciprocity into effect, New Brunswick 
followed suit, taking legislative action on November 3. 22 
But nothing was clear-cut in Nova Scotia. There, opposition 
to the treaty ran deep and for several understandable reasons. Of 
all the colonies apart from Newfoundland, Nova Scotia was the most 
involved in the fisheries. And it was these fisheries which 
Reciprocity proposed to open to the Americans. Just as Prince 
Edward Island's non-involvement in the fisheries had made it 
willing to surrender this boon for Reciprocity, so too had Nova 
Scotia consistently been reluctant to share her fishing grounds 
with her republican neighbours. Indeed, Nova Scotia had led the 
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way in 1852 and in 1853 in securing the stricter enforcement of the 
Convention of 1818, and the colony had even supplied and manned 
ships of her own to patrol the fishing grounds. 23 By 1854 this 
jealous guardianship of her maritime rights had been bolstered by a 
variety of influences. Repeated American snubs to colonial 
overtures had reduced Nova Scotia's willingness to treat with the 
United States, while, at the same time, the return of prosperity 
had added to her confidence that she could live without North 
American free trade. 24 Fuelling this spirit of independent 
defiance was a tradition of anti-Americanism, dating from the 
settlement of Nova Scotia after the American Revolution by the 
. d . 1" 25 Un1te Emp1re Loya 1sts. This hostility to things republican 
could ebb and flow according to the state of the colony's economy; 
but in times of relative prosperity republicanism was rarely in 
vogue. 
Yet the United States was not the sole target of resentment. 
In Nova Scotia it was widely felt that the colony which had made 
least sacrifices but which stood to benefit most from the Treaty 
was Canada. Whereas the Maritimes were surrendering the source of 
their livelihood, argued·the dissenters, Canada was opening up the 
Saint Lawrence. Rather than cause economic hardship, this move was 
likely to bring profits to the Canadians: Such suspicions 
consequently swelled another chip on the Nova Scotian shoulder: 
jealousy of Canada. For those wishing to take offense, there were 
plenty of slights to choose from. To the chagrin of many 
Maritimers, British politicians tended to refer to the Provinces 
collectively as Canada rather than as British North America, giving 
the impression that they viewed Canada as the most important 
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colony. Similarly, the Governor-General of British North America 
was the Governor-General of Canada, the other colonies ~aking do 
with Lieutenant-Governors who answered to the Governor-General. 
He, moreover, had initiated and controlled the colonial role 1n 
British negotiations for reciprocity and, at first, had worked for 
an agreement between just the United States and Canada; the other 
colonies had been included only after throwing the diplomatic 
equivalent of a tantrum. If Elgin had hoped that everyone would 
appreciate his hard work in Washington, he was to be disappointed 
with Nova Scotia. There, even the manner of his triumph was cause 
for complaint. The Province noted that Elgin had been accompanied 
in New York and Washington by top-level representatives from New 
Brunswick and Canada, but there had been no Nova Scotian 
representatives in his party. It mattered not that their absence 
was almost certainly due to a misunderstanding on the part of the 
province's Lieutenant-Governor, Sir Gaspard Le Marchant; what 
mattered was that Nova Scotia had not been consulted. 26 To the 
dissidents in the Province, this went a long way to explaining why 
the fruits of Elgin's labour were so unappealing. They felt, quite 
bluntly, that he had failed in his duty to secure an advantageous 
agreement for them. For instance, in September 1852 Nova Scotia's 
Provincial Secretary had claimed that the proposal that Nova Scotia 
should admit the United States to her fisheries in return for 
access to the Florida fisheries was "equivalent to a Cornwallis 
Farmer allowing his neighbour to mow his march in return for the 
privilege of mowing a piece of pasture." 27 Yet Elgin's treaty did 
not even include free use of Florida's fishing grounds. To many it 
seemed that Elgin had allowed the Americans to steal the Nova 
Scotian pasture while keeping the gates to their own march firmly 
244 
barred. 
However, the friends of Reciprocity in Nova Scotia had reason 
for optimism. While acknowledging in July 1854 that the treaty 
would face "the most decided hostility" in some quarters, even Le 
Marchant predicted that: 
notwithstanding these obstacles in my way I 
feel sanguine that when the Time does come for 
a final settlement of this great Question, that 
I shall succeed in restoring unity of action to 
an extent that will defeat all the threatened 
opposition now attempted to be raised against 
it.28 
Of course, Le Marchant might have been whistling in the dark or 
telling Elgin what he believed the Governor-General wanted to hear. 
But Le Marchant knew that Reciprocity had enough to offer his 
Province's diverse economic interests to win support on its own 
merits. Even the fishermen had an incentive to back the terms 
agreed. Clearly, the prospect of fishing America's eastern 
seaboard held little appeal for men who had such rich pickings on 
their own doorstep; but these pickings had to be sold, and 
Reciprocity threw open the vast American market. In addition, as 
leading Nova Scotian politician Joseph Howe explained in June, the 
fisheries were just one seasonal industry among many trades 
thriving in Nova Scotia. 
In Nova Scotia we do not follow the fishing so 
exclusively as in Newfoundland nor lumbering as 
in New Brunswick. The bulk of our people are 
farmers. A large body living on the seacoast 
are fishermen, but not fishermen only. Having 
plenty of free timber when the fishery is 
unproductive, our men go into shipyards and 
build vessels for themselves or their friends, 
and manning them go into the carrying trade or 
coasting business.29 
This wide range of economic activities Howe did not mention them 
all - was Reciprocity's strength in Nova Scotia. Hence its chances 
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of success were enhanced by the inclusion on the duty-free list of 
·-
coal and iron. Nova Scotian coal, for example, was already used in 
large quantities in New England to produce gas for street lamps; by 
·removing all restrictions on trade, Reciprocity promised the coal 
. d b" f" 30 In ustry even Igger pro Its. Reciprocity also included lumber 
on the enumerated list, thereby favouring another important 
industry - and one which employed many fishermen outside the 
fishing season. Thus, the Halifax Morning Chronicle probably best 
summed up the Province's mixed feelings about Elgin's agreement 
when it wrote that Reciprocity was "a Treaty which, however 
objectionable the mode in which it was negotiated, confers solid, 
substantial and lasting benefits on the people of this country." 31 
As for anti-Americanism, though undoubtedly a factor in 
colonial politics, it should not be overstated. The fishing 
industry, in particular, had long fostered personal contacts 
between Americans and Nova Scotians. Annually the pursuit of fish 
brought huge fleets of American ships to Nova Scotian ports and, 
reflecting this, Nova Scotia had two US Consulates, more than any 
other colony. Though the actions of the American fishermen often 
angered Nova Scotians, their presence guarded against the colonists 
thinking of Americans as completely alien. Moreover, large numbers 
of colonists regularly worked with the New Englanders on board 
their fishing and coasting vessels. Indeed, American fishing boats 
had often violated colonial waters by running up the British flag 
f . . h . 32 on the strength o having Nova Scotians among t e1r crew. The 
Americans and the Nova Scotians, then, were not in two separate, 
rival camps. For good and for ill, their paths often overlapped. 
Consequently, though appe~ls to local patriotism were powerful, 
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especially in times of economic hardship, the prospect of peace and 
prosperity was always likely to be more potent. 
However, Elgin could not rely on these local considerations to 
ensure the success of a measure so important to the Empire. 
Therefore, he chose to use all legitimate means to get Reciprocity 
through the Nova Scotia Assembly. The most direct stage of his 
campaign was to inundate Le Marchant with letters designed to keep 
Reciprocity right at the top of his priorities. Between the June 
signing of the Treaty in Washington and its December acceptance by 
Nova Scotia, Elgin, Lord Clarendon, Colonial Secretary George Grey, 
Sir Edmund Head and Crampton kept up a barrage of letters. They 
told him of the ratification of the Treaty by the American 
Congress, the imperial Parliament and the provincial Parli~~ents of 
Canada and New . k 33 Brunsw1c . In case he did not grasp the 
importance of Nova Scotia's role in the Treaty's future, Elgin also 
sent him a letter expressing the hope that 
the Legislature of Nova Scotia will be disposed 
to meet the advances of the Government and 
Congress of the United States in a liberal 
spirit, by repealing such laws as may be an 
obstacle to the admission of the Fishermen of 
that country to the Fisheries, by providing for 
the admission, duty free, of such articles, the 
produce of the United States, as are included 
in Article III of the Treaty.34 
On a similar vein, Grey hinted at Nova Scotia's imperial duty to 
accept Reciprocity. "Her Majesty's Government sincerely trust," he 
wrote, 
that the common advantages which this Treaty 
will secure to Her Majesty's subjects in North 
America, will be fully appreciated by the 
inhabitants of Nova Scotia, and that its 
Legislature will readily acquiesce in passing 
any Bill which may be requisite for giving 
effect to its provision within the Province.35 
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And, to stress the urgency of the matter the Governor-General 
dropped Le Marchant a line suggesting that Nova Scotia's Assembly 
might be called early specifically to deal with Reciprocity. 36 As 
a spur to Le Marchant, who does not emerge as the most dynamic 
colonial official in British North America, this lobbying by mail 
was advisable; but the former Lieutenant-Governor of Newfoundland, 
having served the Empire in some of its more inhospitable outposts, 
needed no reminding of his imperial duty. Indeed, even before 
Elgin had reached Washington, Le Marchant was convinced of the 
"great necessity" of a settlement over the_Fisheries, and had been 
passing his conviction on to his colonial charges. 
impressed am I in this belief," he told Elgin, 
that I have been using my best endeavours with 
all Parties here, to induce them to relax in 
their views; and now that England is at War & 
embarrassed in Europe, to regard the subject 
more in an Imperial Light, rather than in its 
LOcal character -as subjects of Great Britain 
they have Duties to discharge to the Parent 
State, fully as deep as that which they owe to 
their own Province.37 
"So deeply 
Keeping the pressure on Le Marchant was one thing; encouraging 
Nova Scotia's politicians to favour Reciproci·ty was quite another. 
Britain did this partly by not waiting for the Colonies to ratify 
the Treaty before putting it into effect, at least as far as the 
United States were concerned. However, this step was taken less 
with colonial views in mind and more in the interests of 
transatlantic calm. One goal of Reciprocity for both the British 
and the Americans - who called it the Fishery and Reciprocity 
Treaty - was to preserve peace on the Fishing Grounds. Hence, once 
38 Congress had accepted the Treaty Britain wasted no time at all in 
allowing Reciprocity to act as peacemaker off the rocky shores of 
the Maritimes. Indeed, Clarendon took just twenty four hours to 
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respond to a request from Buchanan that the United States' 
ratification of the Treaty should secure-their free access to the 
colonial fisheries. Thus, on August 17, one week before Britain 
and the United States exchanged their ratifications, Clarendon told 
Buchanan that he was calling off the Royal Navy. He had, he wrote, 
"requested the Colonial Office and the Admiralty to send out 
instructions tomorrow that ... will secure to American fishermen at 
once the privileges of the Treaty." 39 But Britain went still 
further. On August 19 Elgin wrote to Marcy that- subject to the 
approval of the Imperial and Canadian Parliaments he was opening 
the St Lawrence to American vessels, as provided for by the 
40 Treaty. TWo months later, and three days after Canada had 
accepted the Treaty, Elgin again wrote to Marcy, this time to say 
that the Canadian Government had introduced a temporary bond system 
to cater for the possibility that the Treaty might not come into 
effect for another six months. This would allow the United States 
to trade freely with Canada, with refunds on duties once the Treaty 
went into operation. Thus, by October 1854, long before Nova 
Scotia voted, Reciprocity was already in action for the Americans. 
Significantly, the British and the other colonies were not 
alone in working on Nova Scotia. The ·United States, too, pursued 
pressure politics with the recalcitrant province, using both the 
stick and the carrot. The first person to feel the force of the 
stick was the unfortunate Le Marchant. In mid-September he 
cheekily asked Crampton to make 
active intervention with the Government of the 
United States in order to obtain for Her 
Majesty's subjects in Nova Scotia, the 
immediate enjoyment (irrespective of future 
legislation) of the privileges which are 
eventually to be secured to them by the 
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42 Reciprocity Treaty. 
Not surprisingly, the Americans declined to allow Nova Scotia the 
best of all possible worlds and adopted their favourite ploy when 
saying 'No' to foreigners: they hid behind their confusing 
republican constitution. Neither the President nor Congress, they 
argued, possessed any constitutional power which would enable them 
to dispense, even temporarily, any part of the provisions of a 
treaty which, once ratified, formed part of the law of the 43 land. 
But this diplomatic language was just a thin shield for a much 
blunter message. PUt simply, the Americans were telling Nova 
Scotia that she could enjoy the benefits of Reciprocity only when 
she had ratified it. 
It was left to American Treasury Secretary Guthrie, with a 
little help from Sir George Grey, to harraner this warning home. 
Just before the Nova Scotia Assembly debated Reciprocity, Grey 
forwarded to Le Marchant a letter from Guthrie stating that "The 
[American) tariff laws will ... be in force as though the Treaty 
had not been made, until the British Colonies shall legislate upon 
the subject, However, the Americans knew that they had to 
avoid offending provincial pride. After all, they suspected that 
their refusal to treat on Reciprocity in the past partly explained 
Nova Scotian obstinacy in 1854. Hence, the United States 
government opted to give the colonies an incentive to back the 
treaty. The carrot they chose to wave in front of Nova Scotia was 
intended for the treaty's strongest critics. On October 16, the 
United States brought a bond system into effect for all colonial 
fish caught and sold in the republic since the opening of the 
45 fisheries. Thus, without ratifying the treaty, Nova Scotian 
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fishermen could enjoy effective free trade with the United States. 
Yet the Americans had made sure that before the Nova Scotians could 
claim a refund on duties paid since about mid-September, the Treaty 
had to be in full operation. Thus, the colonists knew that to vote 
for the measure was to vote for a financial windfall; egually, a 
vote against could prove very expensive. They therefore had a 
pressing, personal incentive to abandon their resistance to 
Reciprocity. 
The effect of all this was to present Nova Scotia with a fait 
accompli. When the Province's Assembly met in November to debate 
and vote on Reciprocity, its members knew that everybody else was 
depending on them. The United States, Great Britain, Canada, New 
Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island had all shown how much they 
wanted Reciprocity by adopting the treaty; yet, by rejecting it for 
Nova Scotia, the Provincial Parliament would be rejecting it for 
all. Consequently, unlike the Provinces which had voted earlier, 
Nova Scotia could not easily consider Reciprocity in a purely local 
light. Adding to this pressure were Le Marchant's lectures about 
the need for a vote in the wider interests of the Empire. These 
talks accompanied claims from other sources that Reciprocity would 
b . 1 . bl . s . 46 . r1ng countess econom1c ess1ngs to Nova cot1a. Moreover, 1n 
the build-up to the Halifax debate, the effective operation of the 
Treaty had whetted the appetite of its supporters and weakened the 
resistance of others. They now knew that their failure to win the 
day would disappoint not just faceless Yankees and British North 
Americans but also damage their own economic interests. For those 
who in November still opposed the Treaty, despite the 
behind-the-scenes lobbying and public propaganda, the future looked 
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bleak. The British decision to open the fisheries to the Americans 
proved two things, neither of them palatable to the enemies of 
Reciprocity. First, having negotiated what she clearly thought was 
a fair and honourable Treaty, Britain was not going to continue 
risking war with her major trading partner on the insistence of one 
dissident colony guided by purely local interests. The Crimean 
War, which was demanding Imperial unity by draining Britain's 
military and naval resources, merely strengthened this British 
resolve. Second and, according to MacNutt, probably the most 
telling argument, the British had shown that they were no longer 
going to spend the time and money ne~ded to deter the Americans 
from the Fisheries. If Nova Scotia wanted to continue the policy 
of exclusion, she would have to do it on her own. The Royal Navy 
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would not be there to back her vessels up. In short, by November 
1854 Nova Scotia was completely, and deliberately, isolated. This 
left Nova Scotia with one choice only: to vote for the measure 
which for so long had been seen as British North America's 
cure-all, Reciprocity. That Britain had gone to such trouble to 
force Nova Scotia to toe the line reveals quite clearly the 
importance she attached to Reciprocity - and her readiness to ride 
roughshod over colonial self-government. Neither attitude is 
surprising, but both are basic to understanding relations between 
Mother Country and colonies in this period. Reciprocity fitted 
neatly into Britain's current commercial policy of free-trade, but 
it was also expected to yield countless economic and political 
benefits to the colonies and, indirectly, Great Britain. Though 
British North America had long ceased to clamour for the measure, 
Reciprocity was expected to bring greater prosperity by giving the 
colonies access to the American market. This prosperity would then 
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act as the strongest preventative medicine for political 
discontent. As long as British North America \vas economically 
buoyant - or able to enjoy the republic's prosperity the 
colonists were unlikely to seek a radical change in their political 
status. This would in turn reduce the chances of Britain losing 
her strategically valuable possessions to the ominously expanding 
United States. Having at long last secured this measure, then, 
Britain was naturally determined not to let petty local 
considerations destroy it. 
Yet here Britain faced a constitutional dilemma. By 
introducing responsible government, Britain had by definition 
switched considerable power from Whitehall to Toronto, Halifax and 
Fredericton. She had done this because the colonial pressure for 
it was intense and because the colonies were thought to have 
sufficient political maturity to handle the new responsibility. In 
addition, allowing greater political freedom within the Empire 
seemed one way of keeping British North America out of the arms of 
h . 48 t e Amencans. But Britain either deliberately or through 
neglect - had never specified the absolute limits of responsible 
49 government. Here lay the problem. Superficially Reciprocity was 
an imperial matter because foreign affairs and commercial policy 
remained in Whitehall's control. But Britain had opted for a 
Reciprocity Treaty instead of a simple commercial agreement in 
order to link the settlement of the Fishery Dispute with the 
benefits of reciprocal free trade. This was problematic because it 
meant that the ratification of the treaty hinged on the amendment 
of local legislation by the various colonies. The vague terms of 
responsible government, in other words, had given the colonies a 
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say in this complex and vital co~rcial agreement. The 
manipulative actions of Lord Elgin determined to win acceptance 
for the economically advantageous treaty at a tir~ when European 
war demanded calm in North America reveal that Britain was 
willing to operate within this nebulous system. But if necessary 
she would stretch the rules of responsible government to the limit 
in the pursuit of her own interests. The colonies may have won 
responsible government, but they remained members of the British 
Empire. And as such, Britain still pulled the strings - and she 
pulled them quite tightly if it suited her. 5° 
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CONCLUSION 
rovlER 1D THE EDWERLESS 
It may be dangerous to draw parallels between modern times and 
the past, but events as recent as 1982 prove the validity of this 
study's basic premise. The hi-tech battles of the South Atlantic 
were a world and rrore than a century a\-Jay from 
mid-nineteenth-century Canada, but they still exposed one of the 
perils of Empire. When General Galtieri ordered Argentinian forces 
to invade the Falkland Islands, he clearly showed how the 
possession of distant territory could complicate Britain's 
relations with other distant countries. True, between 1848 and 
1854 nothing as dramatic as war broke out over British North 
America, which perhaps explains why historians have neglected the 
colonies' significance in Anglo-~Terican relations. But the five 
Provinces nevertheless exerted considerable influence over the 
diplomatic affairs of both countries. Thus in 1852, as 1n 1982, 
Britain deployed her navy to protect overseas subjects from a 
powerful neighbour. On this occasion, comton sense prevailed; but 
the goodwill of Britain and the United States would not have been 
tested in this way had British North America not existed. The 
colonies, quite simply, raised the stakes 1n Anglo-American 
diplomacy and repeatedly acted as an irritant in an already tense 
relationship. 
This is not to claim that British North America dominated 
either nation's foreign policy; that would be absurd. To Britain, 
the United States and British North America were largely a 
distraction. The great games of mid-nineteenth-century diplomacy 
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were in Europe, where the threat, reality or consequences of 
revolution were dominating public life·~ Moreover, though the 
United States was gaining in strength, the simple facts of 
geography meant that European republics and monarchies seemed a 
greater threat to Britain. Hence Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer's 1849 
posting to vlashington was not a prorrotion but a punishment. He was 
sent across the Atlantic after meddling in the internal affairs of 
Spain, his last posting. In the United States he was able to 
continue his career as a diplomat, and Britain was able to defuse 
the embarrassment he had caused. But he was so reluctant to head 
for the diplomatic wilderness that, after his appointment in 
February 1849, he delayed his departure by nine months - and with 
impunity. Once in America, he took every opportunity to come home, 
despite the dangers of cruising the Atlantic. 1 But if Britain's 
diplomats put a low priority on the United ·States, they paid the 
republic attention for three main reasons - its commercial links 
with Britain, its growing power, and the threat it posed to British 
North America. These possessions, however, were just one sroup of 
countless colonies worldwide. They were, moreover, remote, 
expensive and not particularly profitable. To the frequently aired 
frustration of the colonists, they did not dominate the consciences 
of the British politicians who decided their destiny in 
vlestminster. 
v~ashington, though, had a different view of the world. 
British North American affairs were still a low priority, but to 
successive Artlerican governments, Britain was at the top of the 
diplomatic tree. Thus, until 1855, London was one of only eleven 
foreign postings to carry a salary. After that date, when the 
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salary scale for ministers changed, not only did washington's man 
in London earn the top diplomatic salary, but he earned more than 
members of the American cabinet. They received $8,000 a year; he 
received $9,000 a year and, in his first year overseas, a bonus of 
$9,000 to help cover the costs of crossing the Atlantic and 
settling in London. 2 The importance attached by the Americans to 
Britain is easy to understand. Historical and cultural links 
apart, Britain was the United States' closest partner and rival. 
Britain was not only America's main trading partner and greatest 
source of foreign capital, but she was, until 1846, the only major 
power with which the United States had ever been at war. 
Throughout this period the Royal Navy meant that, of all the 
countries in the world, Britain was still the one mostcapable of 
doing the United States damage in a third conflict. No wonder, 
then, that washington liked to keep a close eye on the British and 
staffed its London mission with men of calibre, like Louis McLane, 
Abbott Lawrence and James Buchanan. Yet British North America 
received much less attention. Remote, ice-bound, sparsely 
populated and split into powerless provinces, it was not the stuff 
of which dreams were made in Arkansas or Alabama. Thus, ignorance 
3 
about British North America prevailed - a situation which seems to 
have survived into modern times. 
This indifference, moreover, extended to foreign affairs 
generally. London may have been the top diplomatic posting for an 
American, but diplomacy was far from the top function of the 
American government. This was perhaps a product of North America's 
remoteness from Europe and of the exciting domestic issues which 
occupied the public mind. But it was also a result of the 
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republic's determination to break free of Old vJorld corruption and 
to avoid entangling alliances. The United States, so the sentiment 
ran, was best left alone, and the best way to be left alone was to 
stand aloof. This self-conscious insularity carried into the 
organisation of the Federal Government. In 1849, 64 clerks worked 
at the war Department, 125 at the Interior Department, and 332 at 
the Treasury. By contrast, the full complement of State Department 
personnel was ten. Indeed, one clerk handled all the business 
relating to Britain, France, Russia, the Netherlands and its near 
neighbour, China. 4 Despite the prestige attached to the post of 
Secretary of State, the nation did not give its holder the means to 
carry out the work. Foreign affairs and Anglo-American relations 
in particular could, from time to time, dominate American politics; 
but for most of the time the American public were preoccupi.ed with 
other issues - like the tariff, internal improvements and slavery. 
Predictably, the odd man out in all this was British North 
America. Like its American neighbour, it tended to be preoccupied 
with internal affairs. But, because it could not yet stand alone 
. . 
as an independent country or countries, it had an incentive to take 
a strong interest in world affairs. Inevitably, the two countries 
which had the greatest power over British North America for good or 
ill were Britain and the United States. For obvious reasons, 
though, the country which drew most attention was Britain. Partly, 
the magnet was cultural and emotional - the French Canadians of 
LOwer canada apart, most of the colonists were either immigrants 
from the British Isles or descended from British or Irish stock. 
But, given that many had left their homeland because of poverty or 
persecution, the dependence on Britain was prolonged by more than 
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just vague emotion. The Mother Country was also the provider of 
many of the colonies' essential services. Despite the move to free 
trade, Britain was the colonies' main trading partner, a 
relationship built up since Britain first acquired the colonies 
from the French. Politically, too, British North America remained 
heavily dependent on its Mother Country. Though the middle of the 
nineteenth century saw the introduction of responsible government, 
this experiment in loosening the financial ties with Britain was 
both novel and limited. After decades of close control from 
London, the colonists could not adjust instantly to their new 
freedom. Britain was still seen as the colonial ruler, a concept 
bolstered by the continued presence and importance in British North 
America of the Queen's representatives, the Governor General and 
the Lieutenant Governors. 
Moreover, responsible government was 
Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island were 
limited. First, 
excluded; second, in 
canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick Britain retained many crucial 
powers. Though successive British governments yearned to see the 
colonies take on a greater share of the costs of defending 
themselves, Britain was still the protector of British North 
America. British troops and British officers led the defence of 
the North American realm; and British ooney paid for it. Moreover, 
the foreign affairs of all the colonies remained in the hands of 
British officials. Representation of colonial interests in foreign 
courts was handled by British diplomats, acting under orders from 
the Foreign Secretary. This situation reflected the relative 
importance which Britain attached to all its colonies. The British 
retained the Empire partly because they did not know how or whether 
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to dismantle it and partly because they believed it brought them 
certain advantages. Anxious to protect their standing as a world 
power, they were naturally determined to prevent the possession of 
this empire becoming a liability. If each individual colony had 
been allowed to handle its own foreign affairs, without regard to 
the interests of Britain, this Empire would rapidly have become a 
crippling burden. The colonies would have hindered British 
diplomatic efforts generally and, when they fell victim to their 
own political inexperience and lack of supporting military power, 
they would have turned to Britain to bail them out. Britain, 
therefore, regarded the foreign affairs of the colonies, from 
Canada to Australia, as an imperial matter, and she coordinated 
them to suit herself. 
As a result, Britain suffered from a split personality in 
colonial eyes. Colonists saw the Mother Country as both their 
champion and a distant power which had to be persuaded to pursue 
their interests. Similarly, the United States loomed as both a 
threat and an opportunity. On the plus side, the republic 
represented a huge market on British North America's doorstep. 
This potential grew in importance with the swing to imperial free 
trade, especially as transcontinental ·trade was already expanding. 
The United States, moreover, represented a permanent reminder that 
there was a viable alternative to British North America's state of 
colonial dependency. With its strong traditions of territorial 
expansion and hostility to Britain, it also seemed a likely ally in 
any power struggle with Westminster. 5 But the colonists had to 
face one disturbing fact: for the most part, the United States was 
not really interested in them. To exploit the political and 
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commercial potential of the United States, British North America 
had to overcome deep-rooted American indi.fference. Adding to the 
colonists' frustration was that when Washington did take an 
interest, it was normally for all the wrong reasons. Quite sinply, 
the United States represented the only martial threat which the 
colonies faced. British North America - and Canada in particular -
was permanently at risk from popular invasions, either by gangs of 
drunken Americans or more organised groups, like the Hunters' 
Lodges of 1837 and 1848. But the colonists also knew that they 
were vulnerable because of their links with Great Britain. Thus, 
one of the arguments used in the 1849 Annexation Manifesto to 
justify seeking union with the republic was that: 
In place of war and the alarms of war with a 
neighbour there would be peace and amity 
between this country [canada] and the United 
States. Disagreements between the United 
States and her chief if not only rival among 
nations [Britain) would not make the soil of 
canada the sanguinary area for their disputes, 
as under our existing relations must 
necessarily be the case.6 
Nor was this mere sophistry. Elgin, too, fully understood Canada's 
unique position in Anglo-American relations. "Canada," he told 
Grey, "has a special ciaim for protection beyond any other Colony, 
because it is the fact of her connexion with Great Britain which 
exposes her to hostile aggression."7 
Small wonder, then, that British North America took an 
interest in the affairs of both Britain and the United States. It 
was this interest, moreover, which explains in part why she was 
able to have a role in Anglo-American relations. She saw Britain, 
the States and Anglo-American relations as important and sought to 
influence all three. In doing this, though, she was painfully 
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aware of her own impotence. She had no arllly or navy, no vast 
population and no economic muscle with. which she could bully 
Britain or the United States. Hence, Prime Minister Lord John 
Russell's smug declaration in August 1849: "Canada has no voice 1n 
imperial affairs."8 Before the year was over, he was to appreciate 
his folly in writing this to his beleaguered Colonial Secretary. 
British North America did have a voice in imperial and 
Anglo.-American- affairs, but only through indirect action. When 
under sufficient pressure, the colonies did not hesitate to take 
such an initiative. 
The official channels open to the colonists were clear and 
well-established. Elections at home gave the public a chance to 
air their views on imperial issues, but as single-issue elections 
were rare, their results could not be conclusive. A more direct 
course was to send a petition to the Queen's representative in the 
Provinces or to the Queen herself. And, if money was available, 
colonists could choose to exercise pressure by sending men to 
London to lobby government and parliament. But at no r::oint did the 
five colonies - or the factions within each colony ~ speak as one. 
Thus, in 1849 after the burning of Montreal's Parliament, Elgin 
sent Francis Hincks to LOndon to represent the Canadian government. 
But on arrival, Hincks found himself competing for attention with 
Sir Allan MacNab, who was implicated in the arson attack. 9 The 
Montreal outrage symbolised the other option available to the 
colonists when they were trying to influence their imperial 
masters: extreme, eye-catching actions. The burning of the 
canadian parliament, accompanied by a band playing 'God Save the 
Queen', was the product of many forces. Mob rule, frustration with 
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domestic politics and economics, and the political immaturity of a 
people still unaccustomed to responsible government - all played a 
role. But just as important was the frustration of certain 
factions with their inability to influence imperial policy towards 
Canada. In much the same way as the IRA today apparently believes 
one bomb attack in London is worth a hundred in Belfast, the 
disaffected colonists saw one violent outburst as worth a hundred 
.... 
formal petitions to the Queen. 10 such actions, however, sometimes 
had a more devious purpose. For many signers of the Annexation 
Manifesto, for instance, the goal was not union with the United 
States. Though the more radical signatories hoped to usher in a 
new era of republicanism, many of the men behind the manifesto had 
commercial backgrounds. To them a return to the imperial 
protectionism which pre-dated the recession would have been more 
acceptable then life in a slavocracy. They hoped to frighten 
Britain into a change of policy by threatening the one development 
which she could not accept for canada - its loss to the United 
States. 
American channels open to the colonists were less clear. 
Though most British North American subjects lived close to the 
American border, the United States was something of an enigma. Its 
republican system appeared alien, with its elections for a massive 
range of public posts and its complex constitution. But, as with 
Britain, the colonists tried to find ways of influencing the 
Americans. Essentially, they relied heavily on lobbying. Through 
their pressure on British officials on both sides of the Atlantic, 
they hoped to shape Britain's policy towards the United States. 
Second, and more directly, they headed south in person to the 
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financiers of New York and the politicians of Washington, DC, 1n 
bids to lobby the powerful. But often they tripped themselves up 
through either inexperience or the efforts in the United States of 
rival colonial factions. Thus, in 1849 the colonists must have 
caused confusion in Washington. Clayton and his staff were to 
learn that granting Reciprocity would either foster or kill off 
Annexation. As a result, the colonists found that it was one thing 
to try to influence washington and quite another .to succeed. But 
the men who travelled south, though influential in British North 
America, were in the minority. The majority stayed at home and, if 
they bothered at all with the views of the Americans, tried an 
early version of megaphone diplomacy. The Annexation Manifesto, 
for instance, could be seen as an appeal to Washington over the 
heads of Elgin and Grey. 
In diplomatic terms, then, British North .~erica's favourite 
ruse was to throw a tantrum. This may have proved its relative 
insignificance and impotence, but the very fact that Britain and 
the United States paid any attention at all shows that the two 
powers attached some importance to the Provinces. In fact, the 
British placed considerable value on British North America, despite 
occasional statements to the contrary. The Empire, they believed, 
made them a world power. As such, the loss of any part of it by 
force would have threatened not only that Empire but also Britain's 
global standing. This would have been more than a diplomatic or 
psychological blow: it could have had commercial repercussions. 
Moreover, though the British concentrated their diplomatic and 
military efforts on checking their traditional European rivals, 
they were also aware that the United States' republican experiment 
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was throwing up a new, possibly stronger rival for the future. 
Here, too, British North America was important. Its loss would 
have strengthened the United States and, in turn, weakened Great 
Britain. The separation of the Provinces from Britain would have 
left the United States completely secure in its North American 
fortress. Worse still, the American annexation of the Provinces 
would have boosted the republic's naval power through the 
acquisition of the Maritimes' shipbuilding industry. But the 
British did not want to retain the colonies purely to keep them out 
of American hands. British North America also had a significant 
strategic value to the Mother country. It allowed Britain to keep 
an eye and a physical check on the United States. These factors, 
and the level of British investment in British North America, made 
the Mother Country very sensitive about all threats to her North 
American territory. LOrd John Russell may-have been-willing to 
grant the colonies their independence if and when they sought it; 
but he and his successors desperately wanted to prevent them 
leaving the Empire for the United States. And under no 
circumstances could Britain tolerate the seizure of the colonies by 
force. Thus, in 1849 Russeli declared: "If the Americans make war 
. 11 for Canada, we must meet them with war." 
In the United States, attitudes to British North America were 
even less clear cut. In truth, the Provinces were veiled in 
mystery, largely because the Americans had never taken the trouble 
to get to know their neighbours. To those in the know - like 
Midwestern grain growers, New England lumbermen, Atlantic fishermen 
- the Provinces had a value in their own right. They possessed 
attractions like the St Lawrence and St John rivers, iron, coal, 
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timber and low-cost, good-quality ships. To those not 1n the know 
- in other words, the vast majority of Americans - British North 
America was not important in itself, but as an arm of the British 
Empire. Thus, the Provinces got most attention in Congress in 
times of Anglo-American tension. Here, though, American 
politicians displayed a convenient ambivalence. Invariably, they 
portrayed the colonies as either a threat or an asset to the United 
States. Usually, such comments reflected less the politician's 
knowledge of the colonies and more the course he wanted the 
government to take with regard to Great Britain. Thus, if he 
favoured a hard line, he would describe canada as on the verge of 
toppling corrupt and overstretched British rule. If he was 
pacific, he would point out that British North America was not only 
loyal but also allowed Britain to deploy troops and refuel her navy 
on the republic's doorstep. The first argument implied that the 
United States could fight and beat Britain easily; the second 
argument suggested that Britain could conduct such a war with 
vigour in North America. 
lead to ridicule. Quite 
Such stances, moreover, did not usually 
simply, either argument was valid. A 
mid-nineteenth-century Anglo-American war would certainly have seen 
Britain victorious at sea, courtesy in part to Halifax, Nova 
Scotia; on land, the United States would have been the narrow 
favourite, though a naval blockade sustained by Nova Scotian coal 
could have brought an eventual British triumph. 
As a result, Americans did tend to see British North America 
as a factor - though not always a major factor - in Anglo-American 
relations. This, and a popular belief in the republic's manifest 
destiny to occupy all of North America, meant that there was 
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considerable support in principle for the eventual acquisition of 
the Provinces. Adding to the appeal of this outcome was the 
prospect of at last expelling the British from the Americas. But 
subtle forces were working to restrain the more restive elements of 
the populace. The strongest was the knowledge that the annexation 
of one or all of the Provinces would almost certainly be fatal to 
the republic. Not only was British North America free soil, but it 
was renowned throughout the South as a. haven for runaway slaves. 
Its annexation was therefore sure to provoke intense opposition 
across the slave sta-tes, despite the faint prospect of recapturing 
fugitive slaves. A mere attempt to acquire British North America 
would have fostered deep suspicion that the North was trying to 
increase its constitutional and Congressional strength at the 
South's expense. Such a growth in tension could have had only one 
result: the secession of the South. South Carolina, for instance, 
had threatened secession over much less obvious dangers like 
tariff reform. In addition, the British made it clear that they 
ld . t t f . bl . 12 wou resist any at empts a orci e annexation. In short, 
American efforts to acquire Canada needed to be handled very 
carefully or else they might cause two wars - one with Britain and 
one between the States. For this reason, British North America 
appeared as a dangerous neighbour. It was Pandora's box of 
sectionalism which could only be opened at great risk, 
particularly when Britain was strong. 
For these reasons, the British and American governments paid 
British North America intermittent attention in these years. As a 
result, the nominally powerless Provinces assumed surprising 
importance in Anglo-American relations. BUt, of all the roles that 
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fell to them, the least obvious was to make Britain and the United 
States take more notice of one another. Transatlantic trade and a 
common language clearly fostered closer relations between the 
British and Americans than they enjoyed with other countries; but 
the existence of British North America made the rival governments 
take an even closer look at one another. The need to protect 
British North America focussed British attention on the United 
States because it was the Provinces' only enemy; and British 
officials stationed in the colonial cities could not help but 
observe developments to the south. Indeed, by the time Elgin paid 
his 1854 mission to Washington, he was already an acute commentator 
on the republic's politics. Similarly, Britain's possession of 
North American territory - and her consequent ability to threaten 
the States - forced the American government to take British power 
more seriously than might otherwise have been the case. 
Yet this closer contact did not necessarily breed a better 
understanding across the Atlantic. Instead, as is often the way 
with foreign travel today, it seems largely to have confirmed 
existing prejudices. Years of trying to second-guess American 
intentions towards British North America convinced Elgin and Grey 
more than ever before that the Republic was unprincipled and 
territorially rapacious. Thus, 
countless examples of public 
the Elgin-Grey correspondence has 
corruption in the States. 
after an 1850 meeting with America's Special Agent Andrews, 
Writing 
Elgin 
declared: "I have had a nice specimen of the model republic and 
underpaid officials in a certain Yankee consul ... " Andrews, said 
Elgin, had claimed to hold "very sound views" on Reciprocity "and 
that if he had the command of a considerable sum of money others 
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might be induced to take the same." 13 But more alarming was the 
expansionist culture of the United States, which Elgin described 
with disgust in 1853. The American political system, he wrote, 
secures to the citizens the privilege of 
molesting unoffending neighbours with absolute 
impunity, except when the said neighbours are 
sharp enough to catch them in the Act. Given 
an Executive at Washington which has an 
objective to gain by winking, and any amount of 
war may be carried on, on private account, by 
the inhabitants of that Country, without its 
being possible to fix the liability elsewhere . 
. . . . 14 
Within two months he had fresh evidence: President Franklin 
Pierce's expansionist inaugural address which vaguely declared that 
certain territories should be acquired for America's protection. 
"I wonder," mused Elgin, "what would be said in Europe if Mr 
President. or Emperor Napoleon made such an announcement." 15 
Similarly, Grey declared that the system of presidential elections 
prevented steady government because "it renders the measures of 
that Govmt. one perpetual canvass, & it tends to encourage the most 
pernicious system of flattering all the worst passions of· the 
people by .the leading Statesmen." 16 
In American eyes, the British did not come out of their links 
with British North America any better. The retention of the 
Provinces - and occasional examples of political disquiet there 
confirmed what many Americans wanted to believe: that their former 
colonial master was still a world-wide oppressor of peoples 
yearning to be free. Similarly, the Provinces reminded the 
Americans of Britain's global empire and world-power status- which 
fed a well-established national inferiority complex. Thus, as the 
two countries squared up over Oregon in 1846 President Polk told 
one correspondent: 
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the only way to treat John Bull was to look him 
straight in the eye; that I considered a bold 
and firm course on our part the Pacific one; 
that if Congress faltered or hesitated in 
their course John Bull would immediately become 
arrogant and more grasping in his demands .... 17 
Similar considerations played a role in forcing Webster's defiant 
address in 1852, when he replied to the new British fishery policy. 
Instead of fostering greater friendship, then, the colonies were 
quite capable of fuelling well-established suspicions and 
hostility. Yet there were plusses to the existence of British 
imperial territory north of the Republic. Contact between 
colonists and Americans convinced many of their great similarities; 
and, close observations of the antics of the Americans taught the 
British not to take every Anglophobic statement seriously. 
If the colonies encouraged greater mutual interest between the 
British and the Americans, their primary role in Anglo-American 
relations was to drag the two countries into a long-drawn-out 
series of negotiations. Britain retained control of the foreign 
affairs of all the Provinces and, in diplomatic terms, nearly all 
their problems were with the United States. As a result, British 
diplomats in Washington, their hands full representing Great 
Britain, found themselves having to handle countless British North 
American issues. Many of these tasks, though time-consuming, were 
trivial: the position of border posts between Canada and Vermont or 
routine American requests to use the St Lawrence. 18 But the 
pursuit of Reciprocity was not trivial, and it took up thousands of 
diplomatic man-hours on the part of British and American officials. 
It also sucked British North America into the very complex world of 
international relations. What in Montreal seemed a simple matter 
of securing a trade agreement was in reality a business of juggling 
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countless interests. In fact, each party - British, American and 
colonial - found itself trying to exploit the others. 
In this way, British North America was largely a hindrance to 
Great Britain. At the simplest level, the colonies frequently 
complicated matters for Crampton and Bulwer as they worked on their 
behalf in Washington. The outbursts of the colonists, whether in 
annexation manifestos or ominous political resolutions, usually 
served only to alert the Americans to the rifts existing within 
British North America and between Mother Country and colonies. 
Just as frustrating, whenever Crampton and Bulwer got to a delicate 
stage in their negotiations, Washington was invaded by colonists 
who rarely acted in unison. The British then had to sit and watch 
their efforts being undermined by the very North American subjects 
they were trying to protect. Inevitably, the American government 
saw such divisions as heaven-sent weapons to use against the 
British. The annexation crisis and the desperate demands from the 
colonies and Britain for Reciprocity persuaded the Americans that 
they could name their price for granting North American free 
trade. 19 BUt the activities of the colonists did not just weaken 
the British in their negotiations for Reciprocity. To the 
Americans, British embarrassment in canada always had much wider 
implications for Anglo-American relations. Just as Washington 
believed that London was more confident when France was quiet 20 , so 
too did Washington watch with glee when Montreal was in turmoil. A 
turbulent British North America guaranteed a cautious Great 
Britain. Hence, one of the reasons why Clayton backed away from 
Reciprocity in 1849 was that it was in his interests to prolong the 
Annexation agitation. Partly this was because he entertained vague 
275 
hopes of admitting British North America to the Republic at the 
same time as CUba; partly it was because he was at loggerheads with 
Britain over Central America. The prospects of American success in 
any negotiations could only be boosted if Britain was unsure of her 
position in the Americas. Distracted by the threat of a revolution 
in British North America, she would find it difficult to be bullish 
over Central America. 
The British, too, were quite willing to use British North 
America in the grand game of transatlantic pressure politics. 
Thus, the 1852 fishery announcement undoubtedly drew part of its 
inspiration from colonial appeals for protection against American 
marauders.. But the announcement had a more devious intent. At the 
time, Britain and the United States were squaring up once again 
over Central America, and the fishery dispute provided Britain with 
the perfect excuse for a display of power. It allowed her to warn 
her rival not only that the colonies were loyal once more but ·that 
Britain had a navy which could refuel within hours of New York. 
Significantly, the announcement did not introduce any changes to 
the existing policy.; it just restated that policy in a very public 
way. Moreover, the colonies had been calling for a show of Royal 
Naval strength for years; only in 1852 did Britain see fit to 
respond. Similarly, Elgin's spectacularly successful Washington 
mission in 1854 had more than just a love of Reciprocity as its 
motive. When he set sail for North America, Britain had already 
gone to war with Russia over the Crimea, and Britain wanted to 
avoid a weakening of her war effort through North American 
d . . 21 1stract1ons. Securing North American free trade, even though 
the colonies had long since stopped clamouring for it, was one way 
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of removing the economic seeds of future unrest. For once, this 
political expediency suited the Americans as well. Faced with 
rising sectional divisions, Washington also wanted peace in North 
America. A war with Britain over the Fisheries would have appeared 
to the South as a war for free soil and Northern interests, and 
there was no knowing what impact that could have had on the 
Republic. Moreover, European wars involving Britain had always led 
to hardship for the United States as the Royal Navy had exercised -
or invented - its right to search neutral ships. To the Americans, 
the appeal of settling the fishery and Reciprocity issue was clear. 
Apart from possible economic benefits, it might well keep both 
North America and Britain calm. Thus, throughout this period the 
colonies, Britain and the United States were acting out a coy 
diplomatic version of the eternal triangle. BUt in this case, none 
of the lovers could reasonably play the aggrieved party; they were 
all as guilty of scheming and infidelity as each other. 
If, in these strained circumstances, British North America was 
able to hold down several roles within Anglo-American relations, 
transatlantic diplomacy had an equally profound impact on British 
North America. Most notably, it helped push the Provinces into 
th . f' h . t d t' 1 't 22 e1r 1rst es1tant steps owar s na 1ona un1 y. Partly, these 
moves came in response to other pressures. Thus, a desire for 
better communications and trade between canada and the Maritimes 
led to a Nova Scotian delegation visiting Quebec in 1848 to press 
for free trade and the Halifax-Quebec Railway. 23 And in 1851, as 
prosperity killed off fancies of annexationism and provincialism, 
Elgin found himself attending the dinner of an inter-colonial 
conference on the Railway. 24 But behind the steady swing towards 
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eventual Confederation, the strongest force was the peculiar 
position of the colonies in Anglo-American relations. 
The Annexation Crisis, for instance, emphasised that attempts 
to join the colonies to the United States were unlikely to succeed. 
For all the agitation of the articulate annexationist minority, the 
movement never won widespread support. Despite the economic 
problems of all the Provinces and the comparative prosperity of the 
neighbouring Republic, Annexationism drowned in a sea of loyalty 
which swept across British North America. Leading annexationists 
were tarred as virtual traitors and their dismissal from public 
office caused little unrest. The most public manifestation of the 
movement, the Annexation Manifesto, was condemned as the product of 
politically and economically desperate men. Such attacks, 
moreover, gained strength as the economy began to pick up in late 
1849. But the basis of the failure of annexationism was that the 
vast majority of the population was either loyal or preferred to 
live in the British Empire than to opt for the uncertainty of union 
with a country whose morals and political· system they had long 
despised. Even the group which had least reason to feel loyalty 
towards Britain did not rally to the Annexationist cause. Papineau 
and his radical allies apart, French Canadians seemed to take the 
view that their community was more likely to survive in British 
North America than in the slave-owning, largely ·protestant republic 
to the south. Under the British system, the Catholic church was 
respected and men like LOuis Hippolyte La Fontaine could hold the 
highest office; such a situation was almost unthinkable in the 
States. Wrote one commentator 
canadians would be a doomed race." 
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in January 1849: "The French 
Small wonder then that in 1848 
Elgin advised Grey: 
Let them feel ... that their religion, their 
habits, their prepossessions, their prejudices 
if you will, are more considered here than in 
other portions of this vast continent which is 
being overrun by the most reckless, 
self-sufficient and dictatorial section of the 
Anglo Saxon race, and who will venture to say 
that the last hand which waves the British flag 
on American ground may not be that of a 
French-canadian?25 
But perhaps just as crucial a blow to future outbreaks of 
colonial annexationism was the reaction of the United States. At 
long last given the chance to realise its dream of acquiring 
canada, it chose to stand on the sidelines looking sheepish. 
Whatever Andrews did behind the scenes, the American government 
deliberately refused to give the movement the overt encouragement 
it needed to succeed. As a result, the torrid months of 1849 saw 
decades of declarations by vote-seeking American politicians vanish 
into hot air. Gradually, it became clear to the British North 
Americans that their political future did not lie with the United 
States. Instead, they would have to work out their political 
future within an imperial framework. And if they wanted to leave 
the Empire, they would have to do so either as individual Provinces 
or as a new nation. 
Adding strength to the moves towards intercolonial unity was 
the long-drawn out quest for Reciprocity. If the failure of the 
Annexation movement had shown the folly of trying to link up with 
the States, the Reciprocity negotiations showed the Provinces the 
wisdom of working together. It was, at times, a tough lesson to 
learn. The Canadians watched in anger after pressure from the 
other colonies for inclusion in any free-trade measure destroyed 
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the canada Reciprocity Bill before it could pass through Congress. 
Thereafter, the movement for Reciprocity ceased to be a matter for 
each colony to pursue individually with the United States. 
Instead, Bulwer had to negotiate a deal involving all of British 
North America - and Elgin was ordered to coordinate and control the 
. f h f. 1 . 26 act1ons o t e 1ve co on1es. Increasingly, he allowed the 
elected representatives of each colony to play an advisory role in 
the negotiations for a free trade measure involving all of British 
North America. This trend came to a head in 1854 when he called 
for delegates from all the colonies to help him in his mission to 
Washington. Only Nova Scotia let him down - but not out of any 
misguided provincialism. Its 
27 
misunderstood Elgin's request. 
Lieutenant Governor apparently 
Throughout this process it became clear·that the colonies were 
better off together than apart. Thus, though delays were legion, 
the American government took more interest in Reciprocity when it 
offered the Fisheries and free navigation of the St John instead of 
just canadian bargaining counters. But perhaps most significant 
was the response of the colonies to American maltreatment over the 
Reciprocity issue. Repeated snubs to delegations to the States 
trying to win Reciprocity certainly provoked parochial hostility; 
but it also reinforced the deep-rooted sense that the United States 
was not an ally but an untrustworthy, greedy neighbour. In short, 
American arrogance united the Provinces by giving them a common 
external foe. This feeling came to a head in 1851 and 1852 when 
the Provinces agreed without any prompting from London to provide 
vessels to guard the Fisheries against American violation. 28 Not 
only was this an astonishing step from colonies which had 
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previously refused to pay for their own defence; but it also 
underlined their growing sense of unity. First, it showed that the 
Provinces were both willing and able 
of a foreign threat. Second, they 
to work together in the face 
clearly understood that the 
United States saw them more as a group than as individuals. Among 
the Provinces providing ships were Canada and Prince Edward Island, 
who were hardly dependent on the fisheries. But by denying the 
Americans access to the fishing banks, they knew there was a 
greater chance of securing Reciprocity. This group effort, then, 
saw canada and Prince Edward Island preparing to use the properties 
of their sister colonies as bargaining weapons against the United 
States. 
Finally, the Reciprocity Treaty itself both underlined the 
increasing sense of intercolonial unity and gave it its biggest 
test. The Treaty applied to the whole of British North America but 
had to be ratified by each colonial parliament, apart from 
Newfoundiand's, to become law. The danger lay in Nova Scotia. 
But, despite a widespread belief among Nova Scotian fishermen that 
Elgin had sacrificed their Fisheries on the altar of Canadian 
commercial demands, the Province ratified Reciprocity. Partly it 
did so because the Treaty catered for other sectors of the Nova 
Scotian economy; but partly the vote reflects Nova Scotia's 
knowledge that the future of Reciprocity rested with her. All her 
sister colonies had given it their backing, and to vote against 
would have been to let them down. Thus, Nova Scotia's ratification 
of Reciprocity reveals that, at last, the concept of colonial unity 
,. was slowly coming of age. 
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In these nationalistic developments, though, there was 
considerable irony. Through moves to cre~te closer unity with the 
United States - either through annexation or Reciprocity the 
colonies found themselves being welded together in an 
independent confederation. But in this period 
increasingly 
confederation 
remained an embryonic dream. In reality, the colonies still tended 
to act separately: it was only under pressure that they were likely 
to come together, and even then the alliance could be uneasy. 
Partly because of this political immaturity, and partly because 
they had grander games to play, neither Britain nor the United 
States treated British North America as an equal. Instead, the two 
powers saw the colonies as both a liability and an asset; and their 
handling of Anglo-American relations reflects this ambivalence. 
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